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Abstract 
 
This thesis is about our moral responsibility towards climate change. More narrowly, it is 
about whether benefiting from the processes which cause climate change makes a moral 
difference to the costs one should bear in addressing its associated harms. Many 
proponents of the ‘beneficiary pays principle’ think that it does. This principle claims that 
being an innocent beneficiary of significant harms inflicted by others may be sufficient 
to ground special duties to address these harms, at least when it is impossible to extract 
compensation from those who perpetrated the harm. My main aim in this thesis is to give 
a novel theoretical defence of the beneficiary pays principle, and justify its application to 
climate change.  
Part I of this thesis motivates the beneficiary pays principle in the context of 
climate change. In Chapter 1, I survey recent empirical literature and argue that climate 
change raises an important moral problem: who should bear the costs of addressing its 
associated harms? I argue that the answer to this question involves weighing the duties 
allocated by various principles of responsibility: namely, the ability to pay principle, the 
contributor pays principle, and the beneficiary pays principle. I then discuss some support 
for the beneficiary pays principle that has been developed in the literature. Chapter 2 (co-
authored with Christian Barry) examines what we take to be the most challenging 
objections that have been presented to the beneficiary pays principle. We argue that none 
of these existing objections undermine it as a principle of moral and practical importance 
for allocating the costs of addressing human-induced climate change. 
Part II of this thesis gives a theoretical defence of the beneficiary pays principle. 
Chapters 3 examines four possible (and exhaustive) ways of formulating beneficiary pays 
and gives a prima facie argument in favour of a formulation that holds that the moral 
relevance of benefiting from wrongdoing reduces to some other factor, and that duties 
should only be allocated to beneficiaries in the presence of some other factor. This chapter 
then critically examines four existing proposals regarding when beneficiary pays is 
triggered to allocate duties, paving the way for my own positive account. In Chapter 4, I 
develop a rule-consequentialist rationale for beneficiary pays. I argue that benefiting-
related duties should be allocated in cases (I call these property-violation and 
motivational-cause cases) in which this practice, if the wide majority tried to internalise 
it, should be expected to result in good consequences. In Chapter 5, I argue that this same 
rationale for beneficiary pays is also able to justify allocating duties to beneficiaries who 
hold or express pro-attitudes towards wrongdoing.  
Part III applies my defence of beneficiary pays to the case of climate change. In 
Chapter 6, I argue that climate change should be assimilated to a property-violation, 
motivational-cause, and pro-attitude case. Since I argued in Part II that beneficiary pays 
is justified in these cases, I claim that the beneficiary pays principle is justified in playing 
an important role in allocating the costs of addressing climate change.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis is about our moral responsibility towards climate change. More narrowly, it is 
about whether benefiting from the processes which cause climate change makes a moral 
difference to the costs we should bear in addressing its associated harms. Many 
proponents of the ‘beneficiary pays principle’ think that it does. This principle, put 
generally, claims that being an innocent beneficiary of significant harms inflicted by 
others may be sufficient to ground special duties to address these harms, at least when it 
is impossible to extract compensation from those who perpetrated the harm. My main aim 
in this thesis is to give a theoretical defence of the beneficiary pays principle, and justify 
its application to climate change.  
 In the course of making this argument I will employ a central methodology shared 
by many proponents and critics alike of beneficiary pays in the literature. One fruitful 
way of understanding this methodology is in terms of what John Rawls called reflective 
equilibrium.1 According to the method of reflective equilibrium, we should aim, as best 
we can, to bring our moral intuitions, principles, and broader theoretical commitments 
into an acceptable coherence with each other—acceptable, that is, in the sense that mere 
consistency is not enough. Rather, intuitions, principles, and theory should offer 
explanatory support for each other. This will inevitably involve “working back and forth”, 
revising and/or abandoning our principles and theoretical commitments when they stand 
in tension with each other and our intuitions, as they often will.2  Furthermore, there may 
                                                 
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), pp. 44-46. 
2 For a good overview of reflective equilibrium, see Norman Daniels, "Reflective Equilibrium,"  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/.  
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be no way to retain all the intuitive judgments that we give with respect to the various 
cases we reflect on. The best overall account may require us to reject some of our 
intuitions as erroneous. Reflective equilibrium is achieved when no further revisions 
would bring a more acceptable coherence. This methodology is explicitly employed by 
other theorists who discuss the beneficiary pays principle. For example, Christian Barry 
and David Wiens write: “…we appeal to our readers’ considered moral judgments about 
simple cases as our starting point, aiming to achieve a reflective equilibrium between 
these judgments and the theoretical account we propose. We recognize that there are 
instances in which our account may conflict with some people’s considered judgments. 
When this is so, we try to show that there is nevertheless reason to accept our account as 
a stable equilibrium point”.3 Understood in this way, this thesis is an attempt to justify 
beneficiary pays by showing that endorsing this principle, rather than rejecting it, sits best 
in reflective equilibrium.  
The argument in this thesis is separated into three parts. Part I motivates the 
beneficiary pays principle in the context of climate change. In this chapter, I survey recent 
empirical literature on climate change and argue that climate change raises an important 
moral problem: who should bear the costs of addressing its associated harms? I argue that 
the answer to this question involves weighing pro-tanto duties allocated by various 
compelling principles of responsibility: namely, the ability to pay principle, the 
contributor pays principle, and the beneficiary pays principle. I then discuss some 
intuitive, theoretical, and other support for the beneficiary pays principle that has been 
developed in the literature. In Chapter 2 (which is a modified version of a paper co-
                                                 
3 Christian Barry and David Wiens, "Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," 
Journal of Moral Philosophy  (2014): p. 5. 
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authored with Christian Barry), we examine what we take to be the most challenging 
objections that have been presented against the beneficiary pays principle. While we do 
not attempt to develop a positive argument for the principle, we argue that none of the 
existing objections undermine it as a principle of moral and practical importance for 
allocating the costs of addressing human-induced climate change. A major innovation of 
this chapter is our account of how the concept of benefiting should be understood in order 
to trigger beneficiary pays. We argue that we should be pluralists regarding the concept 
of benefiting, endorsing a ‘non-comparative’ test as a sufficient condition to trigger 
beneficiary pays while at the same time accepting that particular ‘counterfactual’ tests 
may constitute other, independent, sufficient conditions.   
Part II of this thesis gives a novel theoretical defence of the beneficiary pays 
principle. Chapters 3 examines four possible (and exhaustive) ways of formulating 
beneficiary pays and argues that there is a prima facie case in favour of a formulation of 
this principle which holds that the moral relevance of benefiting from wrongdoing 
reduces to some other factor, and that duties should only be allocated to beneficiaries in 
the presence of some other factor. This chapter then examines – and rejects – four existing 
proposals regarding when beneficiary pays is triggered to allocate duties, paving the way 
for my own positive account. In Chapter 4, I defend beneficiary pays by arguing that a 
morality which incorporates the practice of allocating benefiting-related duties should, if 
the wide majority of people tried to internalise it, be expected to result in morally better 
consequences than a morality that does not. In particular, I give a rule-consequentialist 
argument that benefiting-related duties should be allocated in cases (I call these property-
violation and motivational-cause cases) in which this practice, if the wide majority of 
people tried to internalise it, should be expected to result in good consequences—and not 
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allocated in cases in which this practice would not. I also demonstrate that rule-
consequentialism can justify why beneficiaries in some cases should be allocated more 
stringent and demanding duties than in other cases. Chapter 5 examines whether, and 
how, beneficiaries’ attitudes might make a moral difference to the duties that they should 
be allocated. I argue that the same rule-consequentialist rationale for beneficiary pays that 
I have already developed in the previous chapter is, without modification, also able to 
justify why a beneficiary’s holding or expressing pro-attitudes towards wrongdoing is 
itself wrong, and why such beneficiaries in turn should be allocated duties to relinquish 
their benefits. Rule-consequentialism can also justify why some attitudes are more 
relevant than others, in the sense that they more greatly increase the stringency and 
demandingness of the duty that the beneficiary should be allocated.  
The upshot of Part II of the thesis, then, is that beneficiaries should be allocated 
duties to relinquish their benefits in property-violation, motivational-cause, and pro-
attitude cases. But what are these cases? Property-violation cases are those in which a 
beneficiary accrues benefits that they have no entitlement to, where a victim may or may 
not retain an entitlement to those benefits. Motivational-cause cases are those in which a 
perpetrator of wrongdoing intends to benefit the beneficiary by acting wrongly. Pro-
attitude cases are those in which a beneficiary of wrongdoing or injustice holds an attitude 
which characteristically increases the risk of wrongdoing, or expresses such an attitude 
by retaining the benefits. In these cases, I argue that beneficiaries should be allocated 
benefiting-related duties and this practice is justified since it should, if the wide majority 
of people tried to internalise it, be expected to result in good consequences. 
Finally, Part III of this thesis applies my defence of beneficiary pays to the case 
of climate change. In particular, in Chapter 5, I argue that climate change should be 
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assimilated to a property-violation, motivational-cause, and pro-attitude case. Put briefly, 
climate change is a property-violation case because affluent states (and their citizens, in 
per capita terms) have wrongfully appropriated a greater share of the atmosphere’s safe 
absorptive capacity than a fair distribution would allow. Climate change is a motivational-
cause case since decision-makers in democratic states are motivated to fail to enact 
morally defensible climate change policies in order to benefit their citizens, out of a 
concern for re-election. Lastly, climate change is a pro-attitude case because many 
citizens either hold or express attitudes that display indifference towards the harms of 
climate change from which their benefits derive (for example, citizens routinely fail to 
vote against parties that do not enact morally defensible climate change policies and vote 
for these parties instead). Since I argued in Part II that beneficiary pays can be justified 
in these cases, I claim that the beneficiary pays principle is justified in playing an 
important role in allocating the costs of addressing climate change. I conclude by giving 
an overview of my argument, observing where my account leaves room for further 
research, and note how my defence of the beneficiary pays principle can helpfully guide 
that research. 
  
1. Climate Change as a Moral Problem 
 
Climate change is one of the most pressing problems of our time. In their most recent 
Fifth Assessment Report, the authoritative Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) warns that “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, 
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many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia”.4 
Furthermore, they say: “It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant 
cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century”.5  
Humans influence the climate system by emitting greenhouse gases—for 
example, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O)—into the 
atmosphere. Once in the atmosphere, these gasses disperse and act like a blanket, 
preventing heat from reflecting off the Earth’s surface and back into space. The IPCC 
describes the contribution of these greenhouse gases to climate change in terms of their 
‘radiative forcing’. Put simply, “Positive RF leads to surface warming, negative RF leads 
to surface cooling”.6 Global warming is occurring because positive radiative forcing 
exceeds negative radiative forcing. According to the IPCC, carbon dioxide emissions are 
the chief culprit: “The largest contribution to total radiative forcing is caused by the 
increase in the atmospheric concentration of CO2 since 1750”.7  However, each of the 
three main greenhouse gases exerts positive radiative forcing, which, over time, has 
resulted in a warming climate. 
 
The atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) have all increased since 1750 due to 
human activity. In 2011 the concentrations of these greenhouse gases were 391 
                                                 
4 Original emphasis. IPCC, "Summary for Policymakers," in Climate Change 2013: The Physical 
Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group 1 to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, ed. T.F. Stocker, et al. (Cambridge, UK, 2013), p. 17. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p. 13. 
7 Ibid. 
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ppm, 1803 ppb, and 324 ppb, and exceeded the pre-industrial levels by about 40%, 
150%, and 20%, respectively”.8  
 
Carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide are now at levels of atmospheric 
concentration unprecedented in the last 800,000 years.9  
Climate change is expected to cause various significant impacts. According to the 
IPCC, it is virtually certain that “there will be more frequent hot and fewer cold 
temperature extremes over most land areas daily and seasonal timescales as global mean 
temperatures increase”, and that heat waves will very likely occur with a higher frequency 
and duration.10 There will very likely be, by the end of this century, more intense and 
more frequent extreme precipitation events over most mid-latitude land masses and wet 
tropical regions.11 The world’s oceans will continue to warm and will affect circulation.12 
And global mean sea level will continue to rise due to this warming combined with the 
loss of ice mass from glaciers and ice sheets, very likely at increased rates than already 
observed between 1971 and 2010.13 The oceans will increasingly acidify.14  
 Why are these impacts of climate change morally relevant? These impacts are 
morally relevant in large part because they are expected to cause severe harm. Indeed, 
they already are causing severe harm.15 Recently, a World Health Organisation (WHO) 
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 11. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., p. 20. 
11 Ibid., p. 23. 
12 Ibid., p. 24. 
13 Ibid., p. 25. 
14 Ibid., p. 26. 
15 Even though the current contribution of climate change to ill-health, globally, is relatively small 
compared with other causes. "Summary for Policymakers," in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, 
and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. C.B. Field, et al. (Cambridge, 
UK, 2014), p. 6. 
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quantitative assessment “concluded that the effects of the climate change that has 
occurred since the mid-1970s may have caused over 150,000 deaths in 2000”.16 The IPCC 
likewise writes with very high confidence that “Impacts from recent climate-related 
extremes, such as heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires, reveal significant 
vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystems and many human systems to current 
climate variability”, and that these impacts “include alteration of ecosystems, disruption 
of food production and water supply, damage to infrastructure and settlements, morbidity 
and mortality, and consequences for mental health and human well-being”.17 With high 
confidence, the IPCC lists various risks of climate change as: 
 
i) Risk of death, injury, ill-health, or disrupted livelihoods in low-lying coastal 
zones and small island developing states and other small islands, due to storm 
surges, coastal flooding, and sea level rise. 
ii) Risk of severe ill-health and disrupted livelihoods for large urban populations 
due to inland flooding in some regions. 
iii) Systemic risks due to extreme weather events leading to breakdown of 
infrastructure networks and critical services such as electricity, water supply, 
and health and emergency services. 
iv) Risk of mortality and morbidity during periods of extreme heat, particularly 
for vulnerable urban populations and those working outdoors in urban or rural 
areas. 
                                                 
16 World Health Organisation, "Climate Change and Human Health,"   
http://www.who.int/globalchange/news/fsclimandhealth/en/. 
17 IPCC, "Summary for Policymakers," pp. 6-8. 
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v) Risk of food insecurity and the breakdown of food systems linked to warming, 
drought, flooding, and precipitation variability and extremes, particularly for 
poorer populations in urban and rural settings.  
vi) Risk of loss of rural livelihoods and income due to insufficient access to 
drinking and irrigation water and reduced agricultural productivity, 
particularly for farmers and pastoralists with minimal capital in semi-arid 
regions. 
vii) Risk of loss of marine and coastal ecosystems, biodiversity, and the ecosystem 
goods, functions, and services they provide for coastal livelihoods, especially 
for fishing communities in the tropics and the Arctic. 
viii) Risk of loss of terrestrial and inland water ecosystems, biodiversity, and the 
ecosystem goods, functions, and services they provide for livelihoods.18  
  
Many have argued that, in light of these expected harms of climate change, we ought to 
pursue both mitigation and adaptation efforts.  As I will understand these terms, 
mitigation efforts are directed at preventing the impacts of climate change, chiefly by 
limiting the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere. Adaptation 
efforts are directed at alleviating the impacts of climate change, for example, by 
improving infrastructure to withstand extreme weather events, moving populations away 
from low-lying coastal zones, planting a higher proportion of drought resilient crops, 
cooling buildings in periods of extreme heat, and so on. In the following, I will refer to 
both mitigation and adaption efforts as efforts to address climate change. 
                                                 
18 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
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On the mitigation side of the problem, some have suggested that we should 
attempt to limit global warming to 2°C above 1861-1880 levels, in order to avoid 
unacceptably dangerous climate change.19  Unfortunately, this sets us a very hard task, 
since the IPCC states that staying within the 2°C limit with a probability of >66% will 
require stabilising total CO2 emissions up to about 1000 GtC. And since we had already 
emitted over half this amount by 2011, we are already far along the path towards greater 
global warming.20 More worryingly, there is good reason to think that we should accept 
even tougher emissions constraints than this.21  
Concerns with a 2°C limit were reflected in recent international climate 
negotiations held in Paris in December 2015. In these negotiations, member states 
adopted the Paris Agreement in which they agreed to “Holding the increase in the global 
average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that 
this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change”.22 While this is 
a genuinely aspirational target and a real mark of progress in climate policy negotiations, 
critics have argued that the Paris Agreement does almost nothing to ensure that global 
                                                 
19 For example, The Stern Review states that “The risks of the worst impacts of climate change can be 
substantially reduced if greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere can be stabilised between 450 and 550ppm 
CO2 equivalent (CO2e)”. And the figure 550ppm corresponds to “at least a 77% chance – and perhaps up 
to a 99% chance, depending on the climate model used – of a global average temperature rise exceeding 
2°C”. Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. vii and iii. 
20 IPCC, "Summary for Policymakers," p. 27. 
21 First, a 2°C limit is somewhat arbitrary since many of the harms of climate change are non-trivially 
risked well under 2°C of additional warming. Indeed, as I mentioned above, some harms are already 
occurring. Second, even if 2°C really is a justifiable threshold level of warming—i.e. the consequences of 
any greater amount of warming are unjustifiable—then why should we be content with only as good as a 
>66% probability of staying within this threshold? These would seem unattractive odds in other decision 
making contexts that involve severe harm. Third, these figures only take into account CO2 emissions, rather 
than all greenhouse gases. Ibid., p. 28.  
22 UNFCC, "Adoption of the Paris Agreement,"  
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf. 
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warming will peak below this level. Problematically, they object, the agreement merely 
calls for each state to volunteer the extent of their own emissions cuts and that the 
aggregate cuts that were actually volunteered by states would commit the world to around 
3°C of warming above pre-industrial levels. Furthermore, they note, these cuts are not 
legally binding. These critics have therefore suggested that a 1.5°C limit on global 
warming is unlikely, even within the context of the Paris Agreement.23 Throughout this 
thesis I will engage with a 2°C limit on warming as a more realistic (and until the Paris 
Agreement, a more discussed) option. Note, however, none of my substantive conclusions 
will depend on this target rather than any another plausible target. 
 Even if we do mitigate heavily, adaptation will still be necessary. The IPCC states 
that “Most aspects of climate change will persist for many centuries even if emissions of 
CO2 are stopped. This represents a substantial multi-century climate change commitment 
created by past, present and future emissions of CO2”.24 Absent drastic geoengineering 
techniques (for which there is only limited evidence available for their evaluation25), “A 
large fraction of anthropogenic climate change resulting from CO2 emission is 
irreversible on a multi-century to millennial time scale…”, since about 15% to 40% of 
emitted CO2 will remain in the atmosphere for longer than a millennium.
26 Therefore, 
even if we currently cease emitting greenhouse gases into the atmosphere entirely, we 
will still need to address many of the impacts that have already been locked in place. In 
                                                 
23 For example, see: Jedediah Purdy, "We Are the Climate Change Complacency We Seek," Foreign 
Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/14/we-are-the-climate-change-complacency-we-seek/; George 
Monbiot, "Grand Promises of Paris Climate Deal Undermined by Squalid Retrenchments," The Guardian, 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/georgemonbiot/2015/dec/12/paris-climate-deal-governments-
fossil-fuels. 
24 IPCC, "Summary for Policymakers," p. 27. 
25 Ibid., p. 29. 
26 Ibid., p. 28. 
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any case, it is fanciful that humans, globally, will immediately cease emitting, so greater 
adaptation efforts will be needed. 
 Mitigating and adapting to climate change will be costly. The costs increase the 
lower the level we set for the stabilisation of emissions in the atmosphere, and the more 
substantial our efforts to address the impacts. But not mitigating or making efforts to 
adapt is also costly, since many must then bear the expected harms of climate change. For 
example, according to a report by the World Bank, “Adapting to a climate that is about 
2°C warmer will be costly, but […] the impacts of climate change without adaptation will 
be much more costly” and they find “the costs of adapting to climate change at an average 
of $70 billion to $100 billion a year at 2005 prices between 2010 and 2050”.27 
Independent analysis in The Stern Review found that “the annual costs of achieving 
stabilisation between 500 and 550ppm CO2e are around 1% of global GDP, if we start to 
take strong action now”.28  
There are different ways in which we might respond to these costs. One important 
consideration is which policies we should favour in terms of mitigation and adaptation. 
There is controversy, for example, about whether we should favour a carbon tax, 
emissions trading scheme, or some alternative policy,29 and also about what the precise 
balance of investing in mitigation as opposed to adaption should be. Some theorists are 
even sceptical that we should prioritise addressing climate change over other valuable 
                                                 
27 World Bank, "Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change: Synthesis Report," (Washington DC, 
2010), p. 89. 
28 Which (at the time of the report’s publication was thought) would give us only a chance between 1% 
and 23% of avoiding global warming above 2°C – again, hardly reassuring odds. Stern, The Economics of 
Climate Change: The Stern Review, p. vii and iii. 
29 For a recent ethical objection to emissions trading schemes, see Michael J. Sandel, "It's Immoral to 
Buy the Right to Pollute," The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/15/opinion/it-s-
immoral-to-buy-the-right-to-pollute.html. For a defence of emissions trading schemes against recent 
criticism, see Simon Caney and Cameron Hepburn, "Carbon Trading: Unethical, Unjust and Ineffective?," 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69 (2011). 
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pursuits. For example, some claim that resources spent on abating emissions would be 
better invested in combating global poverty.30 Nevertheless, contrary to these theorists, 
there seems to be a relatively wide consensus (as the Paris Agreement attests) that at least 
some costs of addressing climate change – whatever policies this will practically involve 
– should be taken on. This thesis proceeds on the assumption that addressing climate 
change to some extent is a priority compared to alternative uses to which we might invest 
our resources. Of course, this is not to say we should entirely neglect other valuable 
pursuits, even at the cost of some progress on addressing climate change.  
  
2. Principles of Responsibility and the Allocation of Pro-Tanto Duties 
 
The assumption that someone should bear costs associated with addressing climate 
change raises the moral question that this thesis is about: Who should bear them?  In other 
words, how should the costs of addressing climate change be allocated? To answer this 
question we must look to principles of responsibility that allocate the costs between 
different agents. 
Principles of responsibility identify conditions under which agents have duties to 
perform particular actions.31 I will sometimes call these conditions ‘morally relevant 
factors’, or ‘factors’ for short.32 For example, that I could prevent someone from dying at 
                                                 
30 For example, see: Bjørn Lomborg, "The Truth About the Environment," The Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/node/718860. 
31 This section was greatly influenced by Christian Barry, "Dissertation: Contribution Based Reasons to 
Address Acute Deprivation," p. 5. 
32 This terminology is borrowed from Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics, ed. Norman Daniels and Keith 
Lehrer, Dimensions of Philosophy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998). 
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little cost to myself is a factor that plausibly gives me a duty to assist that person.33  Call 
each of the duties assigned by principles of responsibility to agents to perform particular 
actions pro-tanto. Each of us will have many pro-tanto duties to perform some action or 
another, and many of these pro-tanto duties will stand in tension with each other. For 
example, plausibly, if I am driving my car along a busy road I have a pro-tanto duty to 
obey the law and drive at the speed-limit. But suppose that I need to transport my 
passenger as quickly as possible to hospital or else they will die. In this case, it is plausible 
that I have a pro-tanto duty to assist my passenger by getting them to hospital as quickly 
as I can, even though this will require of me that I not drive at the speed-limit. These two 
pro-tanto duties must be weighed against each other (and any additional duties that I have) 
and what emerges from this weighing is what I have an all-things-considered duty to do. 
All-things-considered, I clearly should get my passenger to the hospital before they die, 
so I should not drive at the speed-limit. I will say that an agent who has an all-things-
considered duty to perform some action has a responsibility to do so. An agent who 
performs that action discharges their responsibility. With respect to that duty, they have 
done what is morally required of them. One particular kind of responsibility that I will 
discuss throughout this thesis is remedial responsibility34—namely, responsibility for 
bearing costs to remedy a bad state of affairs (often where some persons are very badly 
off). My discussion of responsibility can be represented in the following way: 
 
                                                 
33 So weakly put, this claim is relatively uncontroversial. A more demanding argument in this spirit is 
famously developed by Peter Singer in Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality," Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972). 
34 This term is borrowed from David Miller, "Distributing Responsibilities," The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 9, no. 4 (2001): p. 454. 
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Figure 1. Allocating Duties to Address Climate Change: 
 
Often agents who are picked out by principles of responsibility to perform some action 
will be able to discharge their responsibility by themselves, for example, by voluntarily 
taking on its associated costs. If I am responsible for giving a particular amount of money 
to charity, then I can voluntarily take on these costs by logging onto internet banking and 
transferring the charity some of my money. By doing so, I discharge my responsibility. 
In other cases, however, agents will not be in a position to themselves discharge their 
responsibility because it is out of their control whether or not they are able to take on 
particular costs. For example, suppose that each well-off adult citizen of Australia has a 
responsibility to bear some costs associated with providing school education to Australian 
children. Typically, each of the adults picked out by the relevant principle will not be able 
to discharge this responsibility by themselves. Rather, the more common way that such 
responsibilities will be discharged is by paying a corresponding amount of tax to the 
government, who then implements the school education programs.  
To some extent, the issue of allocating the costs of addressing climate change is 
like the issue of allocating the costs of school education programs. Of course, there are 
some actions that an individual can take to limit their emissions: they could ride a bike to 
Principles of 
Responsibility 
Identify 
Morally 
Relevant 
Factors 
Allocate 
Pro-Tanto 
Duties, which 
when weighed: 
Allocate Responsibility 
  
17 
 
 
work, rather than driving, for example.35 But, largely, mitigating and adapting to climate 
change are things that states must do if the world is to address climate change to an 
appropriate degree (i.e. 2°C or lower). For example, states must set emissions reductions 
policies (perhaps in the form of a carbon tax or emissions trading scheme). And by doing 
so, they will impose costs on their citizens. On the understanding of responsibility that I 
am working with, a main justification of states imposing these costs on their citizens is 
that their citizens are individually responsible for bearing these costs, even if they cannot 
themselves discharge this responsibility. In other words, that a state imposes costs of 
addressing climate change on its citizens is (in part) justified because such citizens have 
an all-things-considered duty to bear these costs.   
 To summarise: to answer the question ‘how should the costs of addressing climate 
change be allocated?’ we must look to principles of responsibility that allocate agents 
pro-tanto duties for bearing costs, and we must weigh these duties against each other. An 
agent will have responsibility to bear some costs of climate change if, after weighing their 
pro-tanto duties against each other, they have an all-things-considered duty to take on 
those costs. And if the appropriate method of discharging their responsibility is to 
contribute tax to their government, or bear other costs imposed by their government (i.e. 
in the form of an emissions trading scheme), then that is one good justification for the 
government to impose these costs on them.  
                                                 
35 Some arguments along these lines include: Dale Jamieson, "When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue 
Theorists," Utilitas 19, no. 2 (2007): pp. 73-96; John Broome, Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012); James Garvey, "Climate Change and Causal Inefficacy: 
Why Go Green When It Makes No Difference?," Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69 (2011); 
Anders Schinkel, "Causal and Moral Responsibility of Individuals for (the Harmful Consequences of) 
Climate Change," Ethics, Policy and Environment 14, no. 1 (2011). For a sceptical argument, see: Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong, "It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations," in Climate 
Ethics: Essential Readings, ed. Stephen M Gardiner, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
  
18 
 
 
Three principles of responsibility have been the chief focus of debates about 
allocating the costs of climate change. These are the ‘ability to pay principle’, the 
‘contributor pays principle’, and the ‘beneficiary pays principle’. I argue that each of these 
principles are morally compelling and, therefore, determining how the costs of addressing 
climate change should be allocated involves weighing the duties allocated by these 
principles against each other. Put simply, each principle plays an important role, but none 
on its own provides a plausible account of how to allocate the costs of addressing climate 
change. 
 
3. The Ability to Pay Principle 
 
The ability to pay principle states that agents should bear proportionally greater costs of 
addressing climate change according to their ability to do so. Here is how Simon Caney 
has put it: 
 
Stated formally, this approach states that the duty to address some problem (in 
this case, bearing the burdens of climate change) should be borne by the wealthy, 
and, moreover, that the duty should increase in line with an agent’s wealth.36 
 
                                                 
36 Simon Caney, "Climate Change and the Duties of the Advantaged," Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2010): p. 213. However, sometimes the principle is put slightly 
differently. Henry Shue, for example, puts it: “Among a number of parties, all of whom are bound to 
contribute to some common endeavour, the parties who have the most resources normally should contribute 
the most to the endeavour.” Henry Shue, "Global Environment and International Inequality," International 
Affairs 75, no. 3 (1999): p. 537. 
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This is an entirely forward looking principle. It does not find relevant that some agents 
may be differentially related to the problem of climate change, in that some may have 
contributed to or benefited more from past and present emissions. The only morally 
relevant factor that this principle identifies as giving agents a duty to take on costs is their 
capacity to do so. Accordingly, this principle allocates agents capacity-related duties to 
prevent or alleviate harm.  
The ability to pay principle clearly has broader implications than climate change. 
Peter Singer, for example, has long been a prominent defender of a demanding duty for 
affluent individuals to aid needy others, in virtue of their capacity to do so.37 Many other 
theorists endorse capacity-related duties to aid needy others, though disagree with Singer 
that they are nearly so demanding.38 On the understanding I will adopt in this thesis, a 
duty’s demandingness is proportional to the costs that the duty may justifiably impose on 
the duty-bearer. The greater the costs a duty may impose on its bearer, the more 
demanding the duty. For example, it is typically thought that duties not to harm are very 
demanding whereas duties to be polite are not. That is, I should avoid harming others 
even at large cost to myself, whereas I am not required to incur nearly so large costs in 
order to avoid being impolite to others. A duty is stringent to the extent that the duty-
bearer cannot appeal to other competing values in order to justify failing to act as that 
duty commands.39 The more easily that other values can justify such a failure, the less 
stringent the duty. For example, a duty to be polite is not typically thought to be very 
stringent, whereas a duty not to harm is. Arguably, I can appeal to the harm I would cause 
                                                 
37 Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality." 
38 For a good discussion of Singer’s argument, see Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland, "How Much 
for the Child?," Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16, no. 1 (2013). 
39 I follow the understanding of demandingness and stringency as discussed in Barry and Wiens, 
"Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," pp. 21-22. 
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by being polite in some particular case to justify violating a duty to be polite, but not the 
other way round. I will also understand the ground of a duty as whatever factor – or 
combination of factors – justifies the allocation of that duty. For example, as Singer 
argues, the capacity to aid needy others is often thought to be a factor that grounds a duty 
to do so. 
The first motivation for the ability to pay principle is non-comparative between 
potential duty-bearers: it is simply intuitively compelling that being in a position to 
address something bad at little cost to oneself grounds a pro-tanto duty to do so. For 
example, according to Singer’s famous argument, if you could prevent a child from 
drowning in a shallow pond at only the small cost of getting your clothes muddy, 
intuitively you ought to do so.40 And this only depends on the fact that you have the 
capacity to do so and that it is not unreasonable that you bear those costs. 
A second motivation for the ability to pay principle is comparative between 
potential duty-bearers: we should assign greater costs to some agents insofar as they are 
better off than others. The idea here is that payment of costs becomes more burdensome 
the less able one is to bear them, and less burdensome the more able one is to bear them. 
Therefore, all else equal, it would be wrong not to impose greater costs (that some must 
bear) on those who can better bear them. This is the same motivation that supports 
progressive schemes of taxation. As Henry Shue puts it, “progressive rates … take 
account of whether contributors [to paying costs] can in fact afford their respective 
contributions”.41  
                                                 
40 Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality." 
41 Shue, "Global Environment and International Inequality," p. 538. 
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 What are the practical implications of the ability to pay principle with respect to 
climate change? We live a world characterised by vast inequalities in wealth and life 
prospects. A recent report by the aid-organisation Oxfam made headlines around the 
world42 when it found that “Almost half of the world’s wealth is now owned by just one 
percent of the population” and that “The bottom half of the world’s population owns the 
same as the richest 85 people in the world”.43 According to a World Bank working paper 
by Branko Milanovic, if we divided the income of the world into two halves, “the richest 
8% will take one-half and the other 92% of the population will take another half. So, it is 
a 92-8 world”.44 Likewise, a recent Credit Suisse report finds that “Taken together, the 
bottom half of the global population owns less than 1% of total wealth. In sharp contrast, 
the richest decile hold 87% of the world’s wealth, and the top percentile alone account 
for 48.2% of global assets”.45 Different analyses report contrasting figures about the 
extent of global inequality partly because they take into account different data sets and 
use different methodologies. But all plausible analyses agree that there is vast inequality 
between individuals globally. 
 Inequality is a relative measure that compares how well off different people are. 
But our world is not just characterised by some being much better off than others. Rather, 
                                                 
42 For a few examples, see: Graeme Wearden, "Oxfam: 85 Richest People as Wealthy as Poorest Half 
of the World," The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jan/20/oxfam-85-richest-people-
half-of-the-world; Laura Shin, "The 85 Richest People in the World Have as Much Wealth as the 3.5 Billion 
Poorest," Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2014/01/23/the-85-richest-people-in-the-world-
have-as-much-wealth-as-the-3-5-billion-poorest/; Patricia Cohen, "Oxfam Study Finds Richest 1% Is 
Likely to Control Half of Global Wealth by 2016," The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/business/richest-1-percent-likely-to-control-half-of-global-wealth-
by-2016-study-finds.html. 
43 See Ricardo Fuentes-Nieva and Nick Galasso, "Working for the Few: Political Capture and Economic 
Inequality," (Oxfam International, 2014). 
44 Branko Milanovic, "Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: In History and Now," (The World 
Bank Development Research Group. Poverty and Inequality Team, 2012), p. 8. 
45 Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report, p. 11. 
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it is characterised by many being badly off in absolute terms. According to the United 
Nations, 1.2 billion people live on less than $1.25 per day,46 around 795 million people 
are undernourished,47 748 million people do not have access to an improved drinking 
water source (of which 173 million people rely on untreated surface water),48 2.5 billion 
people do not use an improved sanitation facility,49 about 1.5 billion people lack access 
to electricity,50 and 781 million adults are illiterate.51 Around 6.3 million children die 
before they reach five years old.52 This is a situation of dire poverty, and many of these 
people simply cannot afford to bear further costs associated with climate change. 
In the case of climate change, the upshot of the ability to pay principle is clear. 
Citizens of developed states are generally much better off in relative and absolute terms 
than the citizens of developing states and, therefore, generally have a far greater capacity 
to bear the costs of addressing climate change. In virtue of their greater capacity, they 
should be allocated proportionally greater costs of addressing climate change. Notice that 
this argument makes an assumption about what the relevant units are to which principles 
of responsibility apply: in particular, I referred to the ‘citizens of developed states’, in 
general, as having capacity-related duties to address the costs of climate change. 
However, it is important to note that there are other units to which these principles might 
also apply, for example: states, corporations, and international institutions such as the 
                                                 
46 UNDP, "Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulenrabilities 
and Building Resilience," (New York, 2014), p. 19. 
47 IFAD, WFP, and FAO, "The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015. Meeting the 2015 
International Hunger Targets: Taking Stock of Uneven Progress," (Rome, 2015), p. 8. 
48 UNICEF and WHO, "Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation 2014 Update," (2014), p. vi. 
49 Ibid., p. iv. 
50 UNDP, "The Energy Access Situation in Developing Countries: A Review Focusing on the Least 
Developed Countries and Sub-Saharan Africa," (New York, 2009), p. 1. 
51 UNESCO, "Education for All 2000-2015: Achievements and Challenges," (Paris2015), p. xii. 
52 UNICEF, "The State of the World's Children 2015. Reimagine the Future: Innovation for Every 
Child," (New York, 2014), p. 35. 
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World Trade Organisation.53 I only commit to the claim that these principles do apply to 
individuals, and not to the claim that they do not apply to other potential duty-bearing 
units (or that they do apply to them).  
 
4. The Contributor Pays Principle 
 
The contributor pays principle (often called the ‘polluter pays principle’, in the context 
of climate change) states that agents should bear costs of addressing climate change 
proportional to their contribution to the problem. According to one proponent, Eric 
Neumayer: 
 
…those who caused the environmental damage in the first instance have to 
compensate for it.54 
 
The contributor pays principle is an entirely backward looking principle. Unlike the 
ability to pay principle, it does not find relevant that agents may have differential abilities 
to bear the costs of addressing climate change. Rather, the only morally relevant factor 
that this principle identifies as giving agents pro-tanto duties to bear costs is that they 
contributed to the production of those costs. Accordingly, the duties allocated by the 
contributor pays principle are contribution-related duties to not, in the first place, 
                                                 
53 Simon Caney discusses this problem with respect to the contributor pays principle. See, Simon Caney, 
"Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History," Journal of Social 
Philosophy 37, no. 3 (2006): p. 467. 
54 Eric Neumayer, "In Defence of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Ecological 
Economics 33, no. 2 (2000): p. 187. Henry Shue endorses a different version of the principle in Shue, 
"Global Environment and International Inequality," p. 534. 
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wrongfully impose costs on others and, in the second place, compensate if one has done 
so.  
 The contributor pays principle has also been influential outside of the climate 
change debate. For example, it has been appealed to in the case of affluent individuals’ 
responsibility for global poverty. In particular, Thomas Pogge has recently developed a 
forceful argument that citizens of affluent states cooperate in the imposition of a global 
institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably engenders severe human rights 
deprivations.55 And in virtue of their contribution to these human rights deprivations, 
citizens of affluent states have a duty to compensate for them (and support the reform of 
institutions so that they do not continue to foreseeably and avoidably engender human 
rights deprivations).  
 The main motivation of the contributor pays principle is that it occupies a central 
place in common sense morality. Many people think that those who contribute to the 
imposition of unjustified costs on others have a duty to compensate for them, and that one 
has a duty not to contribute to the imposition of unjustified costs on others in the first 
place. For example, consider a person who dumps toxins in a river simply so that they do 
not have to pay the costs of appropriately disposing the waste, despite knowing that 
downstream there is a popular swimming spot for young children. It is clear to most 
people that this person would have a moral duty to compensate for any harm that they 
caused the children to suffer. And it is equally clear that this person has a duty not to 
endanger the children in the first place. Even some philosophical positions that are very 
                                                 
55 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, 
Second ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). 
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sceptical of duties to address the plight of others—such as libertarianism—find 
contribution to harming others morally significant.56 
What are the implications of the contributor pays principle in the case of climate 
change? It is clear that developed states have contributed most greenhouse gas emissions 
since the industrial revolution towards the problem of climate change. A report from the 
World Resources Institute cites data that “Country-level estimates of CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuels go back as far as 1850. Based on that record, the United States ranks first and 
the EU second in cumulative emissions. Together, the 25 major emitters today account 
for 83 percent of current global emissions and 90 percent of cumulative global 
emissions”.57 This figure is supported by independent analyses.58 Not only have 
developed states emitted more cumulatively than developing states, but this inequality 
corresponds to a large per capita difference in emissions between developed and 
developing countries. In 2012, for example, Australians on average consumed roughly 18 
tonnes, Americans 16 tonnes, and British 8 tonnes of CO2 emissions. During the same 
time, the figures were roughly 6 tonnes for Chinese, 1.5 tonnes for Indians, and 0.5 tonnes 
                                                 
56 This is one reason why Thomas Pogge builds his case for addressing world poverty on negative duties: 
“While some passionately reject such human-rights-imposed positive duties and others passionately 
endorse them, I simply leave them aside here, without prejudice. To keep my argument widely acceptable, 
I conceive human rights narrowly as imposing only negative duties”. Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind 
the Pro-Poor Rhetoric (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), pp. 28-29.  
57 Kevin A. Baumert, Timothy Herzog, and Jonathan Pershing, "Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse 
Gas Data and International Climate Policy," (World Resources Institute, 2005). They cite this data from G. 
Marland, T.A. Boden, and R.J. Andres, "Global, Regional, and National Fossil Fuel Co2 Emissions," in 
Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change (Oak Ridge, TN: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis 
Center, 2005). 
58 For example, another report, by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, gives supportive 
data for 2011: “The top 6 emitting countries and regions … produce 70% of total global emissions, whereas 
the top 25 emitting countries are responsible for more than 80% of total emissions”. See Jos G.J. Olivier, 
Greet Janssens-Maenhout, and Jeroen A.H.W. Peters, "Trends in Global Co2 Emissions: 2012 Report," 
(The Hague: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2012). 
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of CO2 for Bangladeshis.
59  On any plausible measure, each of the developed states (and, 
put in per capita terms, each of their citizens) contributed vastly more emissions to the 
atmosphere than developing states and their citizens. 
 There are two complications for this principle. The first complication is that there 
are various ways in which ‘contributing’ to harm might be understood, and it is 
controversial which (if any) should be endorsed. Some accounts understand contribution 
in terms of whether an agent makes a difference to the occurrence or extent of harm. 
According to this understanding, I might “…contribute to climate change in the sense that 
I make it worse”.60  Another understanding of contribution holds that an agent contributes 
to harm insofar as they became “a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual 
conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence”.61 And many other 
accounts of contribution have been developed in the literature.62 Since this thesis is 
principally concerned with the beneficiary pays principle, and not the contributor pays 
principle, I will avoid taking a stance on the difficult question of how contribution should 
best be understood. In any case, without settling on a particular definition, it seems 
plausible enough that many individuals contribute to climate change in some morally 
relevant sense.   
The second complication is that there seem to be compelling objections to 
applying the contributor pays principle, as I have stated it, to climate change. Due to these 
                                                 
59 I have calculated these figures from the U.S. Energy Information Administration in U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, "International Energy Statistics,"  
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8. 
60 See, for example, Sinnott-Armstrong, "It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral 
Obligations," pp. 336-37. 
61 This quote is from R.W. Wright, "Causation in Tort Law," California Law Review 73, no. 6 (1985): 
p. 1774. However, this understanding of contribution was first developed in H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré, 
Causation in the Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
62 See, for example, the accounts mentioned in Christian Barry, "Applying the Contribution Principle," 
Metaphilosophy 36, no. 1-2 (2005): pp. 212. 
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complications, some theorists instead advocate a close cousin of the contributor pays 
principle. According to these theorists, merely contributing causally to harm is not enough 
to allocate agents duties to address that harm. Instead, it is necessary that such agents 
were somehow culpable for their contribution. Furthermore, they claim, in order to be 
culpable for one’s contribution, one must have known (or should have known) that one’s 
actions would have contributed to such harmful effects. In the context of climate change, 
therefore, we should only take into account emissions that were produced within the 
timeframe in which agents knew, or should have known, that their emissions would 
contribute to harmful climate change (sometimes 1990 is suggested, in which the first 
IPCC assessment report was released).63 These theorists object that it would be unfair to 
hold persons responsible for emissions before this time.64 Furthermore, they point out that 
according to this principle, only current generations can conceptually be held responsible 
for paying the costs associated with their own emissions. The principle cannot 
conceptually hold current generations responsible for paying the costs of emissions 
produced by past generations, whether or not it would be unfair. But even granting that 
we should endorse some nearby version of the contributor pays principle that incorporates 
these culpability concerns, the general upshot seems clear. The citizens of developed 
states (since 1990, or whatever year serves as a justifiable baseline) have generally 
contributed much more to the problem of climate change than the citizens of developing 
states and, therefore, have a duty to bear the preponderance of the costs. As Peter Singer 
has put it, “If we believe that people should contribute to fixing something in proportion 
                                                 
63 For example, Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalisation (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 
2004), p. 38. 
64 This objection is made by Caney in Caney, "Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral 
Significance of History," pp. 469-71. 
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to their responsibility for breaking it, then the developed nations owe it to the rest of the 
world to fix the problem with the atmosphere”.65  
 
5. The Beneficiary Pays Principle 
 
The beneficiary pays principle holds that agents who have benefited from the processes 
that caused climate change should pay the costs of addressing its harms. In some form or 
another, this principle has been appealed to by various moral theorists working on this 
issue.66 Edward Page states: 
 
The burdens involved [in addressing climate change] should be distributed 
amongst states according to the amount of benefit that each state has derived from 
past and present activities that contribute to climate change.67 
 
While Page refers to ‘states’, we need not define the principle only in terms of states’ 
responsibilities. Instead, we can cast beneficiary pays as a principle of individual 
responsibility. The morally relevant factor that this principle identifies as giving agents 
pro-tanto duties to take on costs is their having benefited. Accordingly, this principle 
                                                 
65 Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalisation, p. 38. 
66 See Christian Baatz, "Responsibility for the Past? Some Thoughts on Compensating Those 
Vulnerable to Climate Change in Developing Countries," Ethics, Policy and Environment 16, no. 1 (2013); 
Christian Barry and Robert Kirby, "Skepticism About Beneficiary Pays: A Critique," Journal of Applied 
Philosophy  (2015); Axel Gosseries, "Historical Emissions and Free-Riding," Ethical Perspectives 11, no. 
1 (2004); Clare Heyward, "Benefiting from Climate Geoengineering and Corresponding Remedial Duties: 
The Case of Unforeseeable Harms," Journal of Applied Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2014); Holly Lawford-Smith, 
"Benefiting from Failures to Address Climate Change," Journal of Applied Philosophy.; Neumayer, "In 
Defence of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions."; Edward Page, "Give It up for 
Climate Change: A Defence of the Beneficiary Pays Principle," International Theory 4, no. 2 (2012); Shue, 
"Global Environment and International Inequality."  
67 Page, "Give It up for Climate Change: A Defence of the Beneficiary Pays Principle," pp. 302-03. 
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allocates agents benefiting-related duties to prevent or alleviate harm. As I argued above, 
for beneficiaries to discharge their responsibility – according to this principle – may 
require that their government imposes costs on them (in the form of a carbon tax or by 
implementing costly emissions trading policies) proportional to the value of the benefits 
that they have received. And the fact that these beneficiaries are responsible for bearing 
such costs (i.e. for giving up the value of their benefits) is a good justification for their 
governments implementing such policies. 
 The beneficiary pays principle is potentially very practically important. It has been 
gaining traction in the recent literature on responsibility in the context of climate change. 
And like the ability to pay and contributor pays principles, the beneficiary pays principle 
also has broader implications for other practical problems.68 Insofar as the beneficiary 
pays principle is applicable to these other problems, this thesis is also potentially of 
interest for theorists who are not focusing on issues to do with climate change.  
Nevertheless, what are the implications of the beneficiary pays principle in the 
case of climate change? Various authors have claimed that citizens of developed states 
benefit enormously from the industrial processes that caused climate change in the form 
                                                 
68 For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson has appealed to benefiting in the context of U.S. sexist and racial 
inequality to justify a scheme of preferential hiring in which hiring officers declare in favour of female and 
black job candidates against any equally qualified male competitors. Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Preferential 
Hiring," Philosophy & Public Affairs 2, no. 4 (1973): pp. 383-84. Todd Calder has argued for duties of 
restitution for those who have benefited (in the form of being unjustly enriched) by sweatshop labour. Todd 
Calder, "Shared Responsibility, Global Structural Injustice, and Restitution," Social Theory and Practice 
36, no. 2 (2010): p. 264. Daniel Butt has advocated beneficiary pays in the context of colonisation. Daniel 
Butt, "Repairing Historical Wrongs and the End of Empire," Social & Legal Studies 21, no. 2 (2012). 
Thomas Pogge has discussed benefiting (in the form of profiting) in the context of an unjust global 
institutional order. Thomas Pogge, "Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties," Ethics & 
International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005): p. 71. Lynn Gillam and Ronald Green have independently discussed 
benefiting from Nazi experimentation on unconsenting Jews in the context of medical research. See Lynn 
Gillam, "Is It Ethical to Use Data from Nazi Medical Experiments?," The Conversation, 
https://theconversation.com/is-it-ethical-to-use-data-from-nazi-medical-experiments-39928; Ronald M. 
Green, "Benefiting from Evil: An Incipient Moral Problem in Human Stem Cell Research," Bioethics 16, 
no. 6 (2002). 
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of their high standard of living. For example, Eric Neumayer argues “There can be no 
doubt that the development of ‘Northern’ countries was eased, if not made possible in the 
first place, by having had the possibility of burning large amounts of fossil fuel…”.69 
Peter Singer similarly asserts: “…the wealth of the developed nations is inextricably tied 
to their prodigious use of carbon fuels”.70 And these claims are backed by independent 
economic analysis. For example, Janssen, den Elzen, and Rotmans found that there is a 
significant “positive relation between welfare, measured by GNP per capita, and the 
relative contribution to the CO2-concentration rise by fossil fuel combustion per capita” 
in a regression analysis over 11 world regions.71 And beneficiary pays need not be limited 
only to benefits derived from past industrial processes. Many present individuals benefit 
from present failures to reduce emissions, in the form of maintaining their high-emissions 
dependent lifestyles. They can heat their houses, fly overseas, buy electronics and other 
consumables, and so on, cheaper than they would be able to if demanding emissions 
constraints were implemented. So the implication of beneficiary pays in the case of 
climate change is that the citizens of developed states, all else equal, have a pro-tanto duty 
to bear the preponderance of the costs of climate change. 
Lastly, beneficiary pays has not only been appealed to in allocating costs for 
addressing the harms of our past and present industrial emissions. Beneficiary pays has 
additionally been appealed to in order to allocate costs associated with the potential 
harmful effects of our policy responses to climate change. For example, Clare Heyward 
has argued for benefiting-related duties in the context of the deployment of 
                                                 
69 Neumayer, "In Defence of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions," p. 189. 
70 Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalisation, p. 35. 
71 M.A. Janssen, M.G.J. den Elzen, and J. Rotmans, "Allocating Co2-Emissions by Using Equity Rules 
and Optimization," (Bilthoven: Dutch National Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection, 
1992), p. 23. 
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geoengineering policies (that is, “the deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary 
environment in order to counteract anthropogenic climate change”).72 Heyward focuses 
on the possibility that, “due to the complexity of the global climate system, the full 
consequences of an [geoengineering] intervention might not be knowable at the time the 
decision was made to deploy”. And some of these consequences may result in 
unforeseeable harms that must be dealt with, which raises another issue of remedial 
responsibility: who should bear the costs of these harms? Heyward proposes that “…with 
some modification, the principle that agents should surrender benefits that have accrued 
to them from using geoengineering techniques can be a good basis” for a scheme of 
“redress for any adverse impacts that could not have been predicted at the time of 
deployment”.73 
I have now introduced the beneficiary pays principle alongside the ability to pay 
and contributor pays principles. What reasons do theorists give for endorsing the 
beneficiary pays principle? I will now begin to motivate beneficiary pays by discussing 
various forms of support that have been developed in the literature. 
 
6. Intuitive Support for Beneficiary Pays 
 
Many theorists have attempted to motivate the beneficiary pays principle by showing that 
its application to hypothetical and real scenarios has significant intuitive appeal. For 
example, consider the following case adapted from Daniel Butt: 
                                                 
72 Heyward cites this definition from John Shepherd et al., "Geoengineering the Climate: Science, 
Governance and Uncertainty," (London: The Royal Society, 2009), p. 1. 
73 Heyward, "Benefiting from Climate Geoengineering and Corresponding Remedial Duties: The Case 
of Unforeseeable Harms," p. 405. 
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Island: Four people live on an island, each of whom grows the water-intensive 
Polychrestos plant in order to survive and who only require 200kg of the crop to 
subsist. Each of the islanders are entirely self-sufficient and there is little or no 
contact between them. Rich, who is industrious, works very hard to produce 
700kg. Beneficiary and Victim put in enough work to merely ensure they have the 
necessary 200kg. Wrongdoer, who is an unsavoury character, does not work to 
cultivate his crop and instead secretly diverts water away from Victim’s plantation 
towards his own. However, because he is incompetent, he also diverts water away 
from his own plantation and towards Beneficiary’s. Come harvest time, Rich 
returns 700kg, Beneficiary returns a surprising 400kg, while Victim and 
Wrongdoer return no Polychrestos crop at all. Dismayed by his failure, 
Wrongdoer hangs himself. Sadly, now, in order for Victim to survive, either Rich 
or Beneficiary (or both) must give some of their crop to Victim.74  
 
In this case, how should remedial responsibility be distributed between the agents? Butt 
points out that there are no ties of community between Rich, Beneficiary, and Victim. Of 
course, it is true that they inhabit an island together. But there is little or no contact 
between them. Furthermore, neither Rich nor Beneficiary contributed to Victim’s plight. 
The only remaining relevant considerations seem to be that Rich has a greater ability to 
assist Victim and that Beneficiary was enriched by the process that harmed Victim. One 
option, then, would be to allocate Rich alone a duty to surrender his Polychrestos to 
                                                 
74 Butt, "On Benefiting from Injustice," p. 132. 
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address the harm done to Victim. However, Butt writes: “…does not such a conclusion 
seem intuitively objectionable”?75 Butt’s claim is not that Rich has no duty to surrender 
any Polychrestos to Victim. Rather, his claim is that it is intuitive that Beneficiary also 
has a duty to surrender at least some of his Polychrestos to Victim. If this is right, however, 
then according to Butt we should infer that the beneficiary pays principle is warranted in 
some cases of benefiting.  
Consider another case adapted from Christian Barry and David Wiens:  
 
Stolen Car: Bill steals John’s car and gives it to Susan, who is innocent of any 
wrongdoing herself. Bill can no longer be found, nor does he leave behind assets 
that can be seized.76 
 
According to Barry and Wiens, it is intuitive to think that Susan has a duty to give the car 
back to John, even though Susan was in no way related to the initial wrongdoing other 
than that she benefited. However, if this is right, then the beneficiary pays principle at 
least makes intuitive sense of agents’ responsibilities in cases where some property has 
been wrongfully transferred between victims and beneficiaries. Now, it is a tricky 
question to answer (one that I will take a stand on in this thesis) in which cases does 
beneficiary pays make sense? But there is, at least, some intuitive support for the principle 
in some hypothetical cases of benefiting. 
 
                                                 
75 Daniel Butt, "On Benefiting from Injustice," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37, no. 1 (2007): p. 
133. 
76 Barry and Wiens, "Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," p. 3. 
  
34 
 
 
7. Theoretical Support for Beneficiary Pays 
 
In addition to intuitive support, theorists have now developed various theoretical 
rationales for beneficiary pays. In the following section, I will discuss three main bases 
of beneficiary pays along which these rationales can usefully be grouped.  
 A first basis for beneficiary pays focuses on the attitudes we should take towards 
wrongdoing and injustice. For example, Daniel Butt has developed an influential 
justification of beneficiary pays in terms of condemning injustice. He writes: 
 
The individual’s duty not to benefit from another’s suffering when that suffering 
is a result of injustice stems from one’s moral condemnation of the unjust act 
itself. In consequence, a duty to disgorge (in compensation) the benefits one gains 
as a result of injustice follows from one’s duty not to so benefit. My claim is that 
taking our nature as moral agents seriously requires not only that we be willing 
not to commit acts of injustice ourselves, but that we hold a genuine aversion to 
injustice and its lasting effects. We make a conceptual error if we condemn a given 
act as unjust, but are not willing to reverse or mitigate its effects on the grounds 
that it has benefited us. The refusal undermines the condemnation.77 
 
This justification has proved very influential with theorists writing on beneficiary pays. 
For example, Edward Page entertains this justification as part of his support for 
beneficiary pays in the case of climate change. He writes: “Not to disgorge their fair share 
                                                 
77 Butt, "On Benefiting from Injustice," p. 143. 
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of climatic benefits for the sake of the global climate response would put states in the 
position of condoning the setbacks of interest to which their affluence can historically be 
linked”.78 Christian Baatz endorses this argument when he writes: “The duty results from 
a genuine aversion to injustice and it would constitute a conceptual error to condemn an 
act as unjust but, simultaneously, not be willing to mitigate its effects on the grounds that 
it has benefited us; the refusal undermines the condemnation”.79 Clare Heyward has 
endorsed a version of this argument too, claiming: “If an agent benefits from another 
knowingly acting unjustly, then the beneficiary might be accused of condoning the action 
if she keeps the benefits. Failure to surrender benefits indicates that wrongs committed 
against the victim do not matter”.80 
A second basis for beneficiary pays appeals to ideas of unjust enrichment, 
restitution, or tainted title.81 The basic idea of these accounts is that a violation of rights 
has occurred somewhere along the line of the benefits accruing to the beneficiary, and 
that this violation undermines their entitlement to those benefits. As a result, the 
beneficiary has a duty to relinquish those benefits that they unjustly possess and have no 
moral claim to. For example, Bigelow, Pargetter, and Young defend an unjust enrichment 
account, in which they compare white Australians’ benefiting from colonisation with 
benefiting from piracy: “Where the great gains to the original pirates have been passed 
on to the descendants of those pirates, unless those descendants have divested themselves 
of the stolen property and made restitution, descendants of the original victims have a 
                                                 
78 Page, "Give It up for Climate Change: A Defence of the Beneficiary Pays Principle," p. 315. 
79 Baatz, "Responsibility for the Past? Some Thoughts on Compensating Those Vulnerable to Climate 
Change in Developing Countries," p. 98. 
80 Heyward, "Benefiting from Climate Geoengineering and Corresponding Remedial Duties: The Case 
of Unforeseeable Harms," p. 410. 
81 In addition to the authors I discuss below, see also: Page, "Give It up for Climate Change: A Defence 
of the Beneficiary Pays Principle," p. 314. 
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legitimate claim against them.”82 Similarly, in the context of benefiting from sweatshop 
labour, Todd Calder argues, just as a person “would not be entitled to a stolen bicycle, 
however innocently he acquired it, since stealing is unjust, he is not entitled to the benefits 
resulting from sweatshops if sweatshops are unjust”.83 According to Calder, the amount 
that a beneficiary must pay in restitution is the amount that they have been unjustly 
enriched.  
Lastly, Robert Goodin has argued for duties of disgorgement in terms of ‘tainted 
title’.84 This account is structurally similar to Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of 
justice in holdings. According to Nozick, “A distribution is just if it arises from another 
just distribution by legitimate means”.85 Unlike what he called ‘end-state’ principles 
(which look at a particular distribution of holdings at a given time to check whether it 
corresponds with a substantively favoured just distribution), Nozick’s historic entitlement 
theory looks to the actual past history of acquisition and transfer of holdings alone. If 
holdings were initially acquired justly and then transferred justly, whatever the pattern of 
holdings that obtained is just. On the other hand, if holdings were either not acquired 
justly initially or not transferred justly, then the pattern of holdings that obtained is not 
just—in this case, holdings are in the wrong hands and should be relinquished according 
to a principle of justice in rectification. 
 Goodin discusses the implication of this view for duties of disgorgement on the 
part of innocent beneficiaries: 
                                                 
82 John Bigelow, Robert Pargetter, and Robert Young, "Land, Well-Being and Compensation," 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 3 (1990): p. 336. 
83 Calder, "Shared Responsibility, Global Structural Injustice, and Restitution," p. 274. 
84 Robert E Goodin, "Disgorging the Fruits of Historical Wrongdoing," American Political Science 
Review 107, no. 3 (2013). 
85 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), p. 151. 
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Disgorgement can be analyzed in precisely the same manner that Nozick’s logic 
would have us analyze rectification in general. In the process of original 
acquisition and the subsequent transfer, one seriously wrong step anywhere along 
the line prevents the process from being “justice preserving.” One seriously wrong 
step anywhere along the line suffices to taint the holder’s title to the object. What 
happens to titles that are tainted? They are extinguished; they are rendered void. 
If your title to an object is tainted, then the object is not rightfully yours. You have 
no legitimate claim to it, and you may properly be required to relinquish it.86 
 
Thus, according to Goodin, an innocent beneficiary may properly be required to 
relinquish their benefits when their claim over these benefits qualifies as ‘tainted’.  
A third basis for beneficiary pays emphasises the manner in which retaining the 
benefits of wrongful harm can involve the beneficiary in a separate wrong. Ronald Green 
has recently argued that “Everyone has a stake in opposing forms of benefiting from evil 
that encourage the further commission of evil deeds”, and that such acts of benefiting are 
themselves prima facie wrong.87 Another account which focuses on how retaining 
benefits might involve the beneficiary in performing a distinct wrong is developed by 
Christian Barry and David Wiens, who argue that: “…beneficiaries incur a benefiting-
related remedial duty to the victims of wrongdoing if and only if they sustain wrongful 
harm by retaining the benefits”.88 And they argue that there are two ways by which an 
innocent beneficiary can sustain wrongful harm: “First, an innocent beneficiary sustains 
                                                 
86 Goodin, "Disgorging the Fruits of Historical Wrongdoing," p. 487. 
87 Green, "Benefiting from Evil: An Incipient Moral Problem in Human Stem Cell Research," p. 548. 
88 Barry and Wiens, "Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," p. 18. 
  
38 
 
 
wrongful harm if she receives and retains an item or quantum of value to which another 
person has a justified claim. Second, an innocent beneficiary sustains wrongful harm if 
she receives and retains benefits derived from advantages conferred by a social practice 
or institution in violation of another person’s justified claim(s) against that practice or 
institution”.89 Put another way, Barry and Wiens argue that beneficiaries should 
relinquish their benefits when their failure to do so would present an obstacle for the 
reconciliation of the victims’ claims. 
 
8. Further Support for Beneficiary Pays 
 
The beneficiary pays principle has significant intuitive and theoretical appeal. However, 
some theorists have also developed further support for the beneficiary pays principle by 
pointing to several of its attractive features that are left out of some other accounts. For 
example, in the case of climate change, Edward Page and Ramon Das have independently 
argued that beneficiary pays owes some of its appeal to the way that it treads a plausible 
middle ground between the ability to pay and contributor pays principles.90 Recall that, 
on the one hand, the ability to pay principle is entirely forward looking in that it only 
finds relevant the capacity of agents to take on cost to address climate change. On the 
other hand, the contributor pays principle is an entirely backward looking principle in that 
it only finds relevant the contributions that agents have made towards climate change in 
the past. Each of these principles, claim Page and Das, focus on factors which are morally 
                                                 
89 Ibid., p. 4. 
90 Page, "Give It up for Climate Change: A Defence of the Beneficiary Pays Principle," p. 307. See also, 
Ramon Das, "Has Industrialization Benefited No One? Climate Change and the Non-Identity Problem," 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17, no. 4 (2014): p. 749. 
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important: it seems to morally matter whether, and to what extent, an agent is able to take 
on costs to address harm. And it also seems to morally matter whether, and to what extent, 
an agent is (at least partly) responsible for having caused harm to begin with. But just as 
each principle captures a factor that morally matters, each correspondingly neglects a 
factor of moral importance—that is, the factor the other principle finds relevant. 
Uniquely, they claim, the beneficiary pays principle is able to capture both morally 
relevant factors: beneficiaries are likely to be better off and therefore better able to bear 
costs (the forward looking element) because they have benefited from past and present 
industrial processes that contribute to climate change (the backward looking element). 
A second source of additional motivation for the beneficiary pays principle in the 
context of climate change relates to how it answers an objection to the contributor pays 
principle: we have seen that some theorists argue that the contributor pays principle 
cannot (without being unfair) allocate responsibility for contemporary individuals to bear 
the costs associated with the emissions of past individuals. So, the objection challenges, 
even if developed states have contributed more to the problem of climate change, why 
should their present citizens be willing to bear many of these costs (in particular, the costs 
of emissions prior to the birth of  these presently alive citizens)?  
Some proponents of beneficiary pays have answered that they should be willing 
to pay these costs precisely when and because present individuals have benefited from 
the emissions produced by their ancestors. As Eric Neumayer says, “The fundamental 
counter-argument against not being held accountable for emissions undertaken by past 
generations is that the current developed countries readily accept the benefits from past 
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emissions…”.91 Henry Shue similarly responds: “…current generations are, and future 
generations probably will be, continuing beneficiaries of earlier industrial activity”.92  
Christian Baatz similarly remarks: “When I talk to friends, students or colleagues about 
responsibility for past emissions and explain why it is problematic to apply the PPP 
[polluter pays principle] to the intergenerational context, most of them ask ‘but what 
about the benefits?’ before I have even mentioned the BPP [beneficiary pays principle]”.93 
If this is right, then beneficiary pays gets part of its normative appeal by achieving the 
right intuitive results in cases where other principles of responsibility – in this case, the 
contributor pays principle – cannot do so. 
We might expand on this argument by pointing out that the contributor pays 
principle may fail to assign responsibility in another way that the beneficiary pays 
principle does not. Irrespective of whether the contributor pays principle can allocate 
duties to present people to compensate for past persons’ emissions, some moral theorists 
are sceptical that a convincing story can be told that links present individual emissions to 
climate change related harms.94 For example, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has recently 
argued, “…global warming is such a large problem that it is not individuals who cause it 
or who need to fix it”.95 This claim is largely based on his argument that no ordinary 
individual acts of emitting are necessary or sufficient for global warming: whether or not 
I drive an inefficient car to work rather than ride my bike will make no difference to the 
occurrence or extent of climate change. Therefore, there will be no individual who is 
                                                 
91 Neumayer, "In Defence of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions," p. 189. See 
also, Shue, "Global Environment and International Inequality," p. 536. 
92 "Global Environment and International Inequality," p. 536. 
93 Baatz, "Responsibility for the Past? Some Thoughts on Compensating Those Vulnerable to Climate 
Change in Developing Countries," pp. 96-97. 
94 We make this point in Barry and Kirby, "Skepticism About Beneficiary Pays: A Critique," p. 2. 
95 Sinnott-Armstrong, "It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations." 
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worse off due to my choice.96 It is rather the aggregate of our emissions which cause 
climate change related harms. Therefore, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, individuals should 
focus their efforts on persuading governments to respond appropriately to climate change, 
rather than moderate their own individual emissions: “Finding and implementing a real 
solution is the task of governments. Environmentalists should focus their efforts on those 
who are not doing their job rather than on those who take Sunday afternoon drives just 
for fun”.97 
Some theorists have rejected this argument. They claim that each individual’s 
emissions do make a difference to the extent of harm expected from climate change. 
According to John Nolt, for example, “…the average American causes through his/her 
greenhouse gas emissions the serious suffering and/or deaths of two future people”.98 And 
John Broome has similarly argued that “…it can be estimated very roughly that your 
lifetime emissions will wipe out more than six months of healthy human life”.99 But I do 
not aim to resolve these disagreements here. For my purposes, the important point is that 
no matter how complex the climate system is, no matter how over-determined are its 
harms, it is a fact that a great many people have benefited from past and present emitting 
activities (Chapter 2 will address an objection to this claim arising from what has been 
called the non-identity problem). In this sense, the beneficiary pays principle potentially 
provides a more robust argument (than the contributor pays principle) for allocating 
                                                 
96 Ibid., pp. 334-36. 
97 Ibid., p. 344. 
98 John Nolt, "How Harmful Are the Average American's Greenhouse Gas Emissions?," Ethics, Policy 
and Environment 14, no. 1 (2011): p. 9. 
99Broome, Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World, p. 74. 
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individuals duties to pay the costs associated with their own emissions, let alone the 
emissions of their ancestors.100  
Beneficiary pays succeeds where contributor pays potentially fails because the 
former, unlike the latter, does not require culpability for attributing moral responsibility. 
This attractive feature of benefiting-related duties has been explored by Holly Lawford-
Smith, who attempts to “…undermine that sense of entitlement the affluent (and 
otherwise able) have over their holdings, without accepting the fundamental assumption 
of justice-based arguments, namely that the best way to do that is to pin culpability on 
them”. She does this, precisely, by arguing for “…a principle upon which it is 
impermissible to retain the material benefits of the world going other than it ought”.101 
The thought is that whether or not individuals have culpably contributed to climate 
change, they may still properly be required to take on costs (in the form of relinquishing 
their benefits) when they have benefited from the world going other than it ought to have 
gone. And the world can go other than it ought to, according to Lawford-Smith, without 
anyone being culpable. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
                                                 
100 A similar motivation for beneficiary pays has been appealed to in the case of duties of the affluent 
to address global poverty. Bashshar Haydar and Gerhard Øverland have argued that “It may be argued that 
ordinary people are too remotely related to what their governments do as to assign to them a contribution-
based requirement to assist the global poor. Yet, even if affluent people do not contribute to global poverty 
on this account, it can still be argued that they benefit from what their governments do. If that is the case, 
it could imply that ordinary affluent people have benefiting-based requirements to address global poverty”. 
Bashshar Haydar and Gerhard Øverland, "The Normative Implications of Benefiting from Injustice," 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2014): p. 358. 
101 Holly Lawford-Smith, "Benefiting from Failures to Address Climate Change," Journal of Applied 
Philosophy: pp. 392-93. 
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In this chapter, I surveyed recent empirical literature and argued that climate change raises 
an important moral problem: who should bear the costs of addressing its associated 
harms? I argued that the answer to this question involves weighing the duties assigned by 
various compelling principles of responsibility: namely, the ability to pay principle, the 
contributor pays principle, and the beneficiary pays principle. I then discussed various 
motivations for the beneficiary pays principle developed in recent literature. The next 
chapter evaluates various theorists’ sceptical reactions to the beneficiary pays principle.  
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Chapter 2: Scepticism about Beneficiary Pays: A Critique 
 
In the previous chapter I introduced and motivated beneficiary pays as a principle of 
responsibility for allocating the costs of climate change. This chapter – based on a paper 
co-written with Christian Barry and accepted for publication in the Journal of Applied 
Philosophy – develops a negative defence.102 Our aim in this chapter is to examine some 
critiques of beneficiary pays (both in general and in the particular case of human-induced 
climate change).103 We conclude that, while they have made important points, the 
principle remains worthy of further development and exploration. Our purpose in 
engaging with these critiques is constructive—we aim to formulate beneficiary pays in 
ways that would give it a plausible role in allocating the cost of addressing human-
induced climate change, while acknowledging that some understandings of the principle 
would make it unsuitable for this purpose. A major innovation of this chapter is our 
account of what form benefiting must take in order to trigger beneficiary pays. We argue 
that we should be pluralists regarding benefiting, endorsing a ‘non-comparative’ test as a 
sufficient condition to trigger beneficiary pays while at the same time accepting that 
particular ‘counterfactual’ tests may constitute other, independent, sufficient conditions. 
 
                                                 
102 For the full unmodified paper, see: Christian Barry and Robert Kirby, "Skepticism About Beneficiary 
Pays: A Critique," Journal of Applied Philosophy. (2015).  
103 We will focus on objections developed in Carl Knight, "Benefiting from Injustice and Brute Luck," 
Social Theory and Practice 39, no. 4 (2013); Ewan Kingston, "Climate Justice and Temporally Remote 
Emissions," Social Theory and Practice 40, no. 2 (2014); Robert Huseby, "Should the Beneficiaries Pay?," 
Politics, Philosophy & Economics  (2013); Rudolf Schüssler, "Climate Justice: A Question of Historical 
Responsibility?," Journal of Global Ethics 7, no. 3 (2011); Caney, "Environmental Degradation, 
Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History." 
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1. Non-Identity  
 
The objection from non-identity is not an objection against the idea of beneficiary-pays 
generally, but only in its application to the case of human-induced climate change. For 
the beneficiary-pays principle to have any traction in assigning special duties to address 
the harms of climate change, two minimal requirements must be met. We must be able to 
identify (1) some parties that have suffered harm and (2) some parties that have benefited, 
as a result of the processes that caused climate change. But can we make sense of the idea 
that there exist individuals who have benefited from such processes? The objection based 
on the non-identity problem asserts that condition (2) cannot be met. 
To identify beneficiaries we must be able to find particular individuals who have 
been made better off as a result of industrialization. And to do this we need to be able to 
compare the state of these individual people without industrialization (or without 
industrialization in the form that our world actually experienced) with their state given 
the form that industrialization has taken. The objection is that this makes no sense, since 
different people would have existed had history taken such a different form.104 People 
who currently exist do so only because history has followed a particular path. It thus 
makes no sense to say that actually existing individuals are beneficiaries of carbon 
emissions that have caused climate change. Simon Caney writes: 
 
They [currently alive members of industrialized states] have not been made better 
off than they would have been by industrialization because without 
                                                 
104 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 351-79. 
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industrialization they would not have been at all. The Beneficiary Account, it is 
argued, works where you have a preexisting individual who then receives a 
benefit. In such a scenario, we can clearly and unequivocally say that they have 
been benefited. In an intergenerational context, however, the non-identity problem 
entails that industrialization has not improved the lot of current people.105 
 
This is a powerful objection. It does not challenge the idea of benefitting-related duties 
as such, but alleges a deep incoherence in the use of the beneficiary pays principle as it 
applies to climate change: since no one now alive has benefited from past industrial 
processes that contributed to climate change, there can be no one alive who should be 
responsible for bearing the costs of addressing the problem. We discuss this objection at 
greater length than the others, since it is so potentially damaging. It also quickly uncovers 
basic issues regarding the formulation of the beneficiary pays principle.  
 The first response to this objection relates to its scope. The non-identity problem 
is specifically a problem for the intergenerational application of beneficiary pays. It does 
nothing to undermine its application to harms and benefits that arise intra-generationally. 
That is, once a person has been born, it surely can make sense to claim that they have 
benefited (or not) from policies that were sustained during the period in which they were 
alive. Had any of those policies been different, they would still exist. And insofar as some 
are better off as a result of contemporary carbon-intensive industrial policies (for 
example, because they pay less tax, have lower business expenses, can access cheaper 
energy, travel, and so on, than if stronger climate change policies been adopted) while 
                                                 
105 Caney, "Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History," p. 475. 
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others are worse off, it is possible to claim that the former may have a special duty to 
disgorge their benefits in order to address the harms the latter suffer.106  
 A second and more fundamental response challenges whether the counterfactual 
baseline that is being invoked in making the objection is appropriate, and whether 
alternative baselines would be vulnerable to it. Caney originally states the baseline: “A 
benefits from X if A is better off with X than she would otherwise have been (hereinafter 
the standard version)”.107 Is the standard version the best way of conceiving the relevant 
baseline? He provides two examples in support of it: 
  
If A takes part in a neighborhood watch scheme that successfully deters theft, then 
we will say that A benefits in the sense that she is better off after the institution of 
the scheme than before. Or if A takes part in a scheme with other parents in which 
each takes turn to take the members’ children to school, then again A benefits in 
the sense that A is better off under the scheme than she would have been without 
it. The standard version seems then a pretty plausible conception of ‘benefit’.108 
                                                 
106 A potential problem arises here, since there may be a significant lag between our benefiting from 
contemporary carbon-intensive industrial policies and their negative effects on the climate system. 
Emissions may cause some of their contribution to climate change only after a significant amount of time 
in the atmosphere. If so, contemporary emissions may make us better off now, but those who will be mostly 
effected by these emissions will exist in the future (who will not be worse off, according to the non-identity 
problem, since they would not otherwise exist). Therefore, one might object that the intra-generational 
application of beneficiary pays is inert with respect to contemporary carbon-industrial policies. However, 
we think that: First, the lagging effect may not be absolute: contemporary emissions may result in some 
contemporary persons being worse off to some extent due to their effects of the climate system, even if 
most of these effects occur later. Second, many contemporary persons (for example, in developing 
countries) may be made worse off in the sense that they may be required to limit their emissions to a greater 
degree, given carbon-intensive policies (in affluent countries), than they would otherwise have needed to 
in order to avert dangerous climate change. In other words, when we enjoy the benefits of contemporary 
carbon-intensive policies, others are worse off now because they then do not get to do so. Edward Page 
discusses this point in terms of “constrained development”, see: Page, "Give It up for Climate Change: A 
Defence of the Beneficiary Pays Principle," p. 315. We thank David Wiens for raising this problem with 
us. 
107 We have bolded the sufficiency claim “if”, but the italics are Caney’s: see Caney, "Environmental 
Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History," p. 474. 
108 Original emphasis. Ibid. 
  
48 
 
 
 
Note that the first example does not actually support the standard version, since the 
comparison it makes is a diachronic (how things were before and how things were after) 
comparison, rather than a counterfactual test (what things would have been like without 
the scheme and what things were like with the scheme). This example, if correct, would 
in fact undermine the claim that the standard version of benefiting is a necessary condition 
of benefiting. But we will not dwell further on this point. The second example Caney 
employs for his preferred baseline would support only that it constitutes a sufficient 
condition of benefiting.  For his argument that non-identity worries make beneficiary pays 
inapplicable to succeed, however, he needs to show also that that there are no other 
conditions that are independently sufficient for claiming that people today have benefitted 
from climate change. If there were other independently or jointly sufficient conditions, 
then people could benefit without benefiting in the manner envisioned in the standard 
version. So Caney needs to show that standard version provides both necessary and 
sufficient conditions for benefitting, and the examples he provides clearly do not do this.  
But of course it is very difficult to show that something is a necessary condition, and it 
will not do to simply shift the burden of proof back to Caney. Instead, we will explore 
alternative conditions for benefiting that seem intuitively plausible and which can be 
satisfied when the standard version is not. 
 Daniel Butt has defended an explicitly moralised alternative counterfactual 
baseline to the standard version in which “the actual world, following an act of injustice, 
is compared to an alternative, possible world where injustice is absent”.109 He claims we 
                                                 
109 Butt, "On Benefiting from Injustice," p. 146. 
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should not compare the actual world to the most likely alternative in which injustice is 
absent, since victims of injustice may be better off than they otherwise would have been. 
For example, victims of exploitative labour will often be better off receiving wages than 
not being employed at all, which may well be the most likely alternative scenario.110 
Instead, Butt argues that we should pick out a counterfactual scenario in which “all the 
interaction between the relevant parties was just and consensual”.111 In other words, we 
should compare the exploited labourers’ position with how well off they would have been 
had the employer instead provided a fair wage and decent working conditions. And 
likewise, presumably, we should compare the employer’s position (paying low wages) 
with how well off they would have been had they offered fair wages and conditions. It 
seems clear that there will be cases where Butt’s baseline and the standard version yield 
quite different verdicts. Moreover, it seems that the verdicts yielded by Butt’s baseline 
will often be more plausible than those of the standard version.112 
So there are reasons to prefer Butt’s baseline to the standard version. Will it avoid 
the non-identity problem? Butt claims that it will.113 He writes: “Insofar as it generates 
counterfactuals in a non-probabilistic fashion, it is able to make reference to a 
counterfactual state where the individuals who claim compensation exist, but where the 
action did not occur”.114 While it is highly improbable that had wrongdoing or injustice 
                                                 
110 Daniel Butt, Rectifying International Injustice: Principles of Compensation and Restitution between 
Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 105-15. 
111 Ibid., p. 115. 
112 Indeed, the standard version conceived as a necessary condition of benefiting is vulnerable to the 
very same objections that beset its corollary for the case of harm. If Bill breaks Bobby’s nose with a punch 
he harms him, but according to a simple counterfactual account of harm he would not harm him in case 
Judith (who unbeknownst to both is waiting in the wings) would have broken Bobby’s nose and his harm 
had Bill not punched him. 
113 He credits this argument to A. John Simmons, "Historical Rights and Fair Shares," Law and 
Philosophy 14, no. 2 (1995). 
114 Butt, Rectifying International Injustice: Principles of Compensation and Restitution between 
Nations, p. 105. 
  
50 
 
 
not occurred the same individuals would exist today, it is not strictly impossible. And 
insofar as it is not strictly impossible that history could have been different and the same 
persons could exist, we can select such a scenario as the morally relevant counterfactual, 
no matter how improbable it is. 
One general difficulty with Butt’s proposal is that beneficiaries may be worse off 
given wrongdoing or injustice than they would have been had all the interaction between 
the relevant parties been just and consensual; yet it is still intuitive to think that they ought 
to use their benefits to address harm suffered by victims. Consider an example used by 
Nobert Anwander, “some white businesses in South Africa which were said to have 
profited from the apartheid regime argued that, all in all, they would have been better off 
if there had been no such regime”.115  But even if these white businesses would have been 
better off if interaction had been just and consensual (i.e., in fact, they were worse off due 
to apartheid), it nevertheless seems appropriate that beneficiary pays would assign them 
special duties in virtue of profiting from that unjust regime. Note that the standard version 
does not seem to capture this sort of case any better than Butt’s proposal does unless we 
suppose that the alternative to the Apartheid regime was not the just regime but something 
much worse for white South Africans. So neither seems to provide a plausible account of 
necessary conditions for benefiting. We return to the importance of this sort of case 
below. 
Holly Lawford-Smith has a different proposal for a counterfactual baseline, 
according to which a person has benefited if they possess holdings that are “necessary to 
                                                 
115 Norbert Anwander, "World Poverty and Moral Free-Riding: The Obligations of Those Who Profit 
from Global Injustice," in Absolute Poverty and Global Justice: Empirical Data - Moral Theories - 
Initatives ed. Elke Mack, et al. (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), footnote 8, pp. 181-82. 
  
51 
 
 
the world going as it morally ought to have gone”.116 She argues that this baseline avoids 
the non-identity problem since it makes reference to holdings rather than persons. She 
writes: “If the world had gone as it ought, the holdings would be one way; given that it 
goes other than it ought, the holdings go another way. We figure out who counts as a 
beneficiary by figuring out what the pattern of holdings would look like”.117 It is true that 
present-day members of developed states may not have existed had industrialization not 
occurred in the manner it historically did, but this is compatible with present-day 
members enjoying holdings that were necessary to the world going as it ought to have 
gone.  
This is an interesting proposal and may well constitute an adequate sufficient 
condition for benefiting without falling victim to the non-identity problem. It does raise 
difficult questions about how the relevant comparisons are to be made. How, exactly, do 
we calculate how much of their holdings any given individual has a duty to disgorge?  
One plausible method would be to place individuals into wealth quintiles and compare 
the supposed difference, on average, between what holdings an individual belonging to 
this quintile has in the world as it is against what an individual belonging to this quintile 
would have had if industrialization did not occur in the manner that it historically did. If 
so, one might worry that the individuals that make up the top quintile would have found 
a way to be wealthy no matter what (if they couldn’t enrich themselves through climate 
change they would find other opportunities to enrich themselves), in which cases there 
may be little difference between the pattern of holdings in the two quintiles being 
                                                 
116 The full reading of the counterfactual is: “If there is at least one person who suffers as a result of the 
world going other than it morally ought to have gone who can be compensated or made reparation, then to 
that extent it is impermissible to retain any benefits necessary to the world going as it morally ought to have 
gone”: Lawford-Smith, "Benefiting from Failures to Address Climate Change," pp. 399-400. 
117 Ibid., pp. 401-02. 
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compared – the richest twenty-percent may be equally well off in both. But that would 
just mean that the wealthy weren’t beneficiaries according to this baseline, which is 
hardly a decisive objection to it. 
So far, we have been considering counterfactual baselines for determining 
benefits from wrongful harm and whether they are morally plausible while avoiding the 
non-identity problem. But there is another way of conceiving of benefiting from injustice 
that seems to make sense of our judgments about cases that counterfactual baselines have 
difficulty with. To explain, we need to make a brief detour into some of recent literature 
on the metaphysics of harm. Recently, Seana Shiffrin and Elizabeth Harman have argued 
for a conception of “harming as causing harm” which does not rely on counterfactual 
assessments of the sort we have been discussing.118 The basic idea is that an agent is 
harmed if they are caused to be in a particular kind of bad state—for example, if they are 
caused “to be in pain, to be in mental discomfort, to be in physical discomfort, to have a 
disease, to be deformed, to be disabled, or to die”.119 Of course, what it means to be in a 
bad state of the relevant sort will be controversial: Shiffrin argues for a particular view 
upon which the relevant bad state is constituted by a “significant chasm, conflict, or other 
form of significant disconnect between one’s will and one’s life”.120 But one need not 
accept this particular view to get the basic idea of this notion of harm.  
                                                 
118 See Seana Shiffrin, "Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm," 
Legal Theory 5, no. 2 (1999); "Harm and Its Moral Significance," Legal Theory 18, no. 03 (2012); Elizabeth 
Harman, "Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?," Philosophical Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004); "Harming 
as Causing Harm," in Harming Future Persons, ed. Melina A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2009). Matthew Hanser develops an entirely distinct “event-based” account in 
Matthew Hanser, "The Metaphysics of Harm," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77, no. 2 
(2008). 
119 Harman, "Harming as Causing Harm," p. 149. 
120 Shiffrin, "Harm and Its Moral Significance," p. 384. 
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On this account, one can be harmed without being made worse off. Consider the 
following case:121 A couple knows that if they conceive now, a temporary infection will 
cause their child to inherit a permanent painful condition. If they wait a few months, the 
infection will have cleared and their child will be unaffected. Now, suppose that they 
choose to conceive during the time of infection. On the standard counterfactual version 
of harming, the parents do not harm the child. Their child is not worse off than she would 
have been had the parents conceived later—if they had conceived later, the child would 
not exist (and a different child would). The conception of harm as causing harm, in 
contrast, entails that the parents harm their child (even if they also benefit their child), 
since they cause their child to be in pain, mental or physical discomfort, to have a disease, 
and so on.  
We can similarly say that an agent is benefited if they are caused to be in a 
particular kind of good state—for example, if they are caused to be in pleasure, in mental 
or physical comfort, to be alive, and so on. And this makes sense of some cases that the 
counterfactual interpretations of benefiting tend to have trouble with, for instance, the 
case of white South Africans under the Apartheid regime discussed earlier. Moreover, we 
can say that someone is benefited by being brought into existence (insofar as they are 
brought into a good state), even though they are not better off than they would have been 
had they not existed.  
By employing this account, we can claim that residents of industrialised countries, 
for example, enjoy many benefits—the goods and services made available through 
industrialised economies, for example—and we can point to various activities which are 
                                                 
121 Similar cases are common in the literature on the non-identity problem. See, for example, the various 
cases developed in Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 351-79. 
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responsible for the creation of these benefits. We can then also say that the processes of 
industrialisation have contributed to the creation of the benefits that people now are 
enjoying. And insofar as these processes involved excessive carbon emissions, we can 
say that they are responsible for producing some of the benefits that people now enjoy.  
Those who are enjoying these benefits are beneficiaries in the relevant sense to 
trigger beneficiary pays; they thus have duties to disgorge some of the benefits or 
compensate those who are suffering harms caused by the same processes that have 
secured these benefits. None of this requires denying that some counterfactual baseline 
(whether the standard version or others) may also be employed as a sufficient condition 
of benefiting. Rather, it suggests that a distinct concept of benefiting as being caused to 
benefit may also play a role in applying beneficiary pays.  We may, that is, be pluralistic 
about the form that benefiting may take to trigger remedial duties. 
It might be objected that benefiting as being caused to benefit is simply not what 
people have meant when they have invoked beneficiary pays. This is unconvincing. If 
this notion of benefiting makes sense of commonplace examples that people will 
unreflectively give of some people benefiting from processes that cause harm (such as 
past industrialisation), then we submit that in these cases theorists would misinterpret 
these claims by framing them as false claims involving a counterfactual notion of 
benefiting rather than as true claims involving this notion. 
Note also that there is an interesting asymmetry between harming and benefiting 
that make appeals to benefiting as being caused to benefit morally plausible in ways that 
harming as being caused harm arguably is not. Consider people who are caused to be 
harmed by some industrial process that their existence was contingent on, and who gained 
the benefit of existence from the same process that caused them harm. Arguably, it would 
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be strange for these people to complain about the harms, given that they were part of a 
process to which they owe a great benefit. It can be pointed out to them that they 
presumably would not wish to reach back in time and prevent the process that harmed 
them because it was also the process that caused them to exist. In the benefiting case 
things are different. People who are beneficiaries of past injustice often owe both their 
existence and further benefits to the injustice. It is hard to see how they can legitimately 
claim to hold on to all of the further benefits they receive that result from the injustice. 
That is, they benefitted from wrongful harm by being born and then additionally were 
caused to have many further benefits stemming from that harm. 
 
2. Past Beneficiaries 
 
Many people who have benefited from climate change are no longer alive, and their assets 
cannot now be seized to address the costs of climate change.  A second objection to 
beneficiary pays is that it would be unfair to require current beneficiaries to pay the value 
of all the benefits generated by global climate change to address its harms. Here’s how 
Caney puts the objection: 
 
The desirable consequences of industrialization have been enjoyed not simply by 
those currently alive, but also by members of earlier generations—some of those 
who lived in the industrial revolution and the middle classes in the early and 
middle twentieth century. So the benefits of industrialization (the use of 
electricity) have been enjoyed by people no longer alive. It, therefore, follows that 
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it would be unfair to require current beneficiaries to pay for all of the benefit 
generated by the activities which cause global climate change.122 
 
But the beneficiary pays principle need not hold that present-day beneficiaries have a 
special duty to disgorge all the benefits enjoyed by everyone at all times as a result of the 
processes that have led to the harms engendered by human-induced climate change. 
Rather, present-day beneficiaries might be held responsible for giving up only (some of) 
the benefits that they enjoy as a result of industrialization. 
 Is it unfair that the beneficiary pays principle requires present-day beneficiaries to 
part with the benefits they enjoy, given that there are many past beneficiaries who are 
now dead and, therefore, no longer in a position to relinquish any of their benefits? If two 
people owe compensation to a third person for damage to which each has contributed, 
then even if one refuses to pay the other is still under a duty. The first is failing in her 
duty to the third, but that does not excuse the second. 
 Perhaps if present-day beneficiaries disgorged all or some of their benefits, this 
would not be sufficient to remediate the harms caused by excessive carbon emissions. 
This possibility would not undermine the beneficiary pays principle. It would mean that 
other principles are also relevant in determining who should bear responsibility for 
shouldering the costs of climate change, or that there may be costs that no one is 
responsible for shouldering. There may be problems that cannot be fully addressed 
without imposing undue burdens on some people.  
 
                                                 
122 Caney, "Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History," p. 473. 
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3. Conflicting Accounts  
 
A fourth objection is that beneficiary pays will often be in tension with other plausible-
seeming principles for allocating the costs of addressing climate change. First, some have 
argued for capacity-related duties to address harm.123 This provides the normative 
grounds for the “ability to pay principle”, which picks out all those who can address the 
harms of climate change at little cost to themselves. Second, some have argued for 
contribution-related duties to address harm.124 This provides the normative grounds for 
the “polluter pays principle”, which targets all those who have contributed to climate 
change. Now, there will be many instances in which the sets of people defined by these 
principles will not overlap completely.125 The objection is that there is no determinate 
solution of how to allocate the costs of addressing harms amongst the various relevant 
agents when the various grounds of duties stand in tension, as they inevitably will do in 
the case of climate change.  Caney writes: “It is hard to think of what criterion one can 
use to allocate these responsibilities”.126 
It is common for moral theorists to accept various grounds for addressing harm, 
and it is the complex interaction of these various grounds which determines agents’ duties 
to address harm.127 Robert Huseby offers a case in which “an agent negligently causes an 
accident, while a different agent intentionally avoids preventing the same accident even 
                                                 
123 See Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality.", The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World 
Poverty (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2009). 
124 See Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms. 
125 We do not deny that there may also be many instances in which various principles pick out the very 
same people and assign them duties accordingly.  
126 Caney, "Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History," pp. 472-
73. 
127 Within a single paper on allocating the costs of environmental protection, Henry Shue, for example, 
develops and defends versions of three different principles. See Shue, "Global Environment and 
International Inequality." 
  
58 
 
 
if she could have done so with virtually no cost or effort”.128 It is difficult to determine 
precisely how costs should be allocated between these agents.  But this sort of imprecision 
seems unavoidable if we are pluralists regarding the grounds of allocating responsibility 
and rejecting pluralism leads to significant difficulties of its own.129 It is commonplace in 
political theory for values to be in tension with each other, with no obvious way of striking 
precisely the right balance between them. Giving up on pluralism seems a very high price 
to pay to gain in precision.  
In addition, there is a fairly obvious way in which the tension between beneficiary 
pays and polluter pays might be partially resolved. In the case of climate change, we 
might appeal to beneficiary pays in order to allocate costs of addressing the harms of 
historic emissions (produced prior to the birth of anyone now alive), while employing 
polluter pays to allocate the costs of addressing the harms of contemporary emissions 
(produced within the lifespan of persons now alive). Beneficiary pays might be 
understood as a defeasible requirement to take on cost to address the harms contemporary 
emissions cause, outweighed by the reasons why contributors should bear the costs 
instead.130 Indeed, proponents of beneficiary pays often begin their description of cases 
by stipulating that the contributor to harm is no longer around, the clear implication being 
that were they still with us, they, rather than the beneficiary, should bear the costs of 
addressing harm. Nevertheless, while this is a plausible response, we need not rely on it.  
 
4. No Net Benefits  
 
                                                 
128 Huseby, "Should the Beneficiaries Pay?," p. 6. 
129 Miller, "Distributing Responsibilities." 
130 Huseby, "Should the Beneficiaries Pay?," p. 6. 
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Like the non-identity problem, the no-net-benefits objection claims that the beneficiary-
pays principle may be inapplicable because there may be no (or not enough) net 
beneficiaries of climate change. Caney writes: 
 
It is quite conceivable that the costs of industrialization and the costs needed to 
address anthropogenic climate change exceed the benefits to some, and maybe 
many, of industrialization. In such a case, there are no net beneficiaries and the 
Beneficiary Account, again, does not apply.131    
 
Stated in this fashion the objection includes the costs of addressing the harms of climate 
change in the calculation of whether there are any net beneficiaries (note Caney’s wording 
in the quote above: “and the costs needed to address climate change”). But it’s hardly a 
problem for the beneficiary pays principle that after disgorging benefits for the purpose 
of addressing the harms of climate change, there are no longer net beneficiaries. Indeed, 
that could be viewed as one of its intended implications.  
 A second problem relates back to the baseline issue. Note that, insofar as we 
employ (only) the standard version of the counterfactual baseline suggested by Caney, 
there is no possibility that present persons net-benefited from past industrial processes 
that contribute to climate change (due to the non-identity problem). The no-net-benefits 
possibility only presents a new worry in the intra-generational case: we might wonder 
whether there are persons now alive who are better off given industrial practices pursued 
after their birth than they would otherwise have been. But insofar as we want to know the 
                                                 
131 Caney, "Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History," p. 476. 
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answer to this question, it seems implausible to say that nobody (or few people) now alive 
in affluent states has benefited from high-emissions policies after their birth. It is precisely 
because we enjoy the benefits of emissions now and impose their costs mainly on future 
generations that climate change constitutes such a vexing problem. 
 Nevertheless, we have argued that there is another sense of benefiting (“benefiting 
as being caused to benefit”). And we argued that, on this account, it makes sense to say 
that an agent can be benefited by some process even when they are made worse off than 
they would otherwise have been. If this is right, then the following reply to the no-net-
benefits objection opens up: even if it were true that there are no net beneficiaries of 
climate change, this does not entail that those persons who have accrued some benefits 
from the process of industrialization have no special duty (in virtue of benefiting) to take 
on cost to address the harms of climate change. In other words, the assumption of the no-
net-benefits objection—that the beneficiary pays principle cannot be sustained if no 
present-day (net) beneficiaries can be found—might be mistaken.  
If it were true that present-day persons have not net-benefited from climate 
change, this would not undermine normative plausibility of beneficiary pays. Rather, at 
most it would show that it lacked implications in the climate change case. 
 
5. Unfairness  
 
Some philosophers agree that innocent beneficiaries will often have duties to address 
harm, while disagreeing that these duties are grounded in the moral relevance of 
benefiting per se. “In other words”, writes Robert Huseby, “there are many good reasons 
to agree with the mandates of the BPP [the beneficiary-pays principle], but many of these 
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reasons are not derived from that principle”.132 The worry is that in cases in which a 
beneficiary ought to take on cost to address a victim’s harm, some other background 
morally relevant factor can adequately explain the relevant intuitions, leaving no need to 
appeal to considerations regarding benefiting.  
It has been suggested, for example, that Luck Egalitarianism will account for the 
relevant intuitions in cases where it is plausible to maintain that the beneficiary has a duty 
to surrender their benefits to address harm suffered by victims.133 This is the view that, at 
a minimum, it is in some respect morally worse—but not necessarily altogether morally 
worse—when agents are unequally well off due to differential brute luck. After all, both 
the beneficiary and victim owe their benefits and harms to differential brute luck (the fact 
that some third party caused harm that neither the beneficiary nor victim had a role in). 
Consider: 
  
Climate Change: Industrial processes that occurred prior to the birth of anyone 
now alive have contributed to harms to some and benefits to other present-day 
persons. 
 
A sceptic might agree that beneficiaries of past industrial processes have a duty to use 
their benefits to address the harms suffered by victims of past industrial processes. But 
they might argue that this is a paradigmatic instance in which these person are unequally 
well off due to differential brute luck. After all, the relevant processes occurred before 
these persons were born. The sceptic might conclude that the duty to disgorge benefits, 
                                                 
132 Huseby, "Should the Beneficiaries Pay?," p. 7.  
133 For a forceful statement of this objection, see Knight, "Benefiting from Injustice and Brute Luck." 
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in fact, is owed to this other explanation. This charge may be plausible if we can identify 
cases where beneficiary pays has counterintuitive implications that luck egalitarianism 
avoids. Let’s consider whether this is plausible. 
One might object that beneficiary pays yields unfair implications: (1) if we accept 
beneficiary pays, then a beneficiary will need to take on cost that others who are equally 
advantaged by brute luck are not required to. Therefore the beneficiary will be worse off 
through no fault of their own than the beneficiary of brute luck; (2) if we accept 
beneficiary pays, then a victim of harm (which has benefited another) will be made better 
off than a victim of bad brute luck (which has not benefited another).134  This is because 
beneficiary pays only generates a duty for a beneficiary to address the harm suffered by 
a victim of that harm. The argument holds that these asymmetries in treatment are unfair. 
Note that this objection is general in form, and is not specific to the specific application 
of beneficiary pays to the climate case.  
 Luck Egalitarianism, however, would fail to account for the apparently directed 
nature of these duties. Proponents of beneficiary pays have argued that beneficiaries have 
special duties to those whose harm their benefits derive from, in particular, rather than 
anyone in general who has been harmed through no fault of their own. For example, 
consider the following case: 
 
No Promotion: Senior members of a law firm create a work environment that 
systematically disadvantages women in seeking promotion to senior positions.135  
 
                                                 
134 Ibid., pp. 594-95. 
135 Barry and Wiens, "Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," p. 9. 
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In this case, it is clear that some men benefit from the firm’s discriminatory practices, 
even if they did not know about or contribute to the discriminatory environment. Some 
presumably benefited by being promoted unfairly, others enjoyed a better chance of 
promotion even if they did not receive it. Both Luck Egalitarians and proponents of 
benefiting-related duties will think that these men incur a duty to surrender their benefits 
from the discriminatory practices. However, (between the two alternatives) only 
beneficiary pays entails that the men should address the harm to the women, in particular. 
Luck Egalitarianism, by contrast, entails that the men ought to disgorge their benefits, but 
requires only that these benefits are used to address harms suffered by anyone who is 
worse off through no fault of their own. We submit that failing to account for the directed 
nature of beneficiaries’ duties is unfair and, therefore, that beneficiary pays yields more 
plausible verdicts than Luck Egalitarianism.136  
  
6. Unburdening the Affluent? 
 
This objection is that beneficiary pays risks undermining duties of the affluent to take on 
cost to address harms suffered by the global poor (including harms suffered as a result of 
climate change). After all, suppose it turned out that the affluent have not, in fact, 
benefited from wrongdoing or injustice in the case of climate change. In this case, Carl 
Knight argues, beneficiary pays risks “providing a reason why, in principle, some rich 
countries might be excused from obligations, on the basis that they have not benefited 
                                                 
136 Note, in Chapter 3, I will argue that beneficiary pays is indeed grounded on some other morally 
relevant factor (not based on Luck Egalitarian considerations) but that this fact does not imperil the 
beneficiary pays principle. 
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from injustice.” And, inversely, it also risks “providing a reason why, in principle, some 
poor countries are not due assistance, as they have not been subjected to injustice.”137 
Let us grant that if the citizens of affluent states have not benefited from 
wrongdoing or injustice, then beneficiary pays alone will not generate a duty for them to 
address the harms suffered by the global poor as a result of climate change. However, 
there is no reason to worry about this prospect at all, since citizens of affluent states may 
be duty-bound to address the harms suffered by the global poor as a result of climate 
change for reasons unrelated to being beneficiaries of these harms.  
 An analogy with polluter pays helps to illustrate this. Suppose that there are two 
towns situated along a river bank. The upstream town releases toxins into the river from 
which the downstream town draws its water supply. Furthermore, suppose that, shortly 
after, some of the downstream townsfolk fall ill. If it could be shown that the toxins 
contributed to the illness, then the upstream townsfolk would incur duties to compensate 
for the harms that the downstream townsfolk suffer. And if it could be satisfactorily 
shown that the toxins did not contribute to the illness at all, then the upstream townsfolk 
would have no duty based on polluter pays to compensate for the illness. But proving that 
the toxins did not contribute to the illness would do nothing to demonstrate that the 
upstream townsfolk have no duty to take on cost to address the harms suffered by the 
downstream townsfolk. Perhaps they are much richer, and therefore have capacity-related 
duties to aid. Or perhaps some other ground of responsibility applies.  
                                                 
137 Knight, "Benefiting from Injustice and Brute Luck," p. 597. 
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If Knight is instead making the claim that, if the affluent have not benefited from 
wrongdoing or injustice then external grounds of responsibility will be undermined, the 
objection is implausible.  
 
7. Excusable Ignorance  
 
Some philosophers have argued that prior to some relevant point in time in which climate 
change was reasonably well understood, agents were excusably ignorant of the harms 
their emissions contributed to.138  Furthermore, historic emitters were unaware that the 
atmosphere is an exhaustible good with a capacity for only a limited amount of aggregate 
emissions. Lastly, these historic emitters were also excusably ignorant of the modern legal 
idea of strict liability—that is, the idea that they could be held liable for harms caused 
even under conditions of excusable ignorance. Therefore, the accumulation of emissions 
during this time should be excused and so contemporary beneficiaries of these emissions 
have benefited from excused harms. Since beneficiary pays only generates duties to 
address harm in cases in which some have benefited from non-excused harms (rather than 
mere harms), then beneficiary pays cannot assign present-day beneficiaries of past 
industrial emissions with special duties to address its associated harms.  
We fully agree that, until some relevant point in time, historic emitters did not 
know, nor reasonably could have been expected to know, that their emissions would 
contribute to harmful climate change. So it is true that they should be excused because of 
the evidence and beliefs they had at the time. Furthermore, we agree that this makes an 
                                                 
138 Schüssler, "Climate Justice: A Question of Historical Responsibility?."; Kingston, "Climate Justice 
and Temporally Remote Emissions." 
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important moral difference to how we should evaluate their actions—it would be 
inappropriate to blame historic emitters for their actions or think of them as bad people. 
Nevertheless, they did, in fact, contribute to a state of affairs in which some are 
wrongfully harmed. We think that this is enough to ground duties to address the harms of 
climate change consistent with a plausible interpretation of beneficiary pays. Consider an 
analogy: 
 
Fishing Villages: There are two villages, the populations of which depend for food 
upon fishing in a common river. As long as anybody can remember, neither village 
has ever suffered from scarcity in the supply of fish. Neither village has any 
accurate means of measuring the quantity of fish that the river contains, but in any 
case, it does not appear that the fish are an exhaustible resource. For many years 
now, the Upstream Villagers have been taking out many fish and storing them in 
the snow in their locality. Eventually, Downstream Village can no longer procure 
enough fish to sustain its population, which starts to go hungry. Both villages then 
realise that the fish stocks were exhaustible after all.   
 
The Upstream Villagers are excusably ignorant of the harms their over-fishing is, in fact, 
contributing to. They believe that the fish are a non-exhaustible resource and have no 
evidence to contradict this belief (nor should they have, because they had no means to 
acquire reliable evidence). Nevertheless, as a result of their actions, the Downstream 
Villagers are now going hungry, while they still enjoy the benefits of the stored fish. 
Nevertheless, it seems to be a paradigm case in which the Upstream Villagers ought to 
address the Downstream Villagers’ harms by surrendering to them some of their fish 
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stocks. And they would have more reason to do this than equally well-off people who 
were not connected to the Downstream Villagers’ harms in this way. Furthermore, it does 
not matter that the Upstream Villagers also contributed to the problem (so were not mere 
beneficiaries), since we might imagine that the fish stocks were passed down to their 
descendants, or given to a neighbouring town, in which case the latter ought to surrender 
a share of their fish. We take this example to show that some agents may be excusably 
ignorant that their actions contribute to a situation in which some suffer harms, and that 
this is enough for a plausible version of beneficiary pays to assign duties to address that 
harm.   
 
8. Conclusion 
 
We have examined what we take to be the most challenging objections that have been 
presented to the beneficiary-pays principle. While we have not attempted to develop a 
positive argument for beneficiary pays, we have suggested various ways in which it might 
be plausibly interpreted so that it can avoid these objections. Beneficiary pays remains a 
principle of moral and potentially practical importance for allocating the costs of 
addressing human-induced climate change. 
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Part II: Theory  
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Chapter 3: The Conceptual Space of Beneficiary Pays 
 
This thesis has so far introduced beneficiary pays as a principle of responsibility for 
allocating the costs of addressing climate change. It has also defended this principle 
against sceptical attack. In short, the beneficiary pays principle seems initially plausible 
and can be defended against sceptical attack. This chapter examines four possible (and 
exhaustive) ways of formulating beneficiary pays. I argue that there is a prima facie case 
in favour of an interpretation of beneficiary pays that holds that the moral relevance of 
benefiting reduces to some other factor, and that duties should only be allocated in the 
presence of some other factor. The second half of this chapter examines – and rejects – 
four existing proposals regarding when beneficiary pays is triggered to allocate duties, 
paving the way for my own positive account in the next chapter. 
  
1. Primitivity, Atomicity, and the Conceptual Space of Beneficiary Pays 
 
I start by mapping the conceptual space of the beneficiary pays principle. A positive 
account of beneficiary pays must take a stand on two important distinctions. The first of 
these distinctions is whether benefiting is a primitive or non-primitive factor. The second 
of these distinctions is whether benefiting is an atomic or non-atomic factor. I will start 
with the first of these distinctions. Consider the following example, which I will return to 
later in this chapter: 
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Stolen Car: Bill steals John’s car and gives it to Susan, who is innocent of any 
wrongdoing herself. Bill can no longer be found, nor does he leave behind assets 
that can be seized.139 
 
Many theorists would agree that the beneficiary, Susan, has a duty to relinquish John’s 
car. But what grounds this duty? One answer is that Susan’s duty is grounded in her 
benefiting from a wrongful process (and she might have an independent duty to relinquish 
the car too). This view holds that benefiting per se is a primitive factor. As I shall 
understand it, a factor, F, is primitive if it grounds a duty to perform some action, φ, 
without that duty being ultimately reducible to some other morally relevant factor, F*. 
Yet one might think that Susan’s duty to relinquish the car is not ultimately grounded in 
the fact that she has benefited from a wrongful process, but rather in some additional 
factor. This view holds that benefiting per se is not a primitive factor. Put precisely, a 
factor, F, is non-primitive if it does not ground a duty for agents to perform some action, 
φ, without that duty being ultimately reducible to some other morally relevant factor. In 
this case, the moral relevance of F would in fact reduce to the moral relevance of the other 
factor F*. A duty may be grounded in the conjunction of two or more factors, for example 
F and F*, and neither of these factors reduce to any other factor. In this case, both F and 
F* would be primitive. 
 The second distinction is between atomic or non-atomic factors. As I shall 
understand it, a factor is atomic if it generates duties without being conjoined with other 
                                                 
139 Barry and Wiens, "Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," p. 3. 
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necessary factors. A factor is non-atomic if it only generates duties when conjoined with 
other necessary factors. 
 When taken together, these distinctions entail that there are four exhaustive 
possibilities regarding the conceptual space of the beneficiary pays principle. 
 
Table 1. The Conceptual Space of Beneficiary Pays. 
If benefiting 
is: 
Primitive Non-Primitive 
Atomic All cases of benefiting trigger the 
allocation of duties by beneficiary pays, 
and this allocation of duties is grounded 
in the fact of benefiting. That is, the 
moral relevance of benefiting does not 
reduce to any other factor.  
All cases of benefiting trigger the allocation 
of duties by beneficiary pays, but this 
allocation of duties is not ultimately 
grounded in the fact of benefiting. That is, the 
moral relevance of benefiting reduces to 
some other factor. 
Non-Atomic Not all cases of benefiting trigger the 
allocation of duties by beneficiary pays. 
However, in the cases in which duties are 
triggered, these duties are grounded in 
the fact of benefiting. That is, the moral 
relevance of benefiting does not reduce 
to any other factor (thus, primitive), but 
beneficiary pays is only triggered in the 
presence of some other factor (thus, non-
atomic).  
Not all cases of benefiting trigger the 
allocation of duties by beneficiary pays. 
However, in the cases in which duties are 
triggered, these duties are not ultimately 
grounded in the fact of benefiting. That is, the 
moral relevance of benefiting reduces to 
some other factor (thus, non-primitive), and 
beneficiary pays is only triggered in the 
presence of some other factor (thus, non-
atomic). 
 
Understood in this way, the primitive or non-primitive distinction concerns the normative 
grounding of the duties allocated by beneficiary pays – is it the fact of benefiting per se 
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that grounds the duties allocated by beneficiary pays, or are these duties ultimately 
grounded in some other morally relevant factor? The atomic or non-atomic distinction 
concerns the conditions that must be satisfied in order for beneficiary pays to allocate a 
beneficiary duties – do all cases of benefiting trigger the allocation of duties by 
beneficiary pays, or do only some? If only some, what are the further conditions that must 
be satisfied for beneficiary pays to come into play? These distinctions are cross-cutting 
and exhaustive. I will now examine the strengths and weakness of each of four 
possibilities.  
 
2. Is Benefiting a Primitive or Non-Primitive Factor? 
 
In this section, I examine whether we should understand benefiting as a primitive or non-
primitive factor. If the former, then this rules out the interpretations of beneficiary pays 
on the right-hand side of Table 1. If the latter, then this rules out the interpretations of 
beneficiary pays on the left-hand side of Table 1. In section 3, I then examine whether we 
should understand benefiting as an atomic or non-atomic factor. If the former, then this 
rules out interpretations of beneficiary pays on the bottom-half of Table 1. If the latter, 
then this rules out interpretations of beneficiary pays on the top-half of Table 1. Therefore, 
after examining both distinctions, only one possibility should remain. I conclude that 
there is a prima facie case in favour of an interpretation of beneficiary pays that 
understands benefiting as a non-atomic and non-primitive factor. 
In the previous section I claimed that many theorists will agree that Susan has a 
duty to relinquish the car towards John in Stolen Car. But I asked what grounds this duty? 
Now, notice that one might appeal to the moral importance of property-entitlements to 
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explain why a duty should be allocated to Susan in this case. According to this argument, 
it is because Susan does not have a property-entitlement to the car, and John does, that 
grounds the allocation of the duty. If this is right, then it is plausible that Susan’s duty is 
not grounded in the moral relevance of benefiting per se but in this additional property-
entitlements factor. Notice also, that this property-entitlements rationale for allocating 
duties is not isolated to the Stolen Car case. As Robert Goodin argues, when a person 
benefits from wrongdoing or injustice, they typically end up with material advantages 
that they have no entitlement to, yet others do. According to this argument, it is the fact 
that the beneficiary has no entitlement to these advantages that explains why they should 
be allocated a duty to relinquish them.140 If all relevant cases in which beneficiary pays 
is triggered the allocated duties could be justified by appeal to property-entitlements, then 
this would suggest that it is property-entitlements which are morally primitive and not 
benefiting per se.  
 Some might object that even if we could explain why beneficiaries should be 
allocated additional duties by appealing to some other factor such as property-
entitlements, this would not suggest that benefiting per se is not a morally primitive factor. 
All that has been shown is that Stolen Car is a case in which some other factor – additional 
to the fact that they benefited – is able to ground a duty for the beneficiary to relinquish 
their benefits. But this does not show that benefiting is not morally primitive, since 
benefiting might also be morally relevant and capable of grounding Susan’s duty to 
relinquish the car (i.e. even in the absence of considerations about property-entitlements). 
And even if benefiting could not also ground Susan’s duty in this case, there might 
                                                 
140 Goodin, "Disgorging the Fruits of Historical Wrongdoing." 
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nevertheless be other cases in which benefiting per se can ground the beneficiary’s duty 
to relinquish their benefits (i.e. cases in which a duty should be allocated but 
considerations relating to property are not relevant). According to this objection, in order 
to undermine the view that benefiting is a primitive factor, one must show that it is 
impossible that there could be cases in which benefiting per se grounds the allocation of 
duties. A statement of this objection is given by Bashshar Haydar and Gerhard Øverland, 
who argue: 
 
Generally speaking, in order to establish that a given factor (F) is not morally 
relevant, it is not enough to show 1) that F can be overshadowed by other morally 
relevant factors, or 2) that F on its own does not always make a tangible moral 
difference. In order to show that F is not a morally relevant factor, one needs to 
demonstrate that there are no conditions under which the presence of F would 
make a moral difference.141  
 
One problem with this argument is that it allocates the burden of proof in a way that is 
unduly favourable to the view that benefiting is a primitive factor. Why should the burden 
be placed on those who believe that benefiting is not a primitive factor to demonstrate 
that there could be no cases in which benefiting per se grounds the allocated duty, rather 
than placing the burden on those who support this view to demonstrate that there are some 
cases where no other factor besides benefiting could justify the allocation of the 
beneficiary’s duty? The problem with Haydar and Øverland’s allocation of the burden of 
                                                 
141 Emphasis added. Haydar and Øverland, "The Normative Implications of Benefiting from Injustice," 
p. 352. 
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proof is that there is always a possibility that one could develop a case, not previously 
examined, in which the beneficiary should be allocated a duty and allege that no factor 
other than benefiting could ground the allocation of duties. And if this was enough to 
justify the assumption that benefiting is morally primitive, then the opponent of this view 
would have no possibility of justifying their view, since there is no end to the amount of 
cases that one can develop. Robert Huseby instead places the burden of proof on those 
who believe benefiting is a primitive factor to justify their view: 
 
It is hard to argue conclusively that no cases can be devised in which benefiting 
from injustice gives rise to duties of compensation. But it is noteworthy that many 
of the cases explicitly intended to support the principle can be explained without 
reference to the BPP at all. Of course, this could still mean either that it is the BPP 
that does the work, or that it would have done the work, had the other factors been 
absent. But there is little reason to think so, given that these other factors are well-
known and widely accepted (for instance assisting people in dire need, giving up 
stolen goods that happen to be in your possession, honouring contracts, LE [Luck 
Egalitarianism], etc.142 
 
According to Huseby, all that can reasonably be expected of those who think that 
benefiting is not a primitive factor is that they can show that some other factor (such as 
property-entitlements) grounds the allocation of duties by beneficiary pays in a relevant 
range of cases. And if the other factor (such as property-entitlements) is already widely-
                                                 
142 Huseby, "Should the Beneficiaries Pay?," p. 9. 
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agreed to be morally relevant, then it is plausible but defeasible assumption that the duty 
is in fact grounded in that factor, rather than benefiting. Therefore, this assumption is 
warranted unless (and until) one can develop a new case in which only benefiting per se 
could plausibly ground the beneficiary’s duty. Since this is a prima facie argument, the 
warrant for the view that benefiting is a non-primitive factor is not definitive. It could be 
overturned if the burden of proof is met.  
 One might object that this argument for shifting the burden of proof neglects an 
important fact—namely, that there is direct intuitive support for the claim that benefiting 
per se is a morally primitive factor. For example, suppose that we demanded of a 
beneficiary of wrongdoing that they relinquish their benefits but they refused, pointing 
out that they did not contribute to the wrongdoing in question. Suppose that we then 
countered: ‘It’s true that you did not contribute to the injustice, but you did benefit from 
it, and because of this you should relinquish your benefits’. If this claim has significant 
intuitive force, then one might think that the burden of proof should be placed on those 
who think that benefiting is not a morally primitive factor. But what gives a sentence such 
as this its intuitive force is precisely what is at stake in the disagreement between those 
who think that benefiting is a primitive factor and those who do not. The latter already 
accept that in many cases it will be intuitive that a beneficiary of injustice should 
relinquish their gains. They merely disagree on what the normative grounds of benefiting-
related duties consists in. Perhaps the reason why we find it intuitive that the beneficiary 
should relinquish their benefits is because they have no entitlement to the property that 
they gained as a result of wrongdoing. And if this factor is independently plausible, then 
arguably it accounts for the intuitive force of the sentence, rather than benefiting per se. 
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Whether there is a prima facie case that benefiting is not a primitive factor 
ultimately depends on whether the allocation of benefiting-related duties can be given a 
convincing alternative rationale. In the following chapter I argue that rule-
consequentialism can justify the allocation of benefiting-related duties in a relevant range 
of cases. If this is correct, then we should (prima facie) rule out the two possible ways of 
understanding beneficiary pays on the left-hand side of Table 1. The two possibilities that 
remain are that benefiting is a non-primitive and atomic factor, or that it is a non-primitive 
and non-atomic factor.  
  
3. Is Benefiting an Atomic or Non-Atomic Factor?  
 
The task of showing that benefiting is not an atomic factor would be successful if it could 
be demonstrated that there are at least some cases of benefiting in which it is implausible 
that beneficiary pays should allocate duties, even if it is plausible that there are many 
other cases in which beneficiary pays should allocate duties. Can it be shown that that 
there are at least some cases of benefiting in which it is implausible that beneficiary pays 
should allocate duties? Recently, some theorists have claimed that there are such cases.143 
According to Norbert Anwander, for example, it is counterintuitive that the beneficiaries 
should be allocated additional duties in: 
  
Hiroshima: Most of us have benefited from what was done to the citizens of 
Hiroshima. Every time we have an X-ray the safety data used to set the dose of 
                                                 
143 Another much discussed case appears in Robert K Fullinwider, "Preferential Hiring and 
Compensation," Social Theory and Practice 3, no. 3 (1975): pp. 316-18. Daniel Butt responds to this case 
in Butt, "On Benefiting from Injustice," pp. 139-43. 
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radiation can be directly traced back to the events at Hiroshima. The same holds 
for patients receiving radiotherapy and for people working in nuclear power 
stations. We can estimate the risks of radiation because we are able to correlate 
the incidence of disease with the dose of radiation that the survivors received. 144 
 
Anwander suggests, however, that it is counterintuitive to think that most of us who have 
benefited in this way have any additional duties with respect to the harm done from the 
bombing of Hiroshima. He writes: “I take this result to show that we should reject the 
claim that it is always wrong to benefit from injustice”.145  
Another case is developed by Robert Huseby, who similarly claims that “There 
are quite a few ways of benefiting from injustice, and many of them appear not to imply 
that one is not entitled to one’s holdings or benefits”:146  
 
Shady Garden: Suppose that B has a giant tree in his backyard, and that he is 
within his right to have it there. The tree provides the shadow necessary to grow 
some delicate vegetables and flowers that he is fond of. Shadow-intensive 
gardening, moreover, is B’s favourite hobby. A and C, B’s neighbours on each 
side, both despise the tree, as it blocks the sun from their backyards, and prevents 
them from enjoying fully the pools that they have both put in. … After a while, 
A’s patience runs out, and one weekend, while both B and C are away, A cuts the 
tree down. Subsequently, A dies from the effort. B, of course, is devastated (over 
                                                 
144 Norbert Anwander, "Contributing and Benefiting: Two Grounds for Duties to the Victims of 
Injustice," Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005): p. 40. 
145 Ibid., p. 41. 
146 Huseby, "Should the Beneficiaries Pay?," p. 14.  
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the loss of the tree rather than A’s death). C too is appalled by A’s act, and sorry 
for B’s loss, but also quite happy that the tree is finally gone. He can now enjoy 
swimming in the baking sun.147  
 
After reflecting on Shady Garden, Huseby argues: “B is clearly harmed by A’s unjust act, 
and C has clearly benefited from it. It is very unclear, however, that C owes B 
compensation, or that C is not entitled to either his holdings or his level of benefits or 
welfare”.148 According to Huseby, the beneficiary pays principle cannot justify duties in 
this case, and cases structurally analogous to this one in the important respects.  
In fact, Huseby claims that “the most severe problem” for the beneficiary pays 
principle is that it cannot plausibly allocate duties in such cases.149 But it is worth briefly 
noting that Huseby’s inference from (i) ‘it would be implausible for beneficiary pays to 
allocate duties in some cases’ to (ii) ‘the truth of (i) is the most severe problem for the 
beneficiary pays principle’ is unsound. Even if it would be counterintuitive to allocate 
duties to the beneficiaries in these cases, this would not necessarily constitute a severe 
problem for the beneficiary pays principle, since we might understand that principle as 
invoking a non-atomic understanding of benefiting. And if benefiting was a non-atomic 
factor, then the proponent of beneficiary pays could claim that there are other factors in 
cases in which benefiting-related duties should be allocated that are not present in cases 
like Hiroshima or Shady Garden, and that these factors thus explain why no duty should 
be allocated by beneficiary pays in Hiroshima and Shady Garden. Consider, for example, 
an account developed by Christian Barry and David Wiens who claim that beneficiary 
                                                 
147 Ibid. 
148 Original emphasis. Ibid. 
149 Ibid.  
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pays is triggered if and only if retaining the benefits would sustain wrongful harm. 
Plausibly, none of the beneficiaries in either of these cases would sustain wrongful harm 
by retaining their benefits and, therefore, should not be allocated any additional duty to 
relinquish their benefits according to this account. In Shady Garden, the victim’s harm 
will not be ameliorated if the beneficiary chose to forgo swimming in his pool. In 
Hiroshima, the victims’ harm will not be ameliorated by the beneficiary forgoing medical 
treatment made possible by the use of radiation data. Whether Barry and Wiens’s own 
account is plausible remains to be seen. But the general point is that it is premature to 
conclude that beneficiary pays is implausible if there are some cases of benefiting in 
which duties should not be allocated. We can potentially invoke the distinction between 
benefiting as an atomic or non-atomic factor to undermine some sources of scepticism 
about beneficiary pays. I will return to accounts of beneficiary pays that understand 
benefiting as a non-atomic factor later. 
But is Anwander and Huseby’s general point that it would be implausible for 
beneficiary pays to allocate additional duties in these cases correct? If so, these cases 
would strongly suggest that benefiting was not an atomic factor. One might respond that 
the cases show no such thing. First, one might claim that the objection equivocates on 
whether these duties are being understood as pro-tanto or all-things-considered duties. 
Recall from Chapter 1, a beneficiary who has a pro-tanto duty to relinquish their benefits 
does not necessarily have an all-things-considered duty to do so—there might be 
countervailing considerations which prevent them from having this responsibility. One 
might agree, then, with Anwander and Huseby that it would be counterintuitive in 
Hiroshima and Shady Garden to allocate beneficiaries a full-blown responsibility to 
relinquish their benefits, but insist that it would nevertheless be appropriate to allocate 
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them with pro-tanto duties. If so, then even if we agree that the beneficiaries in Hiroshima 
and Shady Garden have no responsibility to relinquish their benefits, these cases would 
not really be counterexamples to beneficiary pays incorporating an atomic understanding 
of benefiting – in other words, the claim is that these beneficiaries would have a 
responsibility to relinquish their benefits if there were no sufficiently weighty 
countervailing considerations, which in fact there are. If, for some reason or another, these 
countervailing considerations were removed, then the pro-tanto duty would trigger the 
allocation of a full-blown responsibility to relinquish their benefits. 
To make this response plausible, one would need to show that there is some 
countervailing consideration present in Hiroshima and Shady Garden that prevents an 
alleged pro-tanto duty from allocating full-blown responsibility. Perhaps in the former 
case, for example, one might point out that the benefits are medical in nature – we benefit 
by receiving radiotherapy treatments made safer by the data derived from the bombing of 
Hiroshima. And one might appeal to the special importance of health in order to outweigh 
the claim that such beneficiaries should be allocated a responsibility to relinquish these 
medical benefits, or some monetary value corresponding to these benefits – arguably, it 
is particularly important that people are not discouraged from medical treatment by the 
prospect of bearing greater costs. If so, then one might hold that beneficiaries of more 
accurate radiation therapy have no additional responsibility towards the victims of 
Hiroshima, but that they would have such a responsibility if it were not for the special 
medical nature of the benefits in question (so that their pro-tanto duties were not 
outweighed by considerations regarding the importance of health). 
Anwander and Huseby might object to this response that, upon reflection, it is still 
counterintuitive that the beneficiaries in Hiroshima and Shady Garden should be 
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allocated duties to relinquish their benefits, even if we are clear that these may be 
interpreted in a pro-tanto sense. Their claim would then be that it is counterintuitive that 
beneficiary pays should allocate a duty at all, no matter whether there were sufficiently 
weighty countervailing considerations that prevent this pro-tanto duty becoming a full-
blown responsibility to relinquish benefits. In Shady Garden, for example, do we really 
think that the neighbour, C, should point to some countervailing consideration as a 
justification for why he refuses to give up the benefit of enjoying his sunny garden? What 
if he could not point to any such consideration, would he then be required to stop enjoying 
his sunny garden? The idea that he would be required to do so seems quite implausible.  
But we need not rely on intuitions alone. The case in favour of the view that the 
neighbour, C, should not be allocated even pro-tanto duties would be stronger if it could 
be shown that there are principled independent reasons to say that beneficiary pays should 
allocate duties in some cases but not others. I have already mentioned one account that 
attempts to show this – namely, Barry and Wiens’s view that additional duties should 
(only) be allocated in cases in which retaining the benefits would sustain wrongful harm. 
If such an account could be maintained, this would offer independent reasons to reject the 
view that beneficiary pays should allocate pro-tanto duties in Shady Garden (insofar as 
the neighbour would not sustain wrongful harm by enjoying his sunny garden, as seems 
eminently plausible). In section 3, I consider four such proposals before turning to my 
own account in the following chapter. If any of these proposals (or my own) is correct, 
then the argument that it would be implausible for beneficiary pays to allocate duties in 
Hiroshima and Shady Garden is not vulnerable to the objection that it would be 
appropriate for beneficiary pays to merely allocate pro-tanto duties. Thus these cases 
would strongly suggest that benefiting is not an atomic factor. 
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One might advance a second objection to Anwander and Huseby’s claim that it 
would be implausible for beneficiary pays to allocate duties in Hiroshima and Shady 
Garden—namely, one might claim that while it is indeed implausible that beneficiary 
pays should allocate demanding duties to address the harms done to the victims, it is 
nevertheless plausible that beneficiary pays should allocate an undemanding 
responsibility to address the harms done to the victims. For example, perhaps we should 
understand the beneficiaries in Hiroshima as having a responsibility merely “…not to 
forget, and not to whitewash” the historical origin of the medical data from which they 
benefit, as Lynn Gillam argues with respect to the case of benefiting from data sourced 
from Nazi experiments.150 To be reminded of the historical origin of the data used for 
radiation therapy is a small cost for a beneficiary to pay for the large benefit of undergoing 
a potentially life-saving treatment. And it is not counterintuitive that they should bear 
such a minimal cost. 
To justify that the beneficiaries’ responsibility in Hiroshima is especially 
undemanding, one might appeal to the significant passage of time between the initial 
wrongdoing and the benefits enjoyed in present-day radiotherapy treatments. One might 
claim that, ordinarily, the longer the passage of time the less demanding the benefiting-
related duties should be. What reasons could be given in support of this claim? First, in 
general, the longer the passage of time the less likely it is that one’s enjoying the benefits 
would depend only on the initial wrongdoing. For example, independent medical research 
has also made important contributions to improving the accuracy of radiotherapy 
treatments, so it is quite plausible that a great part of the production of the benefit was 
                                                 
150 Gillam, "Is It Ethical to Use Data from Nazi Medical Experiments?". 
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legitimate. Second, one might think that victims’ entitlements over particular benefits 
may weaken or even vanish over time if, and to the extent that, other agents have pressing 
needs regarding the benefits.151 In the case of medical radiation therapy, there is clearly a 
pressing need for using the historical data to determine an accurate dose. However, a 
problem with this response is that it only applies to Hiroshima. In Shady Garden, the 
passage of time between the wrongdoing (the tree being cut down) and the benefit (the 
neighbour being able to enjoy their now sunny garden) is instantaneous. Therefore, this 
response is unable to justify that the beneficiary should be allocated a very undemanding 
duty in this case.  
In this section, I have been evaluating the claim that there are cases of benefiting 
from wrongdoing in which it is counterintuitive that the beneficiary should be allocated 
a duty to relinquish their gains. If the beneficiaries in Hiroshima and Shady Garden 
should not be allocated additional duties, then this strongly suggests that benefiting is not 
an atomic factor. I responded to two objections to the claim it is counterintuitive that these 
beneficiaries should be allocated additional duties. The first objection alleged that it is 
not counterintuitive to think that the beneficiary should be allocated merely a pro-tanto 
duty, even if it is counterintuitive that they should be allocated an all-things-considered 
duty. The second objection alleged that it is not counterintuitive to think that the 
beneficiary should be allocated a very undemanding duty, even if it is counterintuitive 
that they should be allocated a demanding duty. I argued that neither of these responses 
succeed. If so, then the case against understanding benefiting as an atomic factor stands. 
This strongly suggests that we should not formulate beneficiary pays in either of the two 
                                                 
151 Jeremy Waldron makes this point with respect to claims for reparation in the case of historic injustice, 
such as the colonial appropriation of land from indigenous inhabitants. Jeremy Waldron, "Superseding 
Historic Injustice," Ethics 103, no. 1 (1992). 
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possible ways on the top-half of Table 1. Since we already (prima facie) ruled out the two 
possibilities on the left-hand side of Table 1 in the previous section, only the possibility 
in the bottom-right quadrant remains—namely, that benefiting is a non-primitive and non-
atomic factor. 
 
4. Criterions of Distinction 
 
We now turn to accounts of beneficiary pays which hold that benefiting is a non-atomic 
and non-primitive factor. That is, they claim that not all cases of benefiting trigger the 
allocation of duties. Furthermore, in the cases in which duties are triggered, these duties 
are not ultimately grounded in the fact of benefiting. That is, the moral relevance of 
benefiting reduces to some other factor, and beneficiary pays is only triggered in the 
presence of some other factor(s).  
A main challenge for these accounts is that they are committed to the claim that 
there must be other factors which are not present in some cases of benefiting which are 
necessary and sufficient for the allocation of benefiting-related duties. As Christian Barry 
and David Wiens have argued, theorists who endorse duties in only some cases of 
benefiting must provide a ‘criterion of distinction’ which gives principled grounds for 
separating cases of ‘benefiting-with-duty’ from cases of ‘benefiting-without-duty’.152 
What are these factors? In the following, I examine four proposals that aim to provide 
principled grounds for separating these cases. 
 
                                                 
152 Barry and Wiens, "Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," p. 6. 
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5. Actively and Passively Benefiting 
 
In ‘Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties’, Thomas Pogge argues for a specific 
negative duty not to profit from injustice without compensating or making reform 
efforts.153 However, while he endorses a specific form of this duty, he rejects “…any 
general negative duty not to profit from injustice without compensating protection and 
reform efforts” and he claims that “Such a duty can be refuted by example”.154 To support 
this claim, he develops the following case: 
 
Cleaner Air: Whether they want to or not, all people everywhere profit from 
breathing air that is cleaner than it would be if large numbers of human beings 
were not unjustly kept in extreme poverty and thereby severely constrained in 
their polluting activities.155 
 
With respect to this case, Pogge claims that: “Still, it is plausible that people not involved 
in sustaining this injustice owe no compensation to the global poor pursuant to a negative 
duty not to profit from injustice”.156 In other words, while everyone benefits from injustice 
in the form of enjoying air made cleaner as a result of extreme poverty, only some of these 
beneficiaries may owe compensation to the global poor. For the others, the fact of their 
benefiting alone is not enough to trigger their duty to provide compensation or make 
reform efforts. According to Pogge, then, benefiting cannot be an atomic factor. Rather, 
                                                 
153 Pogge, "Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties," pp. 69-74. 
154 Ibid., p. 70. 
155 Ibid.  
156 Ibid.  
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benefiting must be conjoined with other necessary and sufficient conditions in order for 
the relevant duty to be generated.  
But what are these conditions? Pogge, in discussing objections to his work by 
Norbert Anwander,157 entertains a distinction between actively and passively profiting 
from injustice to suggest why many beneficiaries in Cleaner Air may not have a 
responsibility to compensate the global poor. The suggestion is that it is only in cases in 
which a beneficiary actively profits from injustice will they violate the relevant duty. If 
so, then actively profiting from injustice would be a necessary condition for the violation 
of the relevant duty. However many beneficiaries in Cleaner Air merely passively benefit 
from injustice and, therefore, would not violate the relevant duty.158 On the other hand, 
Pogge suggests that actively benefiting from injustice is sufficient to violate a duty not to 
profit from injustice without making compensation or reform efforts. He discusses the 
following case: 
 
Cheap Consumables: Most anything we buy is cheaper than it would be if severe 
poverty were avoided: If the bottom of the global wage scale were higher than it 
is today, products containing a poor-country labor component (coffee and textiles, 
for example) would be more expensive. 159  
 
With respect to this case, Pogge claims that “…by buying them at these prices we are 
actively taking advantage of injustice” and “In actively profiting without adequate 
                                                 
157 Anwander, "Contributing and Benefiting: Two Grounds for Duties to the Victims of Injustice". 
158 In his words, this is a case which features “certain profitings that cannot be declined by their 
beneficiaries”. See also the further discussion of Anwander’s criticisms throughout Thomas Pogge, "Severe 
Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties," pp. 70-72. 
159 Ibid., p. 72. 
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compensation, we are violating a negative duty”.160 By appealing to this distinction, then, 
Pogge hopes to consistently endorse a duty not to profit from injustice in Cheap 
Consumables while claiming that some beneficiaries of injustice, for example in the 
Cleaner Air case, do not violate this duty even if they do not make compensation or 
reform efforts.  
 What does it mean to actively or passively benefit from injustice? I will consider 
various interpretations of actively benefiting and examine whether any would render 
Pogge’s criterion of distinction plausible. The first four of these interpretations 
incorporate an attitudinal component: A beneficiary actively benefited if they (i) intended 
to benefit from injustice, (ii) foresaw that their benefit derived from injustice, (iii) should 
have foreseen that their benefit derived from injustice, or (iv) would not have refused the 
benefit even if they did foresee that their benefit derived from injustice. A final 
interpretation only requires an agential component: A beneficiary actively benefited if 
they merely (v) put themselves in a position where they stood to benefit from injustice.  
The first interpretation holds that a beneficiary actively benefited if they intended 
to benefit from injustice. One version of this view is discussed by Avia Pasternak, who 
writes that a beneficiary actively benefits if she “deliberately put herself in a position 
where she stands to profit from wrongdoing”.161 A second version of this view is 
discussed by Norbert Anwander, who characterises instances of actively benefiting as 
beneficiaries who are “seeking to take advantage of” wrongdoing or injustice.162 Notice, 
these two interpretations require that the beneficiary had a particular attitude in order to 
                                                 
160 Ibid. 
161 Emphasis added. Avia Pasternak, "Voluntary Benefits from Wrongdoing," Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2014): p. 379. 
162 Original emphasis. Anwander, "Contributing and Benefiting: Two Grounds for Duties to the Victims 
of Injustice," p. 43. 
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count as an active beneficiary: a beneficiary must have intended to profit from 
wrongdoing or injustice in the sense that they deliberately tried to profit or sought to profit 
from injustice. The important question is whether this interpretation would yield plausible 
verdicts for Pogge’s criterion. Unfortunately, Pogge’s criterion, understood in this sense, 
is problematic. One problem is that this interpretation would not allocate duties in a 
slightly different version of Cheap Consumables:  
 
Gift: Mary is given a birthday gift from a friend, who purchases that gift from a 
shop at a price made cheaper as a result of severe poverty. 
 
The only difference between this case and Cheap Consumables is that the beneficiary 
receives cheaper goods as a gift, rather than purchasing them herself. Notice, however, 
that Mary does not deliberately put herself in a position where she stands to profit from 
poverty, nor does she seek to take advantage of unjust labour conditions. Put simply, she 
did not intend to benefit from injustice. She is merely given the gift by her friend. Is it 
plausible that because Mary received the gift, rather than bought it herself, she should no 
longer be allocated benefiting-related duties to relinquish her benefits? It is hard to see 
why it should make this moral difference. Gift seems like a paradigmatic case in which 
Mary should be allocated a benefiting-related duty to relinquish some value of her 
benefits. 
One might respond that even though Mary did not actively benefit from injustice 
herself, her friend did actively benefit from injustice when he purchased the present from 
the store at a price made cheaper as a result of poverty. And it might be claimed that this 
is enough to trigger a duty for Mary to relinquish some value of the gift. All that is needed 
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is that somewhere between the injustice and the beneficiary’s receipt of the benefit 
someone must have actively benefited. But there are two problems with this reply: Firstly, 
if in order to allocate a beneficiary additional duties it was sufficient merely that someone 
actively benefited from injustice, then the account’s ability to separate cases of benefiting-
with-duty and cases of benefiting-without-duty is vulnerable. Presumably (almost) all 
cases of benefiting will involve someone who has actively benefited from injustice 
somewhere along the line – injustice is ordinarily committed for a reason, for example, 
to benefit the perpetrators of the injustice at least. Therefore, the account would allocate 
duties in (almost) all cases of benefiting. Secondly, this argument would clearly justify 
why a duty should be allocated to Mary’s friend since they actively benefited by being 
able to purchase a cheaper present, but why should we also think that a duty should be 
allocated to Mary who did not actively benefit herself? We would need some independent 
reason to think that Mary should also be allocated a duty, even though she did not actively 
benefit herself. 
A second interpretation holds that a beneficiary actively benefits if they foresaw 
that their benefit derived from injustice. The problem with this interpretation, however, 
is that this does not seem like a compelling necessary condition to trigger beneficiary 
pays. For example, suppose Mary did not foresee that she benefited from unjustly cheap 
labour when she accepted the gift from her friend. Yet even if she did not foresee that 
accepting the gift would mean that she benefited from injustice, it is still intuitive that she 
should be allocated a duty to relinquish some portion of the value of the gift. This is also 
a problem in Pogge’s case, Cheap Consumables, as well. It is plausible that many 
consumers do not foresee that they are benefiting from unjustly cheap labour when they 
shop for items incorporating a poor-country labour component. Some may do so, of 
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course, but many may not. Nevertheless, it still seems like beneficiary pays should be 
triggered in Cheap Consumables. 
A third interpretation holds that a beneficiary actively benefits if they should have 
foreseen that their benefit derived from injustice. We could then say that the beneficiaries 
in Cheap Consumables should have known that they are likely benefiting from unjustly 
cheap labour when they go shopping. It would be an incredibly naïve consumer to neglect 
the possibility that the price and availability of many items such as electronics, coffee, 
clothing, oil, and so on, are greatly influenced by the extent of severe poverty. However, 
it is again not clear that it is a necessary condition that a beneficiary should have foreseen 
that their benefit derived from injustice in order to trigger beneficiary pays. For example, 
suppose that Mary has good evidence that her friend usually shops in fair-trade stores, or 
that some of the consumers in Cheap Consumables are purchasing from a store that 
ordinarily sources their goods from companies with just labour conditions. Nevertheless, 
suppose that, contrary to evidence, the friend in fact did not buy the gift from a fair-trade 
shop, or that the store that the consumers are shopping at decided on this occasion to 
source their stock from a company with unjust labour conditions (without telling their 
customers). These beneficiaries thus had no good reason to think that their benefit derived 
from injustice and were, therefore, not active beneficiaries according to this 
interpretation. It does not seem far-fetched, however, that they should nevertheless 
relinquish some value of their benefits.  
A fourth interpretation holds that a beneficiary actively benefits if they would not 
have refused the benefit if they had foreseen that the benefit derived from injustice. This 
is similar to Avia Pasternak’s discussion of beneficiaries who welcome their benefits. She 
develops the example of a racist who cannot escape many of the benefits afforded to him 
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from living in a society that discriminates in favour of whites – he was simply born in the 
country, and enjoys many benefits of favourable discrimination throughout the time he 
lives there. He may not even be able to refuse many of these benefits without incurring 
unreasonable costs (for example, he would have to emigrate from the country in order to 
prevent receiving some of the benefits).163 Nevertheless, suppose that he would not 
renounce these benefits even if he could without incurring unreasonable costs. It seems 
fair to say that a welcoming beneficiary actively benefits in a morally relevant sense. And 
it likewise seems intuitive that such a beneficiary should be allocated duties to relinquish 
their benefits. For example, if the consumers in Cheap Consumables welcomed the fact 
that they could buy products made cheaper as a result of severe poverty, there is less 
intuitive resistance against allocating them additional duties. The same applies to Mary 
in Gift: if Mary would not have refused the gift even if she had known that it was made 
cheaper as a result of injustice, then there is less intuitive resistance against allocating her 
a duty to provide some value of compensation. The problem for Pogge’s account, 
however, is that this seems like an appropriate sufficient condition but not a necessary 
condition to trigger beneficiary pays. For example, even if Mary would have refused to 
accept the gift had she foreseen that it derived from injustice, this does not seem to 
exonerate her from paying some value of the gift she did in fact receive as a result of 
injustice. Neither does it seem that the customers in Cheap Consumables would be 
entirely exonerated from additional duties if they would not have bought these items had 
they been aware that their cheap price owed to severe poverty. They do in fact have these 
items, and these beneficiaries should relinquish some value of their gains. 
                                                 
163 Pasternak, "Voluntary Benefits from Wrongdoing," p. 381. 
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Each of the first four interpretations of actively benefiting incorporated an 
attitudinal component. However, none seemed to be necessary to trigger beneficiary pays. 
A final interpretation of actively benefiting removes the requirement that a beneficiary 
had a particular attitude in order to count as an active beneficiary. According to this 
interpretation, all that is required for actively benefiting is that the beneficiary put herself 
in a position where she profits from wrongdoing (irrespective of the attitudinal state she 
held at the time). Would this interpretation make it plausible that actively benefiting is 
necessary and sufficient for beneficiary pays to justifiably allocate duties? Well, it would 
seem to achieve the intuitively right verdict in Cheap Consumables: consumers do in fact 
put themselves in a position where they stand to profit from poverty when they buy items 
made cheaper as a result of severe poverty—that is, they queue at the store and exchange 
their money for these items. However, this interpretation seems to achieve the intuitively 
wrong verdict in Gift: Mary does not put herself in any position where she stands to profit 
from wrongdoing or injustice – she is merely given a gift by her friend – so the account 
would not allocate her any additional duty.   
The upshot is this: If the distinction between actively and passively benefiting is 
best understood in any of the five ways that I have discussed, then Pogge’s account seems 
vulnerable to the charge that it cannot yield intuitively appropriate verdicts about when 
beneficiary pays should allocate duties. If the distinction between actively and passively 
benefiting is not best understood in any of these ways, then some other interpretation of 
the distinction is required. However, it is difficult to see what other sense of actively 
benefiting Pogge could have in mind that would render his criterion of distinction 
plausible.  
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Of course, none of this is to deny that there is some moral difference between 
actively and passively benefiting, depending on how we understand this distinction. For 
example, it seems intuitive that a welcoming beneficiary (recall, a beneficiary who would 
not have refused the benefits even if they had foreseen that the benefits derived from 
injustice) should be allocated duties to relinquish their benefits. Furthermore, it seems 
intuitive that they should be allocated more demanding duties than an unwelcoming 
beneficiary should be (i.e. a beneficiary who would have refused the benefits if they had 
foreseen that the benefits derived from injustice). Likewise, it seems intuitive that a 
beneficiary who intends to benefit from injustice should be allocated duties to relinquish 
their benefits and that they should typically be allocated more stringent and demanding 
duties than beneficiaries who do not intend to benefit from injustice. The distinction 
between being an active or passive beneficiary, therefore, plausibly makes a moral 
difference both to the stringency and demandingness of the duties that they should be 
allocated, and may be sufficient to allocate duties in the first place. But it is not a plausible 
necessary condition for allocating duties. In Chapter 5, I argue that my rule-
consequentialist account can give a rationale of why being a welcoming or intending 
beneficiary seems to be morally relevant in these ways.  
 
6. Benefits Necessary for the World to have gone as it Ought. 
 
Holly Lawford-Smith likewise argues that beneficiaries do not incur additional duties in 
all cases of benefiting, despite claiming that it is impermissible to retain material benefits 
of the world going other than it ought. In particular, she gives the following example in 
which a beneficiary should not be allocated any additional duty: 
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Theatre: the lead in a theatrical performance is mugged shortly before the 
evening’s show, and as a result the understudy is assigned her role.164  
 
According to Lawford-Smith, “it would be absurd to say that the understudy ought not to 
retain the benefits. Surely she ought to play the lead, which after all is what the role of 
understudy is designed for…”.165 Therefore, Lawford-Smith must agree that benefiting is 
a non-atomic factor. Something additional to benefiting must be satisfied in order for the 
relevant duty to be generated.  
In particular, Lawford-Smith argues for the following claim: “It is impermissible 
to retain any benefits necessary to the world going as it morally ought to have gone”. 166 
In other words, it is a necessary condition, on her account, that the benefits were necessary 
to the world going as it morally ought to have gone for the beneficiary to be justifiably 
allocated an additional duty. By ‘necessary to the world going as it morally ought to have 
gone’ she means that it would have been impossible for the world to go as it should have 
and the beneficiary retained those benefits.167 For example, while it is true that the benefit 
enjoyed by the replacement lead in Theatre accrued as a result of injustice, this benefit 
was not necessary to the world going as it ought to have gone. It would not have been 
impossible for the world to go as it ought (i.e. the initial lead was not stabbed) and for the 
                                                 
164 Holly Lawford-Smith, "Benefiting from Failures to Address Climate Change," p. 397. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. Lawford-Smith later argues for a fuller articulation of this principle, but the difference is not 
relevant here. Her modification to this principle is to rule out that beneficiaries may have duties to relinquish 
gains even when nobody has been harmed as a result of the world going other than it ought to have gone. 
See, ibid., pp. 399-400. 
167 Consider, for example, how she discusses what benefits states must give up in the case of climate 
change: “It is not possible that the world went as it ought to have gone, and countries failed to make the 
relevant investments and behavioural changes”. Ibid., p. 397.  
  
96 
 
 
beneficiary to nevertheless enjoy that benefit (i.e. to become the replacement lead). In the 
Theatre case, Lawford-Smith says, “The lead might simply have come down with the 
flu…”, in which case the replacement would have enjoyed the lead role anyway.168 This 
is clearly possible, even if it is not especially likely, so the replacement lead incurs no 
additional duty to give up the role.  
The main problem for this account is that it seems unable to allocate duties to 
beneficiaries in many of the cases that it intuitively should. For example, consider Gift 
again: 
 
Gift: Mary is given a birthday gift from a friend, who purchases that gift from a 
shop at a price made cheaper as a result of severe poverty. 
 
It seems intuitive that Mary should be allocated a benefiting-related duty to relinquish at 
least some value of the gift she receives. But it is clearly possible that the world could 
have gone as it ought to have gone (there was no unjustly cheap labour as a result of 
severe poverty) and Mary could still have enjoyed that benefit (the friend may still have 
given her the gift), even if this would have been unlikely due to the increased price of the 
gift. This is possible in just the same way that the world could have gone as it ought to in 
Theatre consistent with the beneficiary still benefiting: the initial lead could have come 
down with the flu (instead of being stabbed) and so the replacement lead could 
nevertheless enjoy that benefit, even if this outcome would have been unlikely. Therefore, 
it seems that Lawford-Smith’s account is committed to saying in Gift that the benefit was 
                                                 
168 Ibid. 
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not necessary to the world going as it ought to have gone and Mary, therefore, should not 
be allocated any additional duty to relinquish some value of the gift. But if Mary should 
be allocated this duty, then this demonstrates that it is not a necessary condition for the 
justifiable allocation of benefiting-related duties that the benefits were necessary to the 
world going as it ought to have gone. 
Perhaps one might disagree that Mary should be allocated a duty in Gift, and 
therefore claim that it is no objection that Mary would not be allocated a duty according 
to Lawford-Smith’s account. The problem, however, is that it will seldom be true in cases 
of benefiting from injustice that it would have been impossible for the beneficiary to enjoy 
the benefit if the world had gone as it ought. There will almost always be some unlikely 
way that the beneficiary could have enjoyed those benefits anyway. Notice, for example, 
that this even seems to be a problem in the case of climate change that is the focus of 
Lawford-Smith’s discussion.169 In particular, her aim in this paper is to argue that, in the 
case of climate change, certain material benefits were enjoyed by states as a result of their 
failing to make stringent emissions reductions. For example, Australian citizens can buy 
cheaper goods, take cheaper flights, heat their houses more cheaply, than if costly 
emissions reduction policies had been implemented. The claim is that if Australians had 
made these stringent cuts (thus the world went as it ought to have gone), then it would 
have been impossible for them to enjoy those material benefits.  According to Lawford-
Smith, this is what separates the case of climate change from Theatre: in the former case, 
but not the latter, the benefits were necessary for the world going as it ought to have gone.  
                                                 
169 Ibid.  
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However, this seems wrong. It clearly is possible that Australians could have 
enjoyed these material benefits, even if the world had gone as it should have (i.e. Australia 
made deep emissions reductions). For example, Australia could have implemented 
stringent emissions cuts yet other states voluntarily chose to compensate Australia for 
doing so, thereby maintaining Australians’ ability to buy cheap goods, take cheap flights, 
and heat their houses cheaply. This is extraordinarily unlikely, of course, but it is also 
unlikely that the lead would come down with the flu allowing the replacement lead to fill 
that role (instead of being stabbed), and that Mary would be given the birthday present in 
Gift (even if it was far more expensive due to fair labour costs). Insofar as we think Mary 
should relinquish some portion of the value of the gift (or that the Australians should be 
allocated duties in the context of climate change, for that matter), then this demonstrates 
that it is not a necessary condition for the justifiable allocation of benefiting-related duties 
that the beneficiary enjoys material gains necessary for the world going as it ought to 
have gone.  
 
7. Sustaining Wrongful Harm 
 
A third criterion of distinction is developed by Christian Barry and David Wiens, who 
write:  
 
…we deny that the mere reception of benefits from wrongdoing is sufficient to 
ground special remedial duties to the victims of wrongdoing. Simply put, 
benefiting from wrongdoing is not a sui generis moral category and there are no 
benefiting-based duties as such. Yet, given some benefiting-with-duty cases, we 
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acknowledge benefiting-related duties, duties that can be triggered by the fact of 
benefiting from wrongdoing in certain circumstances without being grounded in 
the fact of benefiting. We argue that innocent beneficiaries incur benefiting-
related duties to the victims of wrongdoing—that is, people benefit-with-duty—
if and only if receiving and retaining the benefits sustains wrongful harm.170 
 
A beneficiary who refuses to relinquish their benefits may sustain wrongful harm in two 
ways: (i) “the beneficiary receives an item or quantum of value to which the victim of the 
wrongdoing has a claim and the victim’s claim remains unresolved” and (ii) “the 
beneficiary receives a benefit in violation of the victim’s claim(s) on the wrongful practice 
or institution and the victim’s claim(s) remains unresolved”.171 The basic idea is that 
beneficiaries should be allocated duties to relinquish their benefits in cases in which their 
refusal to relinquish benefits would stand as an obstacle to the victim’s claims being 
reconciled. In cases of benefiting in which retaining the benefit would not sustain 
wrongful harm, however, the beneficiary should not be allocated any additional 
benefiting-related duty. In other words, it is a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
justifiable allocation of benefiting-related duties that retaining the benefits would sustain 
wrongful harm understood in this sense. Barry and Wiens, therefore, conceive of 
benefiting as a non-atomic factor. Furthermore, on their account, benefiting is a non-
primitive factor because a beneficiary’s duty to relinquish benefits reduces to the 
wrongness of sustaining wrongful harm, rather than benefiting as such. 
                                                 
170 Barry and Wiens, "Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," pp. 3-4. 
171 Ibid., p. 14. 
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Barry and Wiens’s account offers an attractive criterion of distinction to separate 
many benefiting-with-duty and benefiting-without-duty cases. However, it seems unable 
to assign duties in all of the cases that it intuitively should. In particular, various theorists 
have argued that there is a class of cases of benefiting in which there are no victims that 
can be identified as having claims over the benefits, in which it is still intuitive that the 
beneficiary has no claim over their benefits either. Recall, the theoretical rationale 
discussed in Chapter 1 relating to unjust enrichment. Goodin who defends such a view, 
argues that if wrongdoing or injustice occurs during the chain of transfer of benefits to 
the beneficiary, their entitlement over those benefits is ‘tainted’. They have no justifiable 
claim to them, and the proper response is to relinquish them. Notice, however, that this 
argument does not depend on victims of wrongdoing being identifiable, or even still alive. 
That no present-day persons can be found with entitlements to the benefits does not mean 
that the beneficiary acquires entitlements to those benefits instead. Goodin’s own 
proposal is that these benefits should be put into a common pool to be used for general 
distributive justice purposes.172 Even some theorists who are generally quite sceptical of 
beneficiary pays seem to agree with this idea. Simon Caney, for example, argues:  
 
…historical injustices have significance in one specific and quite restricted sense, 
namely that they call into question the legitimacy of the current distribution and 
hence (some) wealthy people’s entitlements to their current holdings. The 
existence of historical injustices makes it much more difficult for those who are 
                                                 
172 Goodin, "Disgorging the Fruits of Historical Wrongdoing," pp. 488-89. 
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currently wealthy to explain why they are entitled to keep the wealth they 
currently possess and why the poor are not entitled to more.173 
 
If this is right, what this argument shows is that sustaining wrongful harm is not necessary 
for the beneficiary pays principle to justifiably allocate duties to beneficiaries. In cases 
where victims are dead, for example, the beneficiary’s retaining the benefits would not 
act as an obstacle to the victims’ claims being reconciled. The victims’ claims will remain 
unresolved no matter what the beneficiary does, but arguably the beneficiary should still 
relinquish their gains anyway. 
Another class of cases in which Barry and Wiens’s account is unable to assign 
benefiting-related duties are what Bashshar Haydar and Gerhard Øverland have called 
‘Motivational-Cause’ cases. According to Haydar and Øverland, a beneficiary is a 
motivational-cause of wrongdoing if the wrongdoing “was done at least partly for the 
sake of creating the benefits in question”.174 Thus, for beneficiaries to be a motivational-
cause of wrongdoing, it must be the case that the perpetrator of wrongdoing intended to 
benefit them. Other theorists likewise find it intuitive that benefiting as a motivational-
cause makes a moral difference. Daniel Butt, for example, claims that there is a “category 
of cases where the purpose behind an act of wrongdoing is the conferral of a benefit on a 
particular involuntary beneficiary” which may make a moral difference to the 
beneficiary’s duty. In fact, Butt thinks that these are cases in which the beneficiaries 
should be allocated especially demanding benefiting-related duties.175  
                                                 
173 Caney, "Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History," p. 477. 
174 Haydar and Øverland, "The Normative Implications of Benefiting from Injustice," pp. 356-58. 
175 Daniel Butt, "'A Doctrine Quite New and Altogether Untenable': Defending the Beneficiary Pays 
Principle," Journal of Applied Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2014): pp. 344-45. 
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Barry and Wiens deny that a perpetrator’s intention to benefit the beneficiary 
makes a moral difference to a beneficiary’s duties.176 They thus attempt to give a 
deflationary explanation of the intuitions reported by theorists like Haydar, Øverland, and 
Butt who think benefiting-related duties should be allocated in motivational-cause cases. 
In many cases in which the perpetrator intends to benefit the beneficiary, they say, “we 
might reasonably assume that the beneficiary has an associative connection with the 
wrongdoer”. Why else would the perpetrator want to benefit them? And if there is an 
associative connection, this “might be an independently relevant ground for attributing 
remedial duties”.177 Thus, Barry and Wiens claim that they can explain why theorists like 
Haydar, Øverland, and Butt think that beneficairies who are motivational-causes of 
wrongdoing should be allocated duties, but are nevertheless making a mistake: They are 
miscategorising the duties that beneficiaries should be allocated as benefiting-related 
duties, when they are not duties of this kind – rather, they are in fact association-related 
duties.  
Barry and Wiens are, of course, correct to claim that beneficiaries who are 
motivational-causes of wrongdoing may have independent remedial duties, for example, 
due to their associative connection with the wrongdoer. But that does not mean benefiting 
as a motivational-cause of wrongdoing should not also, independently, make a moral 
difference to the beneficiary’s duty. Notice, in many other cases of benefiting as a 
motivational-cause there may be no associative connection. For example, a perpetrator 
might act wrongly to benefit another whom they are secretly infatuated with, or the 
perpetrator might merely intend to benefit them to ‘add insult’ to the victim (suppose that 
                                                 
176 Barry and Wiens, "Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," pp. 17-18. 
177 Ibid., p. 18. 
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the victim does not like the beneficiary very much and the perpetrator is cognisant of the 
fact that it would upset the victim to see the beneficiary prosper due to their own 
suffering). Despite there being no associative connection, shouldn’t these beneficiaries 
who are motivational-causes of wrongdoing nevertheless relinquish their benefits? 
According to Barry and Wiens, the answer is no: “…in those cases where it is clear that 
there is no associative connection, and where the beneficiary clearly is not privy to the 
wrongdoing, intention doesn’t seem relevant”.178 They support this claim with an 
example: 
 
Tennis Rankings: In 1993 a German nationalist named Gunter Parche stabbed 
Monica Seles in the middle of a tennis match to help Steffi Graf (a German) regain 
her no.1 ATP ranking.179 
  
After considering this case, they conclude: “merely being the intended beneficiary does 
not seem directly relevant” to Graf’s duties towards Seles.180 But is this right? It does not 
seem far fetched, for example, that Graf should give up the benefit of the no. 1 ranking 
until Seles was ready for a rematch (initial reports expected that Seles would return to 
competition within about a month, but it in fact took several years for her to return).  
Why might Barry and Wiens be reluctant to allocate Graf with such duties? Their 
reluctance can be explained by pointing to two peculiar features of this case. For one, 
Graf’s benefit of regaining the no. 1 position is intertwined with her own significant 
efforts. Presumably in order to compete for the number one position, Graf must have 
                                                 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
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trained very hard and put in a great deal of preparation for the match. It is not clear that 
she would not have won even if Seles had not been stabbed. Many theorists think that 
people ordinarily deserve some portion of their achievements that result from hard work 
– Indeed, this very point is made by Christian Barry (together with Robert Goodin) in 
another paper on beneficiary pays: 
 
We ordinarily think that people deserve to keep that portion of their wellbeing that 
is due to their own contributions. ... In such cases at hand, people cannot keep 
what is rightfully theirs without keeping what they have wrongfully received, and 
they cannot disgorge what they have wrongfully received without also 
relinquishing something that is rightfully theirs. Which principle should prevail 
over the other in such cases is an open question, and one that will presumably at 
least sometimes be decided in favour of keeping it all rather than relinquishing it 
all.181  
 
Thus, one reason that Barry and Wiens might be reluctant to allocate Graf any duties in 
this case is because they are putting greater weight on the principle that people should 
ordinarily get to keep the portion of their wellbeing that owes to their own contribution 
than they are on the beneficiary pays principle. And this might result in their mistakenly 
attributing no normative relevance to benefiting as a motivational-cause. 
A second reason that Barry and Wiens might be reluctant to allocate Graf any 
duties in this case is because of the bizzare nature of Parche’s actions. Indeed, according 
                                                 
181 They write: “We ordinarily think that people deserve to keep that portion of their wellbeing that is 
due to their own contribution”. See, Robert E Goodin and Christian Barry, "Benefiting from the 
Wrongdoing of Others," Journal of Applied Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2014): pp. 368-69. 
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to one newspaper report from the time, German police suggested that Parche “appeared 
confused and may be mentally disturbed”.182 As a result of this atypical feature of the 
case, Barry and Wiens may be more disinclined to attribute any difference in Graf’s duties 
as a result of benefiting as a motivational-cause of wrongdoing. But consider a similar 
version of the case in which the wrongdoer was not insane in this way: 
 
Tennis Rankings 2: A professional tennis match is taking place between Sally and 
Mark. An observer, who holds sexist attitudes, wants to make sure that Mark wins, 
so stabs Sally. As a result, Mark wins the match and takes the no. 1 position.  
 
In Tennis Rankings 2 the wrongdoer’s actions are calculated and not insane, unlike 
Parche’s actions. In this case, it seems clearer that being a motivational-cause of 
wrongdoing is morally relevant for the duties that the beneficiary should be allocated. 
Mark should certainly give up the no. 1 position until Sally is ready for a rematch. 
Furthermore, there are some real world cases that seem especially troubling in this way: 
for example, consider children who are bestowed unfair advantages by their parents at the 
expense of other children. Or consider segments of a population who are unjustly 
benefited by a dictator who is attempting to secure their support at the expense of the rest 
of the country’s citizens. The wrongful actions in these examples are very deliberate, have 
significantly bad consequences, and thus seem morally troubling in a way that Parche’s 
actions were not, despite the latter case being morally troubling in its own different way. 
                                                 
182 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/30/newsid_2499000/2499161.stm 
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Thus, for this second reason, too, Barry and Wiens may be mistakenly reluctant to 
attribute benefiting as a motivational-cause of wrongdoing any moral importance.  
Note, while I have claimed that Barry and Wiens are mistaken in this way, I am 
not suggesting that Graf should be allocated a very demanding duty towards Seles. What 
seems appropriate is merely that Graf should be allocated a duty to submit to a rematch 
for the no. 1 position. 
 
8. Transfer of Assets, Motivational-Causes, and Structured Competitions. 
 
A final criterion of distinction has been developed by Bashshar Haydar and Gerhard 
Øverland, who argue: 
 
…in the process of allocating the burdens of alleviating the harm inflicted on a 
victim of wrongdoing, a morally significant factor to consider is whether a person 
has benefited from that wrongdoing. ... However, we argue that a strong 
requirement to disgorge benefits, which have arisen as a result of wrongdoing, is 
generated only if other (boosting) conditions or factors are satisfied.183 
 
Since Haydar and Øverland claim that benefiting from wrongdoing is a morally 
significant factor, but that additional conditions must be met in order for a strong 
requirement to relinquish benefits to be generated, their account seems to understand 
benefiting as a primitive and non-atomic factor.  
                                                 
183 Haydar and Øverland, "The Normative Implications of Benefiting from Injustice," p. 349. 
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What are these conditions that must be satisfied in order to allocate a beneficiary 
a strong requirement to relinquish their benefits? The first condition is where a beneficiary 
benefits from wrongdoing which distorts “…a more or less structured and relatively fair 
competitive procedure for allocating a given benefit or award”.184 The second condition 
is where a beneficiary benefits as a motivational-cause of wrongdoing, as discussed in the 
previous section. The third condition is where, as a result of wrongdoing, there is a 
transfer of assets from the perpetrators of the injustice to the beneficiaries, such as in 
Stolen Car.185 These constitute sufficient conditions for the justifiable allocation of 
benefiting-related duties, and it is necessary for a strong requirement to relinquish benefits 
to be generated that at least one of these factors obtains. 
I have no disagreement with Haydar and Øverland that strong duties should be 
allocated in these cases (Indeed, I will develop an argument for allocating benefiting-
related duties in motivational-cause cases in the following chapter). However, I do object 
that this account is unable, as it stands, to explain why some cases of benefiting from 
wrongdoing seem to generate more stringent and demanding duties than other cases. 
Recall when discussing the Gift case, I argued that certain attitudes held by the beneficiary 
may make a moral difference to the duties that they should be allocated to relinquish their 
benefits. For example, it seems intuitive that a welcoming beneficiary (i.e. a beneficiary 
who would not have refused the benefits even if they had foreseen that the benefits 
derived from injustice) should be allocated a duty to relinquish their benefits, and that 
they should be allocated more demanding duties than an unwelcoming beneficiary (i.e. a 
beneficiary who would have refused the benefits if they had foreseen that the benefits 
                                                 
184 Ibid., p. 354. 
185 Ibid., pp.358-50. 
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derived from injustice). But none of the three factors which Haydar and Øverland discuss 
are sensitive to the different attitudes that a beneficiary of injustice may have. If it is true 
that welcoming benefits from wrongdoing is sufficient to justify allocating such 
beneficiaries relatively demanding duties to relinquish their benefits, then Haydar and 
Øverland are mistaken to insist that their three ‘boosting’ conditions are necessary after 
all. Note, I am not claiming that Haydar and Øverland cannot explain differences in the 
stringency or demandingness of beneficiaries’ duties in any cases. For example, they 
argue that if several of their boosting conditions are simultaneously satisfied, this may 
increase the stringency and demandingness of the allocated duty.186 The point is, rather, 
that their account is insensitive to some factors that seem to make a moral difference to 
the duties that should be allocated – for example, whether the beneficiary has a welcoming 
attitude towards the wrongdoing from which they benefit.  
 
9. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I examined four (exhaustive) ways that the beneficiary pays principle 
might be formulated. I argued that a prima facie case could be made in favour of 
formulating the beneficiary pays principle as understanding benefiting as a non-primitive 
and non-atomic factor. I then examined – and discussed concerns with – four existing 
proposals regarding when beneficiary pays is triggered to allocate duties, paving the way 
for my own positive account in the next chapter. 
  
                                                 
186 See, for example, ibid., p. 357. 
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Chapter 4: Beneficiary Pays and Rule-Consequentialism 
 
In this chapter I defend beneficiary pays by arguing that a morality which incorporates 
the practice of allocating benefiting-related duties in ways that I specify should, if the 
wide majority of people tried to internalise the practice, be expected to result in morally 
better consequences than a morality that does not. In particular, I give a rule-
consequentialist argument that benefiting-related duties should be allocated in cases (I 
call these property-violation and motivational-cause cases) in which this practice, if the 
wide majority tried to internalise it, should be expected to result in good consequences—
and not allocated in cases in which this practice should not. I also demonstrate that rule-
consequentialism can justify why beneficiaries should be allocated more stringent and 
demanding duties in some types of cases than in others. In the following chapter, I extend 
this rule-consequentialist argument for beneficiary pays to show that it can also justify 
allocating benefiting-related duties in an additional (although possibly overlapping) class 
of cases—namely, cases where beneficiaries hold or express a pro-attitude towards 
wrongdoing or injustice. 
 
1. Beneficiary Pays, Reflective Equilibrium, and Rule-Consequentialism  
 
Much of the literature on beneficiary pays has focused on how this principle makes 
intuitive sense of how we think we should allocate responsibility between agents in a 
range of hypothetical and real cases. Indeed, in the previous chapters I have discussed 
many cases in which I (and other theorists) think that beneficiaries should be allocated 
additional duties. While these cases give intuitive support for the beneficiary pays 
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principle, additional support would be provided by developing a theoretical rationale for 
the principle that can explain and justify our intuitive reactions to these cases. 
Additionally, a theoretical rationale may be helpful in explaining why, in cases where 
intuitions are weaker or conflicted, theorists might have reluctance to allocate a 
beneficiary additional duties.  Notice that this process of justifying the beneficiary pays 
principle employs the methodology of reflective equilibrium as discussed in the 
introduction. According to this methodology, the aim is to as best we can bring our moral 
intuitions, principles, and broader theoretical commitments into an acceptable coherence 
with each other—acceptable, that is, in the sense that mere consistency is not enough. 
Rather, each should offer explanatory support for the others. If it is correct that (i) our 
intuitions, (ii) the beneficiary pays principle, and (iii) rule-consequentialist theory all 
support each other in the way that I suggest, then endorsing rather than rejecting the 
beneficiary pays principle sits well in reflective equilibrium.  
The main aim of this chapter (and, more generally, this thesis) is not to defend 
rule-consequentialism itself, nor is my aim to defend any particular formulation of rule-
consequentialism above others. Instead, my aim is to show that rule-consequentialism, 
plausibly conceived, provides theoretical support for the beneficiary pays principle and 
our intuitive allocation of duties in particular cases. This task, I believe, is compatible 
with various formulations of rule-consequentialism. Nevertheless, to make matters 
concrete I will briefly outline the formulation of rule-consequentialism that I favour and 
give some reasons for why I understand the theory in this way. In the final section, I will 
discuss several objections that rule-consequentialism standardly faces, since these general 
objections to the theory threaten to become specific objections to the rationale for 
allocating benefiting-related duties.  
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I understand rule-consequentialism as a family of views that minimally hold that 
what makes an action right or wrong is a matter of conforming to a set of rules justified 
by their consequences. As it is typically understood, rule-consequentialism holds that a 
set of rules is justified if and only if no other set of rules would result in morally better 
consequences.187 As it stands, however, this formulation is imprecise. To make rule-
consequentialism precise, I will take a stand on three important difficulties with 
formulating the theory. The first difficulty is whether we should understand rule-
consequentialism as holding that a set of rules is justified by their actual or expected 
consequences—and if the latter, the consequences which are expected by whom? The 
second difficulty is whether the set of rules is justified by the actual or expected 
consequences they would result in if people were to try to internalise or merely comply 
with those rules. The third difficulty is whether the set is justified by the actual or expected 
consequences they would result in if all or merely some people were to comply with or 
try to internalise these rules – and if the latter, how many people should we understand as 
complying with or trying to internalise these rules?188 My formulation of rule-
consequentialism is greatly informed by Brad Hooker, one of the theory’s most prominent 
contemporary defenders.189 I will state the theory in the following way: 
 
                                                 
187 This way of putting the point allows that some sets of rules may result in equally good consequences, 
in which case none are morally preferable to the others. However, there may still be reasons to favour one 
set than another. Consider an analogy with driving. It is morally important that all drivers stay on one side 
of the road rather than switching between both sides. But it is not morally important which side of the road 
we set aside for this purpose. To resolve this problem, we should mandate one of the options despite neither 
being morally preferable to the other. 
188 Brad Hooker, "Rule Consequentialism,"  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism-rule/. 
189 See, Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality (Clarendon Press: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 72-92; "Rule Consequentialism". 
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Rule-Consequentialism. An act is morally required (or permissible or 
impermissible) if it is required (or allowed or forbidden) by the set of rules which 
should be expected to result in the morally best consequences, if the wide majority 
tried to internalise them. 190   
 
I have formulated rule-consequentialism in terms of expected rather than actual 
consequences. One reason for formulating rule-consequentialism in this way relates to 
epistemic concerns. It would be very difficult (if not impossible) to determine in advance 
what the actual consequences of a set of rules will be, and this means that we often will 
not be in a position to say whether some act would be permissible or not. But it is much 
more likely that we could determine what the expected consequences of a set of rules 
would be. Therefore, if rule-consequentialism is formulated in terms of expected 
consequences, we will more often be in a position to determine whether some act is 
permissible. This epistemic point partly matters because it has implications for our 
intuitive practice of allocating blame. It seems intuitive that someone should be blamed 
for failing to conform to rules that they should expect would result in the best 
consequences, but counterintuitive that they should be blamed for failing to conform to 
rules that actually result in the best consequences if (as will sometimes be the case) they 
cannot know what these rules would be. After all, it seems unfair that we blame someone 
                                                 
190 There are some significant differences between my formulation and Hooker’s own. First, my 
formulation justifies rules in reference to the counterfactual ‘if the wide majority tried to internalise them’, 
rather than the counterfactual ‘whose internalisation by the overwhelming majority’. My way of 
formulating rule-consequentialism allows for the possibility that some people may not be able to able to 
internalise particular rules, even while they can try to do so. Second, as will become apparent, I will be 
explicit on who is expecting the rules to have particular consequences. I also leave out some complications 
that Hooker includes, since many of these complications are not relevant to my argument for beneficiary 
pays. Hooker’s own formulation is found in. Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of 
Morality, p. 32. 
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for something that they did not – and should not – know. The formulation of rule-
consequentialism in terms of expected consequences thus accords better with widely-held 
intuitions about blame. 
One might claim that even formulating rule-consequentialism in terms of the 
expected consequences of a set of rules would make it difficult or impossible to determine 
which set of rules we should endorse. Notice that calculating the expected value of a set 
of rules involves, amongst other things, multiplying the value of each possible outcome 
that the set could result in by the probability that each of those outcomes would occur, 
then summing each of these values together.191 Now, it is true that it is also difficult to 
determine which set of rules should be expected to have the best consequences, since we 
will not have very accurate probabilities for the outcomes that could arise from each set. 
But this lack of precision is not paralysing for the view. As Hooker argues, “…we can 
reasonably hope to make at least some informed judgments about the likely consequences 
of alternative possible rules”.192 For example, we have good reason to think that a rule 
prohibiting torture should be expected to result in very good consequences, if a wide 
majority of people tried to internalise that rule. In this sense, my argument for the 
beneficiary pays principle should be seen as an attempt to develop an informed judgment 
that the allocation of benefiting-related duties would be part of the set of rules expected 
to have the best consequences, but this argument could admittedly be overturned by new 
evidence that this rule should not be expected to result in those consequences.  
                                                 
191 I say ‘amongst other things’ because a probability weighted sum is not necessarily the whole story 
of how the expected value of a set of rules is determined. Some versions of rule-consequentialism also build 
into the calculation distributional preferences—for example, some versions might hold that harms and 
benefits matter more to the worst-off. 
192 Hooker, "Rule Consequentialism". 
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If rule-consequentialism should be formulated in terms of expected rather than 
actual value, we also need to make precise how the calculation of the expected value of a 
set of rules should be made. Some ways of calculating the expected value of a set of rules 
would clearly be inappropriate. For example, some people might assign crazy probability 
estimates to the outcomes of a set of a rules. And rule-consequentialism should not 
countenance a set of rules that was expected to result in optimal consequences according 
to such unreliable probability estimates. Instead, rule-consequentialists can overcome this 
problem by making explicit that a set of rules is justified if and only if it should be 
expected to result in morally optimal consequences, according to the probability estimates 
that an individual should assign to the outcomes of a set of rules given their evidence. I 
am, then, understanding rule-consequentialism as incorporating an evidential-based 
probability assignment by each individual.193  
Secondly, I formulate rule-consequentialism in terms of requiring conformity to 
the set of rules which should be expected to result in best consequences if the wide 
majority tried to internalise them, rather than in terms of the consequences that should be 
expected if these rules were merely complied with. One reason why we should formulate 
rule-consequentialism in this way is that there are costs involved in accepting that one’s 
own (and others’) conduct should be governed by a particular set of rules, and in 
attempting to internalise those rules.194 For example, different sets of rules will impose 
different psychological costs on agents who have to conform to them, and these make a 
difference to which set of rules should be expected to result in the best consequences. For 
                                                 
193 As Hooker argues, “Note that expected good is not to be calculated by employing whatever crazy 
estimates of probabilities people might assign to possible outcomes. Rather, expected good is calculated by 
multiplying the value or disvalue of possible outcomes by rational or justified probability estimates”.  Ibid. 
194 Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality, pp. 75-80. 
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example, suppose that we were deciding between two sets of rules. Suppose, additionally, 
that the first set of rules was vastly more complicated than the second set of rules and, if 
we only took into account what consequences should be expected if these rules were 
widely complied with, would also have greater expected value than the second set. Notice, 
however, that this does not include in our calculation how burdensome it would be for 
people to try to keep these rules in mind when deciding how to act. If we instead 
calculated the expected value of a set of rules by what consequences they should be 
expected to result in if the wide majority of people tried to internalise them, then we could 
include in this calculation the costs of trying to keep rules in mind when deciding how to 
act. This might well mean that the second set of less-complicated rules would result in 
greater expected value than the first more-complicated rules, which seems like a 
possibility that rule-consequentialism should be sensitive to. This way of formulating 
rule-consequentialism therefore puts constraints on how complicated a set of rules can 
be: in general, the more complicated the set of rules, the costlier it would be to try to 
internalise them.  
Lastly, I formulate rule-consequentialism in terms of the set of rules that should 
be expected to result in the morally best consequences if the wide majority tried to 
internalise them, rather than if everyone tried to internalise them. The main reason for 
formulating rule-consequentialism in this way is that it can then take into account 
problems regarding agents who do not act as they are morally required. If we assumed 
that everyone tried to internalise the set of rules, for example, then there would be no need 
to include, within the set, rules regarding how we should respond to criminal behaviour 
– presumably criminal behaviour would be forbidden by any set of rules that claimed to 
be morally optimal, so if all agents tried to internalise such a set of rules there would be 
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no criminal behaviour and thus no need for responding to criminals. But since ours is a 
world in which criminal behaviour occurs, we clearly want to be able to respond to 
criminal behaviour in particular ways (for example, we would want to deter it by having 
a system of punishment). As Hooker argues, “An adequate ethic must provide for 
situations created by people who are malevolent, dishonest, unfair, or simply misguided. 
In short, for use in the real world, a moral code needs provisions for dealing with non-
compliance”.195 Therefore, we should formulate rule-consequentialism in terms of the 
consequences that we should expect to obtain from a set of rules, if the wide majority 
tried to internalise them, so that we can appropriately respond to those who do not comply 
with morality.196 For a similar reason, rule-consequentialism should also be sensitive to 
the fact that our world includes fallible individuals who might simply make mistakes 
about what morality requires of them. Formulating rule-consequentialism in terms of the 
wide majority trying to internalise the rules, rather than everyone trying to internalise 
them, makes the theory sensitive to this possibility. What really matters is that rule-
consequentialism is robust against problems of non-compliance with morality, whether 
innocent or ill-motivated. Lastly, we should also think of rule-consequentialism as 
supposing that it is a matter of common knowledge that the wide majority of people try to 
internalise the rules. In that way, people can assume that most other people will be 
trustworthy to keep promises, not lie or steal, not arbitrarily harm others, and so on.  
 
                                                 
195 Ibid., p. 80. 
196 One difficulty with formulating rule-consequentialism is that it is difficult to justify any particular 
proportion of people that would make a set of rules count as widely internalised. For example, would rules 
be widely internalised if they were accepted by 90% of people, or 91%? And why should we pick one 
number rather than the other? For a discussion of this point, see: ibid., pp. 83-85. 
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1. Justifying the Allocation of Benefiting-Related Duties 
 
To pave the way for my argument that rule-consequentialism can justify benefiting-
related duties, it is helpful to consider how rule-consequentialism is able to justify other 
cognate features of our common-sense morality. I will show that rule-consequentialism 
can give a structurally identical justification for benefiting-related duties as it can give for 
two of these other features of common-sense morality – in particular, capacity-related 
duties and contribution-related duties. 
Take capacity-related duties first. It is often thought that (typically wealthy) 
people who are in a good position to help desperately needy others (i.e. those in poverty) 
have a duty to do so, and that the demandingness of this duty increases proportional to 
their capacity to help. Rule-consequentialists justify this duty by arguing that including a 
rule within the set that required some sacrifice on the part of the wealthy to help the poor 
should be expected to maximise good consequences, if the wide majority tried to 
internalise this rule. Why might this be? One reason is that according to the law of 
diminishing marginal returns, we should expect that the wellbeing of a wealthy person 
would not be reduced nearly so much as the wellbeing of a poor person would be 
increased, if the former were required to give up some given amount to aid the latter – 
put simply, $100 is ordinarily much more valuable for someone who cannot meet their 
basic needs than it is for someone who makes $100,000 each year. If a wealthy person 
gave $100 to a poor person, the gains to the latter would vastly outweigh the harm to the 
former. Requiring wealthier people to give up some of their money in order to aid needy 
others – and requiring them to give up more of their money than less wealthy people – 
should, therefore, be expected to result in good consequences.  
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Similarly, consider duties not to contribute to harming innocent people. These 
contribution-related duties are ordinarily thought to be very stringent and demanding. 
They are stringent in the sense that one cannot easily appeal to other valuable ends to 
justify harming others. For example, most people believe I cannot justifiably kill one 
innocent person in order to save the lives of two others. Furthermore, they are demanding 
in the sense that one cannot easily appeal to the costs that one would incur in the process 
of satisfying the duty in order to justify failing to act as the duty requires. For example, I 
cannot justify killing one innocent person to save myself even from quite considerable 
harm. Rule-consequentialists justify this duty by pointing out that incorporating a rule 
forbidding contributing to harming innocent others should be expected to maximise good 
consequences, if the wide majority tried to internalise that rule. After all, this rule would 
decrease the number of incidents in which innocent people were harmed and make 
everyone more secure in living their day-to-day lives, since they would be confident that 
they cannot be permissibly harmed at any time. Similarly, contribution-related duties are 
usually understood as also requiring those who have impermissibly harmed others to 
compensate for having done so. Rule-consequentialists can justify this aspect of 
contribution-related duties by appeal to considerations regarding deterrence. If those who 
have impermissibly harmed others are required to compensate for having done so, then 
there is a significant incentive to avoid harming others in the first place. 
If these considerations are correct, then rule-consequentialism has in its favour 
that it can justify widely-accepted features of morality. I argue that benefiting-related 
duties can be given a structurally identical rule-consequentialist rationale to these other 
kinds of duties—in particular, I claim that including in the set a rule which requires 
beneficiaries to relinquish their benefits in property-violation and motivational-cause 
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cases should be expected to maximise overall good consequences, if the wide majority 
tried to internalise this rule.  Thus my account attempts to give an explanation of why 
benefiting-related duties should be allocated in these cases. The reason why we should 
allocate these duties is because such a rule, if the wide majority tried to internalise it, 
should be expected to maximise good consequences. I will also demonstrate that my 
account can explain why in some cases beneficiaries should be allocated with more 
stringent and demanding duties to relinquish their benefits than in others.  
 
2. Property-Violation Cases 
 
Consider an example of a property-violation case that I have discussed in previous 
chapters: 
 
Stolen Car: Bill steals John’s car and gives it to Susan, who is innocent of any 
wrongdoing herself. Bill can no longer be found, nor does he leave behind assets 
that can be seized.197 
 
A property-violation case is one in which wrongdoing or injustice results in a beneficiary 
possessing property that she has no entitlement to, where the victim (who initially had an 
entitlement to that property) may or may not still retain that entitlement. For example, in 
Stolen Car, Susan has no entitlement to the car, but John does. As I observed in Chapter 
1, several theorists have argued that, in cases of property-violation, the beneficiary’s duty 
                                                 
197 Barry and Wiens, "Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," p. 3. 
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to relinquish their benefits is justified by the fact that their claim over those benefits has 
been “tainted”.198 Somewhere along the line, rights have been violated making the 
transfer of the benefit to the beneficiary unjust. For example, Robert Goodin argues: 
  
Disgorgement can be analysed in precisely the same manner that Nozick’s logic 
would have us analyse rectification in general. In the process of original 
acquisition and the subsequent transfer, one seriously wrong step anywhere along 
the line prevents the process from being ‘justice preserving’. One seriously wrong 
step anywhere along the line suffices to taint the holder’s title to the object. ... 
What happens to titles that are tainted? They are extinguished; they are rendered 
void. If your title to an object is tainted, then the object is not rightfully yours. 
You have no legitimate claim to it, and you may properly be required to relinquish 
it.199 
 
Supposing the rule-consequentialist rationale that I am developing can justify rules 
requiring the respect of a qualified scheme of property-entitlements, then it can justify 
beneficiaries being required to relinquish their benefits in property-violation cases like 
Stolen Car. Now, many rule-consequentialists have argued precisely that a rule requiring 
the respect of a qualified scheme of property-entitlements would be justified according to 
this theory.200 How does this argument work? Like Goodin’s account, and unlike Robert 
Nozick’s account,201 the rule-consequentialist argument I am developing endorses an 
                                                 
198 Goodin, "Disgorging the Fruits of Historical Wrongdoing." 
199 Ibid., p. 487. 
200 For example, see the list of theorists given in Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-
Consequentialist Theory of Morality, pp. 126-27, footnote 2. 
201 See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 149-231. 
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account of property entitlements for derivative rather than foundational reasons. That is, 
according to rule-consequentialism, an appropriate scheme of property entitlements is 
justified by appeal to the expected consequences of a rule that required respect for that 
scheme, if the wide majority of people tried to internalise that rule.  
Why should we expect that rules requiring respect for a scheme of property, if the 
wide majority tried to internalise them, would result in good consequences? Property 
entitlements are partly important because of the satisfaction individuals derive from 
having robust protection of their possessions. But they are also important because of the 
incentives that they establish: linking hard work to (a qualified) scheme of property-
entitlements creates an incentive for productivity, and individuals may be willing to make 
costly investments due to the prospect of greater rewards.202 Incentives relating to 
property-entitlements (more precisely the good consequences that these entitlements 
should be expected to result in) can therefore justify benefiting-related duties in property-
violation cases. A rule that allowed even innocent beneficiaries to keep property 
wrongfully taken from victims would weaken these incentives, since individuals would 
then run the risk in making costly investments that their property might be unrecoverable 
if an innocent beneficiary came to possess it. These incentives would be strengthened, 
therefore, by a rule that required even innocent beneficiaries to relinquish property stolen 
from others. 
                                                 
202 The qualification indicated above is that individuals should only have entitlements to what property 
remains after whatever level of redistribution should take place has occurred. By this I mean that 
redistributive schemes set the scope of individual entitlements, rather than taking things that are 
antecedently the property of people. Insofar as productivity and investment should be expected to result in 
good consequences, however, there are good rule-consequentialist reasons to endorse some scheme of 
entitlements. 
  
122 
 
 
One might object that these incentive-related considerations only justify why a 
victim of property-violation should be provided compensation and that such 
compensation could be provided in various ways. Why not require, for example, society 
in general to compensate victims of property-violation, rather than the beneficiary in 
particular? Presumably, the objection goes, that would retain the incentive to make costly 
investments at the prospect of gaining greater rewards as these would be protected by a 
scheme of social compensation. However, there are two good incentive-related reasons 
for requiring the beneficiary, in particular, to relinquish property stolen from others rather 
than society in general. Firstly, victims will at least sometimes have an attachment to a 
particular item of property – John might reasonably value his car in particular, especially 
if he has spent time and resources improving the car – and will thus have an interest in 
the beneficiary relinquishing that item of property, rather than being given an equivalent 
value of compensation by society in general. A rule which allows victims to recover 
particular objects stolen from them (at least where this is possible), then, should be 
expected to establish stronger incentives for productivity. Secondly, the practice of 
requiring society to compensate the victim would in fact weaken incentives for 
productivity in society more generally: each of us would be aware that we could be 
required to give up some of our assets to compensate victims of injustice, even when the 
stolen assets could be reclaimed from the beneficiary. If so, then society in general has an 
interest in making beneficiaries relinquish stolen assets (rather than taking on costs 
themselves). 
 Of course, some real world property-violation cases will be more complicated 
than the example I have discussed in this chapter (i.e. Stolen Car). One complicating 
factor is that the material object that the beneficiary gains as a result of wrongdoing or 
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injustice may not be identical to the object that was taken from the beneficiary. Imagine 
that instead of giving John’s stolen car to Susan, Bill keeps that car for himself. Instead, 
he gives his (i.e. Bill’s) old car to Susan, and would not have done so had he not stolen 
John’s car. In this case, Susan benefits from wrongdoing in the form of property-violation 
but does not possess a physical object that was taken from the victim. In other cases, the 
object taken from the victim and transferred to the beneficiary might have been the same, 
but the beneficiary later sold it and gained some other object in its place before the 
situation became transparent. For example, Susan might have been given John’s car by 
Bill, but sold the car before she became aware that it was stolen.  
These complications do not present an in-principle problem for the rule-
consequentialist rationale in cases of property-violation. In cases where the object gained 
by the beneficiary is not the same as what was taken from the victim, the beneficiary pays 
principle can target the value of the object initially taken, if it is has changed into other 
forms of value. Christian Barry and David Wiens liken this to the common law notion of 
‘tracing’ which “…is the exercise of identifying an asset that ought to be treated as 
‘standing in’ for some other item to which a person has a claim”.203 Similarly, Goodin 
argues: “…the duty to give it back or give it up does not necessarily lapse when ‘it’—the 
original physical object—is no longer available to be given back or given up. The same 
duty extends to whatever can be shown (through some suitable procedure tracing the 
substitution of one thing for another) to have taken the place of the original. […] What 
we are tracing is the value that is embodied in the one thing, which is exchanged for the 
value embodied in another”.204 While beneficiaries in these cases do not possess the 
                                                 
203 Barry and Wiens, "Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," p. 7. 
204 Goodin, "Disgorging the Fruits of Historical Wrongdoing," pp. 486-87. 
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material object taken from the victim of wrongdoing or injustice, they have nevertheless 
benefited from property-violation in the form of possessing something of value that can 
be traced to the object wrongfully taken from the victim. Since they have no entitlement 
to this value, the rule-consequentialist account holds that they have a duty to relinquish 
their gains. This practice of tracing can be endorsed by rule-consequentialists because 
some of the good consequences of a scheme of property-entitlements discussed above 
would otherwise be undermined. People would not feel very secure in their investments 
if they had no recompense for objects stolen from them that were exchanged for other 
forms of value. In other words, requiring that the value of the object taken from the victim 
be restored to them, if the physical object is no longer around, strengthens the incentives 
to make costly investments in the first place. And the practice of requiring the beneficiary 
to relinquish the value of the property seems preferable to making society in general bear 
greater costs, since society in general has a strong interest in not paying the costs of 
injustice when these costs could instead be recovered from beneficiaries who possess 
value traced from that injustice.  
Another complicating factor in some real world cases is that the victims who 
initially had an entitlement to that property may no longer be around. As I mentioned in 
the previous chapter, in the case of benefiting from past injustice, the victims may have 
died during the intervening years. Alternatively, the wrongdoing or injustice may have 
been partly constituted by the killing of the victims. Some might think that beneficiaries 
in these types of historical violation cases should not be subject to a rule requiring them 
to relinquish their benefits. After all, if people have held onto property for long periods 
of time, their wellbeing will likely be increasingly reliant on the continued possession of 
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that property. A rule requiring beneficiaries in such cases to relinquish property tainted 
by historical violations, therefore, have some significant damaging consequences.  
But there is another rule-consequentialist consideration relating to historical 
violations of property entitlements that must be taken into account: if becoming reliant 
on property is counted as a consideration in favour of a beneficiary’s being permitted to 
continue possession of that property, then this creates a strong incentive for individuals 
to make themselves reliant on tainted property. An individual could therefore strengthen 
their case for continued possession by holding onto tainted property for longer, or by 
bequeathing it to their children. This creates a harmful incentive to delay returning stolen 
goods to the victims they were taken from. Thus, there is good reason to think that the 
rule-consequentialist account would still hold that beneficiaries should be allocated a duty 
to relinquish their benefits in cases of historical violations of property. Who should 
beneficiaries relinquish tainted property to when the victims are no longer around and 
there are no descendants who have inherited entitlements over the benefits? Goodin 
advocates a plausible proposal that the benefits should be put into a common pool to be 
used for general distributive justice purposes.205 According to my argument, these general 
distributive justice purposes should be interpreted as rule-consequentialist purposes. 
A third complicating factor in many real world cases is that the nature of property-
violation may be mediated through other agents, markets, and global institutions, rather 
than a simple transfer of a stolen object from a victim to a beneficiary as in Stolen Car. 
In recent work, Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar, for example, have developed a powerful 
moral analysis of the fact that many developing states face a “resource curse”, an umbrella 
                                                 
205 Ibid., pp. 488-89. 
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term for a series of interrelated curses that have been identified by political economists in 
which having an abundance of resources is positively correlated with authoritarianism, 
civil conflict, and lower rates of economic growth.206 According to Pogge and Wenar, 
these interrelated resource curses are engendered by an “international resource privilege” 
which confers upon any group controlling a preponderance of the means of coercion 
within a country the power to effect legally valid transfers of ownership rights over that 
countries natural resources—that is, even without the consent of its people.207 The 
international resource privilege does this by incentivising coup attempts, using sales to 
bolster internal support (often with military), and generally encouraging funds gained 
from sales of resources to be put towards economically unproductive uses.208 The relevant 
point for the present discussion is that, according to Wenar, this international resource 
privilege engenders the widespread violation of property rights—that is, the theft of 
natural resources from the citizens of developing states and the trafficking of these 
resources into developed states. As he argues, “The idea that the natural resources of a 
country belong to the people of that country is so intuitive that most will need no more 
proof than its statement”.209 And, therefore, the people must give valid consent to the sale 
and transfer of their country’s resources. Since these resources are traded on international 
markets without the consent of the population from whom they are taken, consumers who 
buy products at cheaper prices as a result of components sourced from these resources 
                                                 
206 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, esp. pp. 119-
21; 68-73. Leif Wenar, "Property Rights and the Resource Curse," Philosophy & Public Affairs 36, no. 1 
(2008). 
207 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, pp. 118-19. 
208 Would-be rulers know that if they can successfully maintain de facto authority over the state, they 
will be conferred the legal standing to sell a lucrative supply of the state’s natural resources on international 
markets. And they know that they can divert the wealth generated by the sale of resources to maintain 
internal support, for example amongst the military.  
209 Wenar, "Property Rights and the Resource Curse," p. 10.  
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should be understood as possessing stolen assets.210 Would rule-consequentialism also 
vest the people of a country with property entitlements over the natural resources found 
within that country? One reason to think so would be that vesting entitlements to the 
resources of a country in its people generally encourages the productive use (to improve 
their lives) and good management (to avoid despoiling their local environment) of those 
resources. But I need not commit to this particular answer for the property-violation 
argument to work. While there might be various plausible ways that rule-
consequentialists would treat entitlements to natural resources, it is implausible that rules 
could be justified that would permit seizing natural resources by force and selling them 
on international markets without any sincere attempt at providing a moral claim to that 
property. If this practice engenders severely bad consequences, as many political 
economists claim, then no plausible formulation of rule-consequentialism would license 
the practice.  
I have been considering ways in which property-violation cases may be more 
complicated than simple cases like Stolen Car and I have claimed that these complications 
do not present an in-principle problem for allocating beneficiaries in these cases with 
duties to relinquish their gains on a rule-consequentialist basis. Understanding that cases 
can be complicated in these ways is important because theorists of beneficiary pays are 
                                                 
210  Some theorists believe that the natural resources of a country do not belong exclusively to its people, 
but to all of humankind in common. For example, many left libertarians will endorse some version of this 
view. See, Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka, "Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not 
Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried," Philosophy & Public Affairs .33, no. 2 (2005). 
Other philosophers have argued that all of humankind should enjoy at least a “minority stake” in all natural 
resources, and that the extraction and sale of these resources can be justified by paying a tax that can be 
used to benefit those who are thereby excluded from these resources. For example, see: Thomas Pogge, 
"An Egalitarian Law of Peoples," Philosophy & Public Affairs 23, no. 3 (1994): pp. 199-205. However, 
this view would hardly undermine Wenar’s general argument that seizing natural resources by force and 
selling them on international markets without any sincere attempt at providing a moral justification would 
constitute a violation of property rights (in this case, from all humankind in common). 
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ultimately interested in the implications of this principle for real-world cases.  However, 
understanding these complications is also important because they help explain why my 
rule-consequentialist account can adequately respond to cases that I have discussed in 
previous chapters, in which I suggested that beneficiaries should relinquish their gains. 
For example, consider: 
 
Gift: Mary is given a birthday gift from a friend, who purchases that gift from a 
shop at a price made cheaper as a result of severe poverty. 
 
I can now claim that if the gift that Mary receives incorporates resources sourced from 
countries suffering the resource curse, then my argument can justify allocating Mary with 
a duty to relinquish some portion of the value of the gift she received. Since rule-
consequentialism can justify allocating benefiting-related duties in cases of property-
violation, then it can justify allocating Mary a duty if the gift she received amounts to her 
possessing stolen assets. And even if the gift Mary receives does not incorporate resources 
extracted from states without the consent of their population, we might still be able to 
count this as a case of property-violation. Recently, Todd Calder has argued that people 
who benefit in the form of buying cheap goods sourced through sweatshop labour should 
properly be counted as being unjustly enriched, in the same way that a recipient of stolen 
goods should be counted as being unjustly enriched.211 The rule-consequentialist rationale 
for this would be similar to the justification for the practice of tracing discussed above: 
what matters is not so much the physical object that has transferred from victim to 
                                                 
211 Calder, "Shared Responsibility, Global Structural Injustice, and Restitution." 
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beneficiary, but the value of that object. If people are confident in the knowledge that the 
value of their property will be returned (even by innocent beneficiaries) should it be 
stolen, this strengthens incentives for making costly investments in the first place. 
Similarly, if beneficiaries are required to relinquish property where the workers’ 
remuneration is less than the fair value of their labour, then this strengthens incentives 
not to unfairly remunerate labour in the first place. If one was required to relinquish such 
products, why would anyone purchase them in the first place (or give them as gifts to 
friends)?  
In a recent sceptical paper, Carl Knight has objected to arguments for beneficiary 
pays which are premised on Nozickian theories of property entitlements. He objects that 
Nozick’s historic entitlement theory is generally problematic, so offers a poor justification 
for beneficiary pays: “Were this the only way in which the benefiting view could be 
defended, most political philosophers would take that as a reductio of the view”.212 
Whether or not this is true, the objection is irrelevant. The view I am defending here is 
not foundationally Nozickian, but based on the moral importance of incentives. And it is 
eminently plausible – something I suspect most political philosophers would agree with 
– that some scheme of property-entitlements or another is perfectly justifiable. In 
particular, since my account endorses property-entitlements in a derivative way that 
allows for redistribution, it is likely a much more palatable view for many political 
theorists than full-fledged Nozickian property-rights. Without some further argument that 
shows why no scheme of entitlements is justified in terms of their good consequences, 
Knight’s objection can be safely dismissed.  
                                                 
212 Carl Knight, "Benefiting from Injustice and Brute Luck," ibid.39, no. 4 (2013): p. 591. 
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3. Motivational-Cause Cases 
 
I have argued that rule-consequentialism justifies the practice of allocating benefiting-
related duties in property-violation cases in a two-step fashion: The first step is to defend 
the claim that rule-consequentialism would include a rule requiring respect for a scheme 
of property-entitlements. The second step is to show that some cases of benefiting from 
wrongdoing or injustice are cases in which a scheme of property-entitlements is violated. 
Thus, in these cases, beneficiaries are required to relinquish their benefits that they have 
no entitlement to and return them to those who do have an entitlement (or, if nobody is 
now alive with an entitlement to those benefits, other responses may be justifiable such 
as putting the benefits into a common pool). In this section, I argue that rule-
consequentialism can justify the practice of allocating benefiting-related duties in 
motivational-cause cases in a much more direct way. Motivational-cause cases are those 
in which the reason why someone acts wrongly is precisely in order to benefit the 
beneficiary. In the previous chapter, I discussed a case introduced by Christian Barry and 
David Wiens: 
 
Tennis Rankings: In 1993 a German nationalist named Gunter Parche stabbed 
Monica Seles in the middle of a tennis match to help Steffi Graf (a German) regain 
her no.1 ATP ranking.213 
 
                                                 
213 Barry and Wiens, "Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," p. 18. 
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Since she benefits as a motivational-cause of wrongdoing, I previously suggested 
(contrary to Barry and Wiens) that Graf should be allocated additional duties in this case 
– in particular, I claimed that Graf should be willing to submit to a rematch for the no. 1 
position. However, I also claimed that Graf should not be allocated very demanding duties 
and that some theorists’ reluctance to agree that additional duties should be allocated to 
Graf might be explained by the fact that there are other factors in this case that militate 
against allocating very demanding duties.   
I will start by showing how rule-consequentialism can justify the allocation of 
duties in motivational-cause cases, then show why in some cases (like Tennis Rankings) 
the beneficiary should be allocated a much less demanding duty than in other cases. If my 
argument is to succeed, what must be shown is that a rule requiring beneficiaries who are 
motivational-causes of wrongdoing to relinquish their benefits should be expected to 
maximise good consequences, if the wide majority tried to internalise this rule. I must 
then show why a rule-consequentialist would agree that there are some factors, present in 
Tennis Rankings but absent in other cases, which explain why Graf should not be 
allocated very demanding duties.  
The basic argument in support of allocating duties in motivational-cause cases is 
that a morality which incorporated rules requiring this practice should be expected to 
maximise overall good consequences, if the wide majority tried to internalise them. 
Notice that if we allocated duties to beneficiaries who are motivational causes of 
wrongdoing to give up their benefits, then this removes the motivation for wrongdoing in 
the first place—namely, to benefit the beneficiary. After all, if a wide majority of people 
tried to internalise a rule requiring a beneficiary who is a motivational-cause of 
wrongdoing to relinquish their benefits, then the beneficiary will be likely to relinquish 
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their benefit. And if this is right, why would a wrongdoer attempt to benefit them in the 
first place? Of course, there may be many several reasons why a wrondoer may be 
motivated to act wrongly at play in a single case. That is, benefiting the beneficiary might 
only provide some motivation for their wrongful action. However, the argument from 
incentives does not depend on the wrongdoing being performed only to benefit the 
beneficiary. It is still important to undermine incentives for wrongdoing, even if this does 
not fully undermine the wrongdoer’s motivation for acting wrongly. Since undermining 
incentives for wrongdoing should be expected to reduce the number of incidents of 
wrongdoing, and since reducing the number of incidents of wrongdoing should be 
expected to result in morally good consequences, then rule-consequentialism should 
include a rule into the set which undermines such incentives. It should therefore endorse 
benefiting-related duties in motivational-cause cases. 
 
4. Stringency and Demandingness. 
 
The rule-consequentialist rationale for beneficiary pays is also able to explain why it 
seems that beneficiaries in some cases should be allocated more stringent and demanding 
duties than in other cases. For example, I claimed that in Tennis Rankings Graf should be 
allocated quite undemanding duties to, at most, submit to a rematch for the no. 1 ranking 
if and when Seles recovered from the stabbing. One of the factors that I previously 
suggested could explain why Graf should not be allocated a demanding duty was that the 
benefits were intertwined with her own efforts. Presumably in order to compete for the 
number one position, Graf must have trained very hard and put in a great deal of 
preparation for the match. It is unclear that she would not have won even if Seles had not 
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been stabbed. And, I noted, many theorists think that people ordinarily deserve some 
portion of their achievements that result from hard work, and that this might explain the 
reluctance of some theorists to allocate Graf with any additional duties.  
A second factor, present in Tennis Rankings, that I suggested should make the 
duties allocated to Graf undemanding concerned the fact that Parche, the wrongdoer, was 
insane. According to a newspaper report from the time, German police suggested that 
Parche “appeared confused and may be mentally disturbed”.214 And I noted that there 
were some real world cases, in which some people benefit as a motivational-cause of 
wrongdoing where the wrongdoer is not insane, which seem especially problematic: for 
example, consider children who are bestowed unfair advantages by their parents at the 
expense of other children. Or consider segments of a population who are unjustly 
benefited by a dictator who is attempting to secure their support at the expense of the rest 
of the country’s citizens. The fact that the wrongdoers in these cases are not typically 
insane might explain why it seems the beneficiaries should be allocated more demanding 
duties than in Tennis Rankings. 
Rule-consequentialism can give a structural identical treatment to these factors 
that it gives in justifying other features of common-sense morality (i.e. capacity-related 
and contribution-related duties). One powerful reason why we should allow people to 
ordinarily keep benefits owing to their own contributions is because this creates a strong 
incentive for productivity, just as property-entitlements do. People may be willing to 
make costly efforts in order to reap the benefits of their own efforts. Rule-
consequentialists, therefore, would endorse a rule which ordinarily allowed people to 
                                                 
214 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/30/newsid_2499000/2499161.stm 
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keep benefits owing to their own contributions because it should be expected to result in 
morally good consequences, if the wide majority of people tried to internalise this rule. 
Similarly, one powerful reason why the wrongdoer’s insanity should make a difference 
to the demandingness of the duties allocated in motivational-cause cases is that a rule 
requiring beneficiaries to relinquish their benefits would be a less effective incentive for 
regulating an insane person’s behaviour. And the purpose of allocating duties in 
motivational-cause cases was that it undermines an incentive for wrongdoing, since if the 
wide majority tried to internalise a rule requiring beneficiaries who are motivational-
causes to relinquish their gains, there would be no point attempting to benefit them – they 
would be likely to give up their benefits. 
The rule-consequentialist rationale can also justify why duties in some cases – for 
example, property-violation cases – seem especially stringent and demanding. We 
generally think that people’s entitlement to property places stringent and demanding 
constraints on other agents. It is particularly important that people are able to plan their 
economic investments in the belief that nobody will deprive them of their property. And 
it is also important to encourage innovation and economic productivity by incentivising 
people to take on reasonable risks at the prospect of gaining greater rewards (in the form 
of protected property). Therefore, in general, beneficiaries in property-violation cases 
should be allocated quite stringent and demanding duties to relinquish their benefits.  
 Lastly, various theorists have distinguished between different ways benefits may 
accrue to a beneficiary. These ways of benefiting seem to make a difference to the 
stringency and demandingness of the duties which should be allocated. In the previous 
chapter, I noted that Thomas Pogge explicitly distinguishes between “merely passive” or 
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“actively” profiting from injustice.215 While I claimed that ‘actively benefiting’ is unable 
to provide a convincing necessary condition for the justifiable allocation of benefiting-
related duties, I suggested that this distinction (on some interpretations of actively and 
passively benefiting) might make an important moral difference to stringency and 
demandingness of beneficiaries’ duties. For example, it seems plausible that a beneficiary 
who deliberately puts herself in a position where she profits from wrongdoing or injustice, 
or a beneficiary who seeks to take advantage of injustice, should be allocated more 
stringent and demanding duties to relinquish the value of their benefits than beneficiaries 
who do not. Similarly, Avia Pasternak distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary 
beneficiaries. She defines a voluntary beneficiary as someone “who could avoid receiving 
the tainted benefit”. If wrongdoing was transparent to the beneficiary, and if they could 
have avoided benefiting, then this might also make a difference to the stringency and 
demandingness of a beneficiary’s duties. Rule-consequentialism can justify why these 
different ways of benefiting might make a moral difference to the duties that should be 
allocated to beneficiaries. Consider a slightly altered version of the Stolen Car case. 
Suppose now that Susan was aware that the car was stolen when she benefited from it, 
and could have avoided benefiting by giving the car to John. If we incorporated a rule 
that issued a stringent and demanding duty for such beneficiaries to relinquish their 
benefits, and if this rule was widely internalised, then we should expect the instances in 
which victims are deprived of their goods to be reduced (since beneficiaries will not seek 
to take these goods, or will take these goods but return them to the victim instead).216  
                                                 
215 Pogge, "Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties," p. 72. 
216 One might think that rule-consequentialism should require people to seek out stolen benefits in order 
to return them to their rightful owner. However, in this case these people would not be beneficiaries, since 
they are merely seeking stolen goods in order to return them, rather than enjoy these goods themselves. 
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5. Objections 
 
I have argued that rule-consequentialism is able to provide a theoretical rationale for the 
beneficiary pays principle. And since this rationale gives explanatory support for our 
intuitive allocation of responsibility in cases of benefiting from wrongdoing and injustice, 
the beneficiary pays principle sits well in reflective equilibrium. While rule-
consequentialism thus adds justificatory support for the beneficiary pays principle, it also 
makes this principle vulnerable to objections against rule-consequentialist theory more 
generally. In this section, I discuss several objections that beneficiary pays must now face 
due to its rule-consequentialist rationale. I conclude that the rule-consequentialist 
rationale can be sustained in the face of these fresh objections.217 Of course, there are 
other objections against the beneficiary pays principle that do not relate to its rule-
consequentialist foundation. Chapter 2, recall, has already defended the beneficiary pays 
principle against independent objections that have been developed in the literature. 
 The most prominent objection to rule-consequentialist theory alleges that there is 
nothing in favour of conforming to a set of rules in a particular case if an agent knows (or 
should expect) that violating these rules instead would maximise good consequences on 
that particular occasion. For example, suppose that in Stolen Car, the car that Bill steals 
from John and gives to Susan completes her private collection of cars, something that she 
                                                 
217 This is by no means a full treatment of the objections to the formulation of rule-consequentialism 
that I have borrowed from the work of Brad Hooker. For a critical evaluation of this view, see: Richard J. 
Arneson, "Sophisticated Rule Consequentialism: Some Simple Objections," Philosophical Issues 15, no. 1 
(2005); Alison McIntyre, "The Perils of Holism: Brad Hooker's Ideal Code, Real World," Philosophical 
Issues 15, no. 1 (2005). For a response to these criticisms, see: Brad Hooker, "Reply to Arneson and 
Mcintyre," Philosophical Issues 15, no. 1 (2005). 
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has been attempting to do for most of her adult life. Suppose that Susan would be so 
ecstatic as a result of completing her collection that relinquishing the car should be 
expected to result in morally worse consequences than if she kept it. Since I have argued 
rule-consequentialists should accept a rule requiring beneficiaries to relinquish their 
benefits in property-violation cases, this amounts to advocating a rule that should not be 
expected to result in the morally best consequences in some cases. This puts pressure on 
my argument to revise the rule relating to beneficiaries in property-violation cases: The 
rule-consequentialist should instead endorse a rule requiring beneficiaries to relinquish 
their benefits in property-violation cases except when retaining the benefits should be 
expected to maximise good consequences. And, indeed, this rule in turn could be safely 
discarded in favour of a rule that simply required all individuals to act so as to maximise 
good consequences. If this is right, however, the rule-consequentialist rationale for 
beneficiary pays has given way to an act-consequentialist theory. As it is typically 
understood, act-consequentialism is the view that an act is morally required if and only if 
it should be expected to result in morally optimal consequences. More importantly, for 
my argument, it means that the case in favour for allocating benefiting-related duties in 
property-violation cases does not succeed. We should instead favour the rule that 
individuals should act so as to maximise good consequences.  
A rule-consequentialist should respond to this argument by pointing out that their 
theory need not collapse into act-consequentialism.218 Recall that according to the 
formulation of rule-consequentialism that I am employing, a set of rules is justified if and 
only if it should be expected to result in morally optimal consequences, if the wide 
                                                 
218 Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality, pp. 93-99. 
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majority of people tried to internalise those rules. And there are several reasons why rule-
consequentialism, formulated in this way, would not endorse a rule that requires each 
person to act in such a way that they should expect to maximise good consequences. In 
other words, there are several reasons why rule-consequentialists would not endorse a 
rule requiring that we acted according to act-consequentialist theory.  
One reason is apparent in my previous discussion of why we should endorse a 
qualified scheme of property-entitlements. I claimed that the wide-spread attempted 
internalisation of a rule requiring a respect for property should be expected to result in 
maximally good consequences because individuals would feel secure knowing that they 
are not vulnerable to being permissibly deprived of their assets. They would be willing to 
take on risks and costs due to the prospect of gaining greater rewards in the form of 
protected property. A rule requiring respect for property is also important because 
individuals could build stable life-plans, secure in the knowledge that their assets will not 
be taken from them. On the other hand, a rule that required people to steal others property 
whenever doing so would maximise good consequences, if the wide majority tried to 
internalise that rule, should be expected to weaken incentives for productivity and 
economic growth. People would be more wary of taking on risks and costs in order to 
reap greater rewards in the form of property. Such a rule should also be expected to make 
everyone more worried that their property could be permissibly taken at any time. This 
rule should not be expected to maximise overall good consequences. Therefore, a rule-
consequentialist should favour a rule that required respect for a qualified scheme of 
property, rather than a rule requiring individuals to steal property whenever they could 
maximise the good on a given occasion.   
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Put in general terms, then, the idea is that there is a general class of cases in which 
people have an interest in being able to confidently know what to expect others will do. 
And those interests can be secured only if others internalise rules of a fairly general form. 
We all have an interest in confidently knowing that others will honour contracts with us, 
not lie to us, nor kill us, and so on, without worrying that some exceptional circumstance 
would justify them deviating from these rules. As Brad Hooker argues, a rule requiring 
people to act as act-consequentialism prescribes would “undermine people’s ability to 
rely confidently on others to behave in agreed-upon ways. Trust would break down. In 
short, terrible consequences would result from the public expectation that this rule would 
prescribe killing, stealing, and so on when such acts would maximise the good”.219 
Act-consequentialists might object that their theory is not committed to the view 
that individuals should, in every circumstance, try and determine which available action 
should be expected to produce the most good. If it is true that terrible consequences would 
result from individuals always trying to perform particular actions which produce the 
most good, then an act-consequentialist can claim that individuals should act according 
to a rule-consequentialist decision procedure while maintaining that the moral status of 
an action is nevertheless determined by whether it would result in morally optimal 
consequences. According to this view, an individual should ordinarily act according to 
plausible rules such as ‘do not harm innocent people without their consent’, even though 
on at least some occasions this will mean that they, in fact, will act wrongly because they 
will not perform the action which has morally optimal consequences. By distinguishing 
between the appropriate decision procedure to take when deciding how to act, on the one 
                                                 
219 Ibid., p. 94. 
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hand, and the moral status of actions, on the other hand, an act consequentialist is 
therefore not committed to a theory that would result in the terrible consequences that I 
have just described.  
I accept this argument. Note, my aim in this section is not to undermine act-
consequentialism as a moral theory, but to defend the rule-consequentialist rationale for 
benefiting-related duties against a common objection from act-consequentialists. I accept 
that act-consequentialists can reject the claim that their theory is committed to terrible 
consequences resulting from individuals performing particular actions that would 
produce the most good. But by endorsing a rule-consequentialist decision procedure, in 
turn, the act-consequentialist must abandon the claim that a rule-consequentialist 
allocation of benefiting-related duties is undermined because it does not require 
individuals to always perform the particular action which would produce the most good. 
After all, both the rule-consequentialist and amended act-consequentialist view share a 
rule-consequentialist decision procedure. There remains an important question about 
whether we should now prefer rule or act-consequentialism overall, if they have the same 
decision procedures, but that is a question beyond the scope of this chapter and thesis.  
A second objection claims that there is problem with this response—in particular, 
since I have argued that rule-consequentialists should favour a rule that requires 
beneficiaries to relinquish their benefits even in particular cases where an individual could 
produce more good by violating such a requirement, my rule-consequentialist argument 
has wildly implausible commitments in some particular cases. Surely there is some limit 
to how much good a person should be willing to sacrifice in order to conform to a rule 
which, if the wide majority tried to internalise it, should be expected to maximise the 
good. Surely, that is, a beneficiary should refuse to relinquish their benefits if in some 
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case, by doing so, she could produce an enormous amount of good. And if beneficiaries 
should refuse to relinquish their benefits in cases where they would otherwise sacrifice 
an enormous amount of good, then the requirement to relinquish benefits in property-
violation and motivational-cause cases is undermined.  
In response, the rule-consequentialist commitments that I have been arguing for 
are more complicated than this objection envisages. I have argued that rule-
consequentialism is committed to several of the same rules that are also endorsed by 
common-sense morality: for example, a rule-consequentialist should endorse capacity-
related and contribution-related duties in addition to benefiting-related duties (not 
because these duties are features of common-sense morality, but because these duties are 
isomorphic with rules independently justified according to rule-consequentialism). I have 
also argued that the rule-consequentialist holds that each of these duties have a particular 
stringency and demandingness, and these must be weighed against each other to 
determine what an agent all-things-considered has a duty to do (in the terms I put it in 
introduction, this would be how we determine an agent’s moral responsibility). According 
to my argument, for example, while it is true that a wealthy person has a duty to aid the 
poor (typically by donating to aid agencies), they should not donate in some cases in 
which they should expect this donation to also contribute to harm (for example, if there 
is reason to expect that a large portion of the donation would be squandered by corrupt 
officials, despite expecting that the remainder of the donation would help the poor). This 
does not mean that contribution-related duties always outweigh capacity-related duties. 
In some cases, a wealthy person should proceed with the donation anyway knowing that 
this will make them complicit with corruption, since the donation should nevertheless be 
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expected to result in enough good to justify their complicity.220 Similarly, it is true that 
beneficiaries should be allocated duties to relinquish their benefits in property-violation 
and motivational-cause cases, but that these duties should be understood to have a certain 
stringency and demandingness. The beneficiary’s duty to relinquish their benefits will, in 
some cases, be outweighed by other duties that they have (for example, plausibly, duties 
to perform actions that have very good consequences). What the relative weighting of 
different duties (or rules) should be is a difficult question, but the fact that they should 
have such different weightings is a widely accepted view. Therefore, my argument is not 
undermined by the fact that in some cases in which refusing to relinquish benefits would 
produce an enormous amount of good, the beneficiary should not relinquish their benefits. 
This will simply mean that their duty to do so was outweighed by another duty. 
According to a final pair of related objections, while I have shown that rule-
consequentialism (if we accept it) can give a rationale for the beneficiary pays principle, 
if we have little reason to adopt rule-consequentialism in the first place then I have not 
shown why we should affirm the beneficiary pays principle. In response, while the aim 
of this thesis is not to give a definitive case for rule-consequentialism, I have raised some 
important considerations that count in favour of accepting this moral theory: I have shown 
that rule-consequentialism gives a good accounting of various features of intuitive 
morality, including the allocation of duties to beneficiaries of injustice in some types of 
cases, and this itself counts as evidence in favour of rule-consequentialism. Put 
differently, that rule-consequentialism sits well in reflective equilibrium is itself a reason 
to accept this moral theory. 
                                                 
220 For a good discussion of this problem, see: Chiara Lepora and Robert E Goodin, On Complicity and 
Compromise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
  
143 
 
 
One who rejects rule-consequentialism might relatedly object that while I have 
shown that the practice of allocating duties to beneficiaries in some types of cases should 
be expected to result in good consequences if the wide majority tried to internalise this 
practice, I have not shown that allocating such duties is morally required. Put simply, I 
have shown that it is good to treat the beneficiary pays principle as if it matters (because 
of its good consequences), but I have not shown that it actually morally matters. In 
response, while I do not aim to make a full defence of rule-consequentialism in this thesis, 
I nevertheless have suggested that there is evidence to think that rejecting rule-
consequentialism is a mistake, since this theory sits well in reflective equilibrium. If rule-
consequentialism is correct, however, then the distinction appealed to in the objection 
(between a practice that would have optimally good consequences and what practices 
morality really requires) does not make sense. In other words, according to rule-
consequentialism, the morality we should affirm just is one in which its practices, if the 
wide majority tried to internalise them, should be expected to result in optimally good 
consequences. 
  
6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have developed a positive defence of beneficiary pays. I defended 
beneficiary pays by arguing that a morality which incorporates the practice of allocating 
benefiting-related duties in some types of cases should be expected to result in morally 
better consequences than a morality that does not. In particular, I argued that benefiting-
related duties should be allocated in property-violation and motivational-cause cases. On 
my account, the only reason why we should allocate these duties is because of the 
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expected effects that such a practice would have, if the wide majority tried to internalise 
the rules that governed this practice. This chapter thus has important upshots both for 
theorists who are interested in how we should allocate responsibility between agents in 
particular scenarios in which people benefit from wrongdoing or injustice and for 
theorists who are independently interested in rule-consequentialist theory. The important 
upshot for the former is that a convincing rationale can be developed for the claim that 
the beneficiary pays principle plays an important role in allocating responsibility to 
address harm in some cases. The important upshot for the latter is that rule-
consequentialists are committed to applications of their theory that they may not have 
been aware of. In the following chapter, I extend this argument for beneficiary pays to 
show it can justify allocating benefiting-related duties in an additional class of cases—
namely, cases where beneficiaries hold or express a pro-attitude towards wrongdoing or 
injustice.  
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Chapter 5: Beneficiary Pays and Pro-Attitude Cases 
 
I have proposed that benefiting-related duties should be allocated in cases in which this 
practice, if the wide majority tried to internalise it, should be expected to result in good 
consequences. In particular, I have claimed that the allocation of benefiting-related duties 
is justified in property-violation and motivational-cause cases. This chapter examines 
whether and how beneficiaries’ attitudes might make a moral difference to the duties that 
they should be allocated. I argue that the same rule-consequentialist rationale for 
beneficiary pays that I have already developed in the previous chapter is, without 
modification, also able to justify why a beneficiary’s holding or expressing pro-attitudes 
towards wrongdoing is itself wrong, and why such beneficiaries in turn should be 
allocated duties to relinquish their benefits. Rule-consequentialism can also justify why 
some attitudes are more relevant than others, in the sense that they more greatly increase 
the stringency and demandingness of the duty that the beneficiary should be allocated to 
relinquish their benefits than other attitudes.  
 
1. Risking Wrongs 
 
I will begin by examining two existing accounts which argue that a beneficiary’s attitude 
towards wrongdoing may itself be wrongful when it increases the risk of wrongdoing. In 
a recent argument, Ronald Green has suggested that benefiting from wrongdoing is prima 
facie wrong when failure to refuse the benefit would encourage the wrongdoing to be 
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repeated.221 He distinguishes between three different kinds of encouragement. The first 
kind of encouragement is “direct encouragement through agency”, in which the 
beneficiary does not want to perform the wrongful act herself and so asks someone else 
to do it instead. As Green notes, this type of encouragement is in reality a “major cause” 
of the wrongdoing. No wrongdoing has yet occurred, and it is the beneficiary who 
attempts to initiate the wrongdoing. A second kind of encouragement is “direct 
encouragement through the acceptance of benefit”, in which a beneficiary’s mere 
acceptance of the benefit encourages repetition of the wrongdoing.  Consider the 
following example adapted from his discussion: 
 
Supervisor: A rogue employee secretly engages in insider trading and thereby 
increases the company’s profits. His supervisor receives a commission of these 
profits, so benefits from the insider trading.222 
 
As Green points out, were the supervisor to accept such benefits (while knowing that they 
are sourced in wrongdoing), she would encourage the repetition of the rogue employee’s 
actions. Green argues that such an agent “…condones such [wrongful] behaviour and 
encourages its repetition in the future”. And the reason why direct encouragement through 
the acceptance of benefit—why condoning wrongful behaviour—is itself wrongful, 
Green says, is because “it provides a powerful incentive for misconduct”.223  A final form 
of encouragement is “indirect encouragement through the legitimisation of a practice”, in 
which mere acceptance of the benefit impacts upon public norms of conduct, thereby 
                                                 
221 Green, "Benefiting from Evil: An Incipient Moral Problem in Human Stem Cell Research," p. 544. 
222 Ibid., p. 549. 
223 Ibid., pp. 549-50. 
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contributing to the general legitimisation the wrongdoing.224 Each of these forms of 
encouraging have in common that they increase the risk that wrongdoing will occur.  
In a similar treatment, Robert Goodin and Avia Pasternak have argued that a 
beneficiary who intends wrongdoing for the sake of the benefits, despite not themselves 
performing the wrongful action, can be wrong in itself. They develop the following case 
which I have adapted here:  
 
Vice President: The Vice President intends to assassinate the President so that she 
can take the position. However, a different agent performs the assassination first. 
The Vice-President benefits by being made the President.225  
 
The core of their argument is that when we are evaluating the actions that agents 
performed at a particular time (i.e. we are assigning praise, blame, responsibility, and so 
on), we should include in our evaluation what the agent should have expected would result 
from their actions, at the time that they acted. This is because a paradigmatic task of 
morality is to be action guiding, yielding verdicts about what agents ought to do given the 
available evidence they have at the time they must act. Therefore, in retrospect, we can 
morally evaluate an agent’s failure to do what they ought (prospectively, given their 
available evidence) to have done at that time. Likewise, we can blame them for acting as 
they should not have done at the time even if, against the odds, nothing bad ended up 
occurring as a consequence of their actions.  
                                                 
224 Ibid., pp. 548-51. 
225 Robert E Goodin and Avia Pasternak, "Intending to Benefit from Wrongdoing," Forthcoming  
(2015). 
  
148 
 
 
A beneficiary who intends to do wrong in order to reap the benefits may be pre-
empted from doing so, but she could not be certain of this at the time of acting – for 
example, the Vice President cannot be certain that the other assassin will succeed. All she 
can do is assign a probability to the various outcomes that might occur. Surely, then, she 
should assign some non-zero probability that her intended wrongful action will not be 
pre-empted (and that she will not change her mind), in which case she will perform the 
assassination instead. Given her beliefs and the evidence at the time, then, her forming 
the intention to perform the assassination increases the probability that the assassination 
will occur. And it is because her intention increases the risk of a wrong occurring that it 
is, itself, a wrongful attitude. This is true even if she does not end up, in retrospect, 
performing the assassination. As Goodin and Pasternak say,  
 
Depending on the probability of that (and of course on how bad the outcome 
would be), we might judge her to have run an unacceptable risk of becoming 
causally, and hence morally, implicated in a bad outcome. Forming an intention 
positively related to wrongdoing might, depending on that calculation, count as 
wrong in just that way.226  
 
To be sure, our assessment of an agent who merely intends to do wrong should be 
different from another agent who both intends to do wrong and has taken further steps to 
performing the wrong. Nevertheless, the agent who merely intends to do wrong herself 
                                                 
226 Ibid., p. 18. 
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will, in fact, do wrong when she poses an “unacceptable risk the wrongdoing will ensue 
as a result”.227 
Notice that a beneficiary’s attitude towards wrongdoing might risk wrongdoing 
when it is expressed (the attitude is acknowledged by others) and/or when it is private 
(the attitude is held by the beneficiary, and may or may not also be expressed). In the 
Supervisor example, it is because the employees acknowledge the condoning attitude of 
the supervisor that they are tempted to engage in repeated acts of insider trading. In this 
case, it is the supervisor’s expressed attitude that is morally relevant because it increases 
the risk of future wrongdoing. In the Vice President example, it is because the Vice 
President has the intention to perform the assassination that the risk of wrongdoing is 
increased, and this does not depend on others acknowledging the attitude of the Vice 
President towards wrongdoing, or being aware of it at all.  Therefore, in this case, it is a 
private intention to do wrong that is morally relevant because it increases the risk of future 
wrongdoing.  
There is another way of understanding what makes these attitudes towards 
wrongdoing problematic—namely, these attitudes make wrongful outcomes more 
modally robust, in a sense described by Philip Pettit.228 According to Pettit, some goods 
are modally demanding in the sense that their instantiation does not only depend on what 
actually happens, but what would happen in a range of counterfactual scenarios. 
Famously, for example, Pettit argues that freedom is a modally demanding good. Suppose 
that another agent was in a position to interfere with my choice between two options, a 
or b. Now, suppose that I had two tactics to avoid my choice being interfered with by the 
                                                 
227 Ibid., p. 20. 
228 Philip Pettit, "Freedom and Probability: A Comment on Goodin and Jackson," Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 36, no. 2 (2008). 
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other agent. First, I could adapt my preferences to choose whatever the other agent would 
wish I choose. Second, I could attempt to ingratiate myself with the other agent such that 
they are inclined to allow me to choose however I wish. Pettit’s point is that it would not 
be enough for me to be free that I was successful in either (or both) of these tactics, such 
that the other agent does not actually interfere with my choice. Rather, my freedom 
depends on whether the other agent would be able to interfere with my choice in the 
(counterfactual) event that my attempt to ingratiate myself with them did not succeed, or 
they simply changed their mind and decided not to allow me a choice between a or b. 
Since the other agent is in a position to monitor my choices, and interfere if and whenever 
they so desire, my ability to choose a or b is not modally robust.  Now, my suggestion is 
that we can also employ this concept of modal robustness to understand what is wrong 
with intending to do wrong or encouraging wrongdoing. It is true that the Vice President 
does not actually assassinate the President, but her intention to do so makes the outcome 
that the President will be assassinated more modally robust. In the (counterfactual) event 
that the other assassin failed, the Vice President is ready to step in and perform the 
assassination instead. Since the wrongful action occurs in a greater range of possible 
scenarios due to the Vice President’s intention, this attitude makes wrongdoing more 
modally robust.  
 
2. Rule-Consequentialism and Risky Attitudes 
 
So far I have examined arguments that claim particular attitudes a beneficiary may hold 
or express are wrongful if they increase the risk of wrongdoing. But why should rule-
  
151 
 
 
consequentialists accept this argument? In the previous chapter, I understood rule-
consequentialism as making the following claim:  
 
Rule-Consequentialism. An act is morally required (or permissible or 
impermissible) if it is required (or allowed or forbidden) by the set of rules which 
should be expected to result in the morally best consequences, if the wide majority 
tried to internalise them.  
 
Based on this understanding, I argued that rule-consequentialism can provide a rationale 
for why duties should be allocated to beneficiaries of wrongdoing and injustice in cases 
in which a rule requiring them to relinquish their benefits should, if widely internalised, 
be expected to result in good consequences. Recall, in property-violation cases, allocating 
a beneficiary with a duty to relinquish their benefits is justified by appeal to property-
entitlements which, in turn, are grounded on the good consequences that should be 
expected would obtain if a rule requiring a respect for a qualified scheme of property 
entitlements was widely internalised. In motivational-cause cases, allocating a 
beneficiary with a duty to relinquish their benefits is justified by appeal to desirable 
incentives. If a rule requiring beneficiaries to relinquish their benefits when they are a 
motivational-cause of wrongdoing was widely internalised, then this would (partly) 
undermine the motivation for some to do wrong to benefit others in the first place.  
In the same way that rule-consequentialism is able to justify the allocation of 
duties to beneficiaries in property-violation and motivational-cause cases, I argue that 
rule-consequentialism can also justify why holding or expressing an attitude that 
increases the risk of wrongdoing is itself wrong. For example, if intending or encouraging 
  
152 
 
 
wrongdoing characteristically increases the risk of wrongdoing occurring, then part of the 
optimal set of rules would presumably be an injunction against intending or encouraging 
wrongdoing, since this rule should be expected, if widely internalised, to result in good 
consequences. If this rule were widely internalised, then there would be fewer instances 
of people intending or encouraging wrongdoing, and so the risk of wrongdoing occurring 
would be decreased.  
Notice, also, that this rule-consequentialist argument is able to generalise to a 
range of pro-attitudes towards wrongdoing that a beneficiary might have. In other words, 
the moral relevance of beneficiaries’ attitudes are not exclusive to intending or 
encouraging wrongdoing alone. Any pro-attitude towards wrongdoing characteristically 
increases the risk that wrongdoing will occur, albeit to different degrees, so these rule-
consequentialist considerations extend to the range of pro-attitudes towards wrongdoing 
that a beneficiary might hold or express. This is important, because various theorists have 
recently suggested a range of attitudes that may be morally relevant to the duties that 
beneficiaries should be allocated. For example, Daniel Butt has claimed that “The 
individual’s duty not to benefit […] stems from one’s moral condemnation of the unjust 
act itself” and that we ought to “hold a genuine aversion to injustice and its lasting 
effects”.229 Edward Page claims that failing to disgorge a fair share of benefits associated 
with climate change “would put [affluent] states in the position of condoning the setbacks 
of interest [to developing states] to which their affluence is historically linked”.230 Clare 
Heyward writes: “If an agent benefits from another knowingly acting unjustly, then the 
                                                 
229 Butt, "On Benefiting from Injustice." Emphasis has been added to the references through to the end 
of this paragraph. 
230 Page, 'Give It up for Climate Change: A Defence of the Beneficiary Pays Principle', p. 315 
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beneficiary might be accused of condoning the action if she keeps the benefits”.231 Avia 
Pasternak argues “…even though welcoming beneficiaries cannot refuse the wrongful 
benefit, the fact that they welcome it [i.e. the wrongdoing] implicates them too, at least in 
some sense, in wrongdoing, and could therefore ground further duties towards its 
victims”.232 Ronald Green insists that “Everyone has a stake in opposing forms of 
benefiting from evil that encourage the further commission of evil deeds”.233 Lastly, 
Robert Goodin and Avia Pasternak argue that a beneficiary’s “forming an intention 
positively related to wrongdoing” might count as wrong, depending on whether it 
increased the risk of wrongdoing.234  
Rule-consequentialism can explain not only why people should not hold pro-
attitudes towards wrongdoing, but also why they should hold con-attitudes towards 
wrongdoing—in other words, why they should be regretful of and adverse to wrongdoing. 
A rule requiring people to be regretful of or adverse to wrongdoing should, if the wide 
majority tried to internalise this rule, be expected to decrease the risk of wrongdoing 
occurring.  
 Lastly, rule-consequentialism can also explain why some attitudes seem more 
morally problematic than others. For example, it seems plausible that intending 
wrongdoing is worse than encouraging it, which is worse than welcoming it, which is 
worse than being indifferent to it, and so on. The natural explanation for this ordering is 
that intending wrongdoing characteristically increases the risk of wrongdoing occurring 
                                                 
231 Heyward, "Benefiting from Climate Geoengineering and Corresponding Remedial Duties: The Case 
of Unforeseeable Harms," p. 410. 
232 Avia Pasternak, "Voluntary Benefits from Wrongdoing," Journal of Applied Philosophy 31, no. 4 
(2014).: p. 378. 
233 Green, "Benefiting from Evil: An Incipient Moral Problem in Human Stem Cell Research," p. 548. 
234 Goodin and Pasternak, "Intending to Benefit from Wrongdoing," p. 18. 
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the most, then encouraging, welcoming, condoning, and finally being indifferent to 
wrongdoing. Recall my argument that an agent’s intending wrongdoing makes the 
occurrence of wrongdoing more modally robust, in the sense that in a greater range of 
possible scenarios the wrongdoing will occur due to the agent’s having that attitude. 
Arguably, intending wrongdoing makes the occurrence of wrongdoing more modally 
robust than being indifferent to it. It is true that an agent’s being indifferent to wrongdoing 
increases the possible scenarios in which wrongdoing will occur. For example, consider 
a scenario in which another agent would act wrongly unless he believed that someone 
would reproach him for doing so. In such a scenario, another agent’s indifference to 
wrongdoing may fail to prevent the occurrence of wrongdoing. But those who intend to 
do wrongdoing would themselves attempt to make wrongdoing occur, rather than merely 
failing to prevent others’ attempts at wrongdoing. Rule-consequentialism can justify why, 
intuitively, some attitudes are more morally problematic than others to the extent that they 
increase the risk of wrongdoing to different degrees or make wrongdoing more modally 
robust.  
In short, rule-consequentialism can justify why a great many attitudes that 
beneficiaries might hold or express are morally relevant, and why some are more morally 
problematic than others. Rule-consequentialists should forbid agents from holding or 
expressing attitudes that characteristically increase the risk of wrongdoing, since a rule 
forbidding these attitudes should, if the wide majority tried to internalise it, be expected 
to result in good consequences. Furthermore, rule-consequentialists would find attitudes 
more wrongful the greater the risk of wrongdoing they should be expected to 
characteristically result in.  
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3. Attitudes and Actions 
 
I have now given a rule-consequentialist argument that holding or expressing pro-
attitudes towards wrongdoing is itself wrongful. But I have not shown how this claim 
about wrongful attitudes connects with a claim about actions. In other words, I have not 
shown why a beneficiary who holds or expresses a pro-attitude towards wrongdoing 
should take the action of relinquishing their benefits from wrongdoing.  
There are two ways in which a rule-consequentialist could justify why 
beneficiaries who held or expressed a pro-attitude towards wrongdoing should be 
allocated duties to relinquish their benefits from wrongdoing, depending on whether the 
pro-attitude was privately held or publically expressed. Let us start with beneficiaries who 
express pro-attitudes towards wrongdoing, since this is the more straightforward case. 
Recall the Supervisor example. By retaining the benefits from their employee’s insider 
trading, the Supervisor expresses towards that employee a condoning attitude regarding 
their wrongdoing. And this increases the risk that the employee will engage in further 
instances of insider trading. So, here, it is the fact that retaining the benefits risks further 
wrongdoing (via their condoning attitude) that explains why the Supervisor should be 
allocated a duty to relinquish them. It is important to emphasise that, according to this 
argument, the beneficiary has a duty to relinquish their benefits not because of the attitude 
they actually hold, but because, were they to fail to disgorge the benefits, it would express 
a pro-attitude regarding wrongdoing to others, who thereby are incentivised to perform 
further wrongs. Put simply, if agents have a duty not to express a pro-attitude towards 
wrongdoing (in light of these attitudes characteristically increasing the risk of 
wrongdoing), and retaining benefits in some cases would express a pro-attitude towards 
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wrongdoing, then in these cases the beneficiaries should be allocated a duty to relinquish 
their benefits.  
This argument has important implications for real-world cases that interest 
proponents of benefiting-related duties. The real-world case that it most clearly applies to 
is exploitative labour. While it doesn’t seem plausible to think that most citizens of 
affluent countries who benefit from exploitative labour (by being able to purchase cheap 
products) welcome, intend, or encourage wrongdoing, it is very plausible that many are 
indifferent to, or even condone, the exploitative labour from which they benefit. Factories 
which engage in exploitative labour are set up because they are profitable. And they are 
profitable because a great many consumers are willing to buy their products at cheap 
prices, and unwilling to sanction companies that engage in these wrongful practices. 
Neither do these consumers, by and large, switch to alternative products which may be 
less harmful. The expressed attitudes of a great many consumers towards wrongdoing 
really do risk further wrongdoing, by incentivising exploitative labour. If this is correct, 
then my argument explains a central case that motivates interest in benefiting-related 
duties to address harm. Beneficiaries of exploitative labour should be allocated a duty to 
relinquish their benefits because such a practice, if the wide majority tried to internalise 
it, should be expected to result in good consequences (by removing incentives for 
exploitative labour). 
How does the rule-consequentialist argument justify the allocation of duties in 
cases in which the beneficiary privately holds but does not publically express a pro-
attitude towards wrongdoing? Consider the Vice President case. The Vice President holds 
an intention to assassinate the President but does not express this intention (since another 
agent pre-empts their attempt, leaving them with nothing to do). I have shown why a rule-
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consequentialist should claim that holding this intention was wrongful, because they 
should accept a rule forbidding people from holding attitudes which characteristically 
increase the risk of wrongs. But why should we think that this means beneficiaries who 
privately held a wrongful attitude should relinquish their benefits? The reasoning is 
similar to motivational-cause cases. A rule which required beneficiaries who held a pro-
attitude towards wrongdoing to relinquish their benefits should, if the wide majority tried 
to internalise it, be expected to undermine a motivation for these beneficiaries to do wrong 
in the first place. If we required the Vice President to forgo the office of President due to 
her intention to assassinate the President, then there would be no reason for her to intend 
to assassinate the President in the first place. The main difference between this case and 
motivational-cause cases is that in the latter, wrongdoing is performed by a third party 
with the aim of benefiting the beneficiary, who may be entirely innocent of wrongdoing. 
In the Vice President case, however, wrongdoing is performed by the beneficiary with 
the aim of benefiting herself. In such pro-attitude cases, then, the beneficiary is not 
innocent but should nevertheless be allocated a duty to relinquish the benefits. 
 
4. Two Objections 
 
I have now argued that rule-consequentialism can justify the allocation of duties in pro-
attitude cases in a two-step fashion. The first step was to demonstrate that rule-
consequentialists should accept a rule that forbade holding or expressing a pro-attitude 
towards wrongdoing. They should accept this rule because these pro-attitudes towards 
wrongdoing characteristically increase the risk of wrongdoing—therefore, a rule which 
forbade these attitudes should, if the wide majority tried to internalise it, be expected to 
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reduce the overall occurrence of wrongdoing (resulting in good consequences). The 
second step was to demonstrate why this argument would have the upshot that 
beneficiaries in pro-attitude cases should be allocated duties to relinquish their benefits. I 
argued that if agents have a requirement not to express a pro-attitude towards wrongdoing 
(because these attitudes characteristically increase the risk of wrongdoing), and retaining 
benefits in some cases (like the Supervisor case) would express a pro-attitude towards 
wrongdoing, then in these cases the beneficiaries should be allocated a duty to relinquish 
their benefits. And a rule which required beneficiaries who privately held a pro-attitude 
towards wrongdoing to relinquish their benefits should, if the wide majority tried to 
internalise it, be expected to undermine a motivation for these beneficiaries to do wrong 
in the first place. I will now consider some objections to this argument. 
A first objection is that some other straightforward explanation can be given for 
why the beneficiaries should be allocated duties to relinquish their benefits in the pro-
attitude cases I have discussed. For example, a plausible explanation of why we should 
prohibit the Vice President from gaining the office of President is because it would be 
disastrous to allow someone who attempted assassinating a government official to be 
President. Similarly, a plausible explanation of why the supervisor should be required to 
relinquish their benefits is because they failed to satisfy their responsibility to make sure 
their employees are abiding by the law. Therefore, we need not appeal to the attitudes 
these beneficiaries had to justify why they should be required to relinquish the benefits 
they received. In response, a rule-consequentialist should accept that these do provide 
good explanations of why the respective beneficiaries should be required to relinquish 
their benefits. Clearly, a rule forbidding those who attempt to assassinate government 
officials from taking political office themselves should, if the wide majority tried to 
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internalise it, be expected to maximise good consequences (since it would prevent 
unscrupulous people from becoming politicians). However, these explanations are 
compatible with the argument that such beneficiaries should be allocated a duty to 
relinquish their benefits because they held or expressed a pro-attitude towards 
wrongdoing. In other words, it is compatible that the supervisor acts wrongly both by 
expressing an attitude that increases the risk of wrongdoing and because they did not 
exercise due oversight of their employees actions, as their professional responsibility 
demanded. It will often be true in cases where a beneficiary holds a pro-attitude towards 
wrongdoing that they act wrongly in some other way, and that this may also justify why 
they should be allocated a duty to relinquish their benefits. But this does not mean we 
should reject the moral relevance of pro-attitudes towards wrongdoing. 
A second objection is that the rule-consequentialist account that I have developed 
does not offer a uniquely compelling explanation of the morally significant attitudes. In 
particular, one might suggest a candidate attitude-type that seems wrongful but does not 
characteristically increase the risk of wrongdoing. If the wrongness of this candidate 
attitude-type can be explained on other non-rule-consequentialist grounds, then the 
objector may argue that their account offers a better analysis of wrongful attitudes. For 
example, consider a beneficiary who merely privately wishes that wrongdoing occurs so 
that they may reap the benefits, despite not performing the wrongdoing themselves. 
Insofar as ‘private wishings’ are not publically expressed (so nobody else is incentivised 
to perform wrong) and do not constitute intentions to do wrong (so the wish does not 
increase the risk of themselves performing wrongdoing), it seems that the rule-
consequentialist account I have offered is unable to explain the wrongness of holding this 
attitude.  
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This objection is not particularly damaging unless an alternative explanation is 
offered. However, one might argue that virtue ethics does, in fact, offer a more compelling 
explanation of wrongful attitudes than rule-consequentialism can. The focus of the virtue 
ethicist’s moral evaluation, after all, is on the virtues that make up an agent’s moral 
character: kindness, generosity, tolerance, forgivingness, and so on; and also on the vices: 
jealousy, vindictiveness, greediness, and so on. The virtue ethicist understands these 
character traits as including “…emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, 
desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities”.235 According to 
virtue ethicists, an agent should hold whichever attitude towards wrongdoing that would 
be virtuous. And a virtuous agent, plausibly, would not condone, encourage, welcome, or 
intend wrongdoing. Neither would they privately wish it to occur. 
 In response, I agree that privately wishing wrongdoing seems morally dubious. 
But if the virtue ethicist is to appeal to this attitude to undermine the rule-consequentialist 
account, they need to provide some principled explanation of why it would not be virtuous 
to privately wish wrongdoing occur. And their account must not explain the vice of the 
attitude ‘privately wishing wrongdoing to occur’ by pointing out that it characteristically 
increases the risk of wrongdoing, since that would then prove too much: this is the precise 
answer the rule-consequentialist who accepts my argument would offer. Furthermore, as 
I argued above, there is a rank-ordering of how bad pro-attitudes towards wrongdoing are 
according to how greatly they characteristically increase the risk of wrongdoing. I 
suggested, for example, that intending wrongdoing was morally worse than encouraging 
it, which was worse than being indifferent to others’ wrongdoing. The rule-
                                                 
235 Rosalind Hursthouse, "Virtue Ethics,"  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/. 
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consequentialist can explain this rank-ordering by pointing to the characteristic risks 
associated with each type of attitude. Intending characteristically increases the risk of 
wrongdoing much more than indifference, for example. However, it is much harder to see 
how the virtue ethicist could explain this phenomenon, and why we should think that pro-
attitudes towards wrongdoing constitute vices without resort to the characteristic 
consequences of these attitudes.   
 
5. Conclusion 
  
I have argued that the attitudes beneficiaries take towards wrongdoing are themselves 
wrongful when they characteristically increase the risk of wrongdoing, since a rule 
forbidding people to hold or express attitudes that characteristically increase the risk of 
wrongdoing should, if the wide majority tried to internalise it, be expected to result in 
good consequences. If my argument has been successful, then there are various 
substantive upshots: First, there are a great many other attitudes that are morally relevant 
than has so far been suggested in the literature. Second, the moral relevance of these 
attitudes can be given a unified explanation: a beneficiary’s attitude towards wrongdoing 
may itself be wrong when it increases the risk of wrongdoing. Third, if (as I have already 
argued in Chapter 4), this rule-consequentialist account also does well in justifying duties 
in property-violation and motivational-cause cases, it offers a good overall account of 
why we should allocate beneficiaries with duties in a central range of cases. 
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Part III: Application  
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Chapter 6: Applying Beneficiary Pays to Climate Change 
 
In the previous two chapters, I defended beneficiary pays by arguing that a morality which 
incorporates the practice of allocating benefiting-related duties should, if the wide 
majority tried to internalise it, be expected to result in morally better consequences than 
a morality that does not. In particular, I developed a rule-consequentialist argument that 
benefiting-related duties should be allocated in cases (I called these property-violation, 
motivational-cause, and pro-attitude cases) in which this practice, if the wide majority 
tried to internalise it, should be expected to result in good consequences—and not 
allocated in cases in which this practice would not.  
Part III of this thesis, comprised of this chapter alone, justifies the application of 
the beneficiary pays principle to climate change by assimilating climate change to these 
cases. I will argue, first, that climate change constitutes a property-violation case since 
many citizens of developed states have violated property entitlements that others have to 
particular shares of the atmosphere’s safe absorptive capacity. In particular, I argue that 
all individuals have entitlements to an equal share of the atmosphere’s safe absorptive 
capacity, and that the citizens of developed states have wrongfully appropriated others’ 
shares by exceeding an equal allocation of emissions. I argue, second, that climate change 
constitutes a motivational-cause case since decision-makers within developed states fail 
to appropriately limit their states’ overall emissions, partly because they intend to benefit 
their citizens whom they depend on for election (and are thus not willing to undermine 
their high-consumption life-styles). I argue, third, that climate change constitutes a pro-
attitude case, since many citizens are indifferent to the harms expected from climate 
change. Therefore, beneficiary pays justifiably allocates such citizens pro-tanto duties to 
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bear costs of addressing climate change (corresponding to the value of the benefits that 
they enjoy).  
If climate change can be assimilated to these other cases as I suggest, this 
completes my argument that the beneficiary pays principle plays an important role in 
determining how the costs of addressing climate change should be allocated. But while it 
plays an important role, other principles of responsibility are also relevant. For example, 
I have argued that the ability to pay principle and the contributor pays principle are also 
compelling and play a significant role, and that each of these principles can also be given 
a rule-consequentialist rationale. A complete account of how we should allocate the costs 
of addressing climate change, therefore, would take into consideration these other 
principles, weighing all the relevant pro-tanto duties agents have against each other. Each 
person’s all-things-considered towards addressing climate change is whatever duty 
emerges from this weighing. 
 
1. Benefiting from Property-Violation in Climate Change 
 
I have argued that a rule-consequentialist commitment to property-entitlements can 
justify the allocation of benefiting-related duties in property-violation cases. According 
to this account, beneficiaries may come to hold material objects which they have no title 
over, where the victim may or may not retain an entitlement to those objects.236 This 
argument runs on the same logic as Nozick’s account of rectification.237 Somewhere along 
                                                 
236 Goodin, "Disgorging the Fruits of Historical Wrongdoing." Other accounts along the lines of unjust 
enrichment have been developed in Page, "Give It up for Climate Change: A Defence of the Beneficiary 
Pays Principle." and Calder, "Shared Responsibility, Global Structural Injustice, and Restitution." 
237 Goodin, "Disgorging the Fruits of Historical Wrongdoing," p. 487. 
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the line, rights have been violated making the transfer of the benefit to the beneficiary 
unjust. If the victim is still alive and able to be identified, the proper response on the part 
of the beneficiary is to give back the (value of the) object that they wrongfully possess. 
In typical cases, the victim does, and the beneficiary does not, have entitlements to those 
objects. If victims are not alive, or cannot be identified, other responses may be justifiable: 
for example, beneficiaries may be required to relinquish their benefits into a common 
pool to be used for general distributive justice purposes. Unlike Nozick’s account, 
however, in which entitlements to property are foundational and absolute, on my account 
property rights are derivatively justified because they should be expected to have good 
consequences, if the wide majority of people tried to internalise them. Property 
entitlements incentivise technological innovation and economic growth, since individuals 
are more likely to make risky investments due to the prospect of greater rewards. 
Individuals are also likely to feel secure in the knowledge that their property cannot be 
permissibly taken from them.238  
 In this section, I will justify benefiting-related duties in the case of climate change 
by assimilating it to a property-violation case. That is, I will argue that the beneficiaries 
of climate change possess ‘tainted’ holdings as a result of the violation of others’ rights, 
and therefore these beneficiaries have been unjustly enriched. The proper response to this 
situation is for them to relinquish (the value of) these benefits. In practice, this may take 
the form of being allocated costs by their government as part of an appropriate state-based 
                                                 
238 It is worth briefly noting that this argument need not deny that desert plays any role in a justifiable 
scheme of property entitlements, as some theorists think it should. Rule-consequentialists can incorporate 
considerations of desert by incorporating it into their account of the good. If it is good that people get what 
they deserve, then a rule which ordinarily protected people’s claims over property which they deserve 
should, if the wide majority tried to internalise it, be expected to maximise overall good consequences. 
While my argument need not reject the role of desert in a justifiable scheme of property-entitlements, 
neither is it committed to desert having that role. 
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response to climate change. I cover this argument in the most detail, for two reasons: 
First, it is complicated, raising important and controversial issues about individuals’ 
entitlements to a fair share of emissions. Second, I have argued that benefiting-related 
duties in property-violation cases are typically very stringent and demanding, since we 
ordinarily think that entitlements to property are quite constraining: we cannot easily 
override property entitlements even in order to secure other morally desirable ends.  
The first step of this argument is to identify what the relevant holdings are that I 
am suggesting beneficiaries of climate change wrongfully possess. Recall, from Chapter 
1, that in order to avoid unacceptably dangerous climate change, many scientists and 
policymakers claim that we should limit global warming to 2°C above 1861-1880 
levels.239  And since the largest contribution to global warming is human induced by 
greenhouse gas emissions (the most important being carbon dioxide),240 this entails that 
we must limit the total amount of emissions in the atmosphere. Put precisely, to have a 
reasonable probability of staying within the 2°C limit will require stabilising total carbon 
dioxide emissions up to about 1000 GtC. And since we had already emitted over half this 
amount by 2011, we are already far along the path towards greater global warming.241 
The imposition of a limit on total emissions means that the absorptive capacity of the 
atmosphere within safe limits is a scarce resource. This raises a distributive problem. 
Since we must collectively constrain our emissions, we must allocate entitlements to emit 
                                                 
239 For example, The Stern Review states that “The risks of the worst impacts of climate change can be 
substantially reduced if greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere can be stabilised between 450 and 550ppm 
CO2 equivalent (CO2e)”. And the figure 550ppm corresponds to “at least a 77% chance – and perhaps up 
to a 99% chance, depending on the climate model used – of a global average temperature rise exceeding 
2°C”. Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, p. vii and iii. 
240 IPCC, "Summary for Policymakers," p. 13. 
241 Ibid., p. 27. 
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amongst the various agents with an interest in being able to do so. If some emit more, 
others must emit less. Put simply, the relevant holdings are the entitlements to emit.  
However, there is a qualification to this claim. Emissions entitlements are not 
intrinsically valuable in the sense that it is not, in itself, better have more emissions 
entitlements rather than less. Rather, our interest in emitting is so that we can obtain 
particular goods that we need or desire. In some cases, the relevant holdings will no longer 
be the emissions entitlements to be allocated, since they will already have been depleted. 
Rather, in this case the relevant holdings are the value of the goods that the emissions 
were turned into. As I previously observed, some advocates of beneficiary pays claim that 
we need not merely focus on the particular items that have been taken from victims and 
transferred to the beneficiary.242 As Robert Goodin argues: “…the duty to give it back or 
give it up does not necessarily lapse when ‘it’—the original physical object—is no longer 
available to be given back or given up. The same duty extends to whatever can be shown 
(through some suitable procedure tracing the substitution of one thing for another) to have 
taken the place of the original. […] What we are tracing is the value that is embodied in 
the one thing, which is exchanged for the value embodied in another”.243  
But what, precisely, constitutes each person’s entitlement to emit? Some 
allocation of emissions entitlements or another must be defended. Thus, the second step 
in the argument is to take a stance on this question. I will argue that distributing 
entitlements to emit equally is the morally best policy. I will refer to this view as 
‘emissions egalitarianism’ for short, borrowing this term from the literature.244  
                                                 
242 See Barry and Wiens, "Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Sustaining Wrongful Harm," p. 7. 
243 Goodin, "Disgorging the Fruits of Historical Wrongdoing," pp. 486-87. 
244 Christian Baatz and Konrad Ott, "In Defense of Emissions Egalitarianism?," in Climate Justice and 
Historical Emissions, ed. Lukas H Meyer and Pranay Sanklecha (Cambridge University Press, 
Forthcoming). 
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Why should we accept emissions egalitarianism? Some theorists suggest that an 
equal distribution of emissions entitlements is simply obviously just. Peter Singer, for 
example, writes:  
 
If we begin by asking, ‘Why should anyone have a greater claim to part of the 
global atmospheric sink than any other?’ then the first and simplest response is 
‘No reason at all’. In other words, everyone has the same claim to part of the 
atmospheric sink as everyone else. This kind of equality seems self-evidently 
fair…245   
 
The intuition behind this claim is that the distribution of emissions entitlements is like the 
distribution of cake slices at a birthday party.246 Intuitively, there is no reason why anyone 
should be allocated a smaller slice of cake than anyone else, at least assuming that each 
of the party-goers are similarly situated (i.e. they are equally hungry, none have already 
had a slice, and so on).  As with cake, so with emissions entitlements, it would be unjust 
to allocate any similarly situated individual an inferior share.  
 A second argument for emissions egalitarianism appeals to considerations 
regarding sufficiency. According to one articulation of this position, we should distinguish 
between “subsistence” and “luxury” emissions. Subsistence emissions are those that are 
necessary for survival, or to meet other basic needs (roughly, the conditions of a life worth 
living). Luxury emissions are those that are emitted to attain goods that are not basic 
needs. Of course, it is somewhat misleading to say that all emissions above those that are 
                                                 
245 Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalisation. 
246 Derek Bell, "Carbon Justice? The Case against a Universal Right to Equal Carbon Emissions," in 
Seeking Environmental Justice, ed. Sarah Wilks (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008), p. 241. 
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necessary to meet basic needs are luxury emissions: for example, heating one’s house to 
a comfortable level is not as much of luxury compared with going for a lavish holiday on 
a cruise-liner, yet it is more of a luxury than using emissions in order to cook food. 
Arguably, then, we should have different responses to degrees of luxury emissions. Even 
still, the basic point remains that all persons should at least have an equal right to 
emissions necessary for their survival. Now, this argument clearly allows that some might 
be entitled to more emissions than others, so long as everyone has emissions necessary 
for their survival.  Therefore, it does not count as an in-principle commitment to emissions 
egalitarianism. Nevertheless, it might (given certain empirical assumptions) contingently 
result in emissions egalitarianism in practice. After all, the proposal holds that when we 
must collectively constrain our emissions in order to stay within a particular target of 
global warming (e.g. 2°C), luxury emissions ought to be cut in priority to subsistence 
emissions.247 Now, it may be true that once everyone is allocated their allowance of 
subsistence emissions, there will be no further luxury emissions left to distribute, since 
we will collectively have run up against the collective emissions limits for staying within 
a justifiable degree of warming. In this case, everyone will contingently have equal 
emissions entitlements. The success of this argument depends on various other factors. 
For example, we would need to know how much each person must emit in order to meet 
their basic needs. And we would also need to know how high the threshold of sufficiency 
should be set.248  
A third justification for emissions egalitarianism claims that the atmosphere is a 
commonly owned natural resource by all the world’s people. As a consequence, all 
                                                 
247 Henry Shue, "Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions," Law & Policy 15, no. 1 (1993). 
248 Simon Caney, "Just Emissions," Philosophy & Public Affairs 40, no. 4 (2012): pp. 263-64. 
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persons have a presumptively equal claim to emissions entitlements.249  Peter Singer, for 
example, talks of the “global atmospheric sink”, which he says, has “for all of human 
history, belonged to human beings in common”.250 Paul Baer, likewise, has claimed that 
“The central argument for equal per capita rights is that the atmosphere is a global 
commons, whose use and preservation are essential to human well being”.251 Indeed, the 
global atmosphere’s safe absorptive capacity does seem to qualify as a commons: it is 
rivalrous, in the sense that one person’s emitting more entails that others must emit less. 
And it is, to a large degree, non-excludable, in the sense that it is difficult to stop anyone 
from emitting more. Global regulation (for example, under a cap-and-trade system) is, 
then, an attempt to ‘dismantle’ the commons—it aims to make the global atmosphere’s 
safe absorptive capacity excludable, by setting enforceable limits on how much each 
person can emit.  
Granting that the atmosphere’s safe absorptive capacity is a global commons, 
what could upset the presumption of an equal claim for all? There would have to be good 
reasons for allowing some to appropriate more of the atmosphere’s safe absorptive 
capacity than others. Are there any such reasons?  
A first line of argument for deviating from the presumption of equality invokes a 
Lockean account of appropriation. John Locke’s account of property entitlements 
famously tells a story about how they arose in a state of nature in which God gave the 
entire world to mankind in common, while also giving them reason and authority to make 
                                                 
249 Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalisation, pp. 30-38; Paul Baer, "Equity, Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, and Global Common Resources," in Climate Change Policy: A Survey, ed. Stephen H. 
Schneider, Armin Rosencranz, and John O. Niles (Washington: Island Press, 2002). Steve Vanderheiden, 
likewise, endorses an “equal shares approach” in Steve Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political 
Theory of Climate Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 226. 
250 Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalisation, pp. 32-35. 
251 Baer, "Equity, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Global Common Resources," p. 401. 
  
171 
 
 
use of the world to satisfy their wants and needs.252 But there was one exception to this 
initial state of common ownership. Each person had property in their self and their labour 
but no one else’s. To justify why commonly owned parts of the world could become 
private-property, Locke argued that a person need only mix their labour (which they own) 
with some unappropriated thing and they would gain an entitlement over it. The 
acquisition of property, however, is subject to the proviso that it must leave “enough, and 
as good, for others”.253 One who invoked this reasoning to justify abandoning emissions 
egalitarianism would need to show that some peoples’ appropriating a greater than equal 
share of the atmosphere’s safe absorptive capacity would leave enough and as good for 
others.  
However, granted the facts of climate change that I have already cited in this 
chapter, this argument is flawed: we have already emitted over half the allowance of 
increased emissions compatible with having a reasonable chance of staying under 2°C of 
warming. For some to emit more means that others must emit less, and this would in 
reality mean that poorer countries must sacrifice development. As Edward Page has 
argued, “…states located in the developing world, face a tragic dilemma between using 
less greenhouse gas than they planned (in order to increase the probability of meeting the 
2°C objective …) or using the same amount of greenhouse gas as they planned (in order 
to achieve something approaching the economic progress enjoyed by developed states 
                                                 
252 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London: Baldwin, 1824 [1690]), pp. 144-50. 
253 Locke provides a nice summary of this argument in the following passage: “Though the earth, and 
all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this nobody 
has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly 
his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his 
labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him 
removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that 
excludes the common right of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, 
no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, 
left in common for others”. Ibid., pp. 145-46. 
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before the climate problem was discovered”.254 In reality, the appropriation of a greater 
than equal share on behalf of developed states has not left enough and as good for others. 
Furthermore, a second problem with the Lockean rationale is that Locke’s account of 
appropriation seems especially ill-suited to justifying ‘atmospheric appropriation’: in 
what sense do we mix our labour with the atmosphere? The claim that we gain emissions 
entitlements by mixing our labour with the atmosphere is jarring in a way that claiming 
we get an entitlement to a house by building it, for example, is not.255  
A second line of argument to overturn the presumption of equality does not 
depend on the same interpretation of ‘enough and as good’ just discussed. According to 
another interpretation of the Lockean proviso, to justify a departure from equality it is 
sufficient that allocating a greater share of emissions to some (i.e. developed states, or 
their citizens) would make everyone better-off. But better off than what? We might 
invoke the following baseline comparison, asking: ‘Are all individuals better-off given a 
greater share of emissions entitlements to developed states than they would have been 
had nobody emitted at all’. Plausibly we are all better off in this sense, since everyone 
requires at least some emissions in order to live a life worth living. But employing this 
baseline is morally implausible in a similar way that it would be morally implausible to 
justify the appropriation of indigenous people’s land during colonisation by pointing out 
that indigenous people are better-off today than they would have been had their land not 
been forcibly taken. Even if the claim about their wellbeing were true, these baselines are 
unduly favourable to the appropriators’ claims. Instead, as Daniel Butt has argued, we 
should compare how well-off indigenous people are today against how well-off they 
                                                 
254 Page, "Give It up for Climate Change: A Defence of the Beneficiary Pays Principle," p. 315. 
255 Baatz and Ott, "In Defense of Emissions Egalitarianism?," pp. 15-16. 
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would have been had the history of interaction between them and colonists proceeded on 
consensual and non-exploitative terms – i.e. supposing that colonists had peacefully 
struck a fair deal with indigenous people and shared land peacefully over time.256  
Therefore, according to a more plausible baseline, we might ask: ‘Are all 
individuals better-off given a greater share of emissions entitlements to some than they 
would have been had all individuals emitted an equal share within safe limits’. But in this 
case, it no longer seems clear that everyone has been made better-off in this sense. While 
it is true that citizens of developing states enjoy some (even large) benefits of 
industrialisation, these benefits have also come at large costs. As Henry Shue writes: 
“Whatever benefits LDCs [less developed countries] have received, they have mostly 
been charged for. No doubt some improvements have been widespread. Yet, except for a 
trickle of aid, all transfers have been charged to the recipients, who have in fact been left 
with an enormous burden of debt, much of it incurred precisely in the effort to purchase 
the good things produced by industrialization”.257 Furthermore, even if industrialisation 
on the part of developed states has benefited many who are now alive, others most 
certainly have been made worse-off in that climate change has already been reported to 
have resulted in premature deaths. A widely quoted World Health Organisation (WHO) 
quantitative assessment “concluded that the effects of the climate change that has 
occurred since the mid-1970s may have caused over 150,000 deaths in 2000”.258 
Furthermore, climate change is expected to result in much greater harm into the future. 
At least some of these people would surely be right to argue that they are not made better-
                                                 
256 Butt, Rectifying International Injustice: Principles of Compensation and Restitution between 
Nations, pp. 102-11. 
257 Shue, "Global Environment and International Inequality," p. 535. 
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off as a result of the over-appropriation of the atmosphere’s absorptive capacity on the 
part of developed states, than they would have been had they (or their states) emitted an 
equal (and collectively lower) share.259 So one cannot appeal to the claim that everyone 
has been made better-off by the greater than equal emissions of developed states (and 
their citizens) to overturn the presumption for emissions egalitarianism.  
So far, in this discussion, I have simply been assuming that there has been a greater 
than equal appropriation of the atmosphere’s safe absorptive capacity by developed states 
(and their citizens). But has there? To justify this assumption we must know, firstly, what 
constitutes the atmosphere’s safe absorptive capacity. And, second, we must know 
whether developed states (and each of their citizens, in per capita terms) have exceeded 
this limit. Answering the first question, Peter Singer suggests the figure of 1 tonne per 
person annually, somewhat arbitrarily chosen to stabilise emissions at their 2002 levels.260 
This figure will do, since any plausible estimation of an equal share (within safe limits) 
will yield the same problematic conclusion. A report from the World Resources Institute 
cites data that “Country-level estimates of CO2 emissions from fossil fuels go back as far 
as 1850. Based on that record, the United States ranks first and the EU second in 
cumulative emissions. Together, the 25 major emitters today account for 83 percent of 
                                                 
259 Notice, this phrasing is consistent with taking the non-identity problem seriously, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Simon Caney objects that present-day persons have not been made better-off by industrialisation 
since without industrialisation they would not exist. Since I am only claiming here that it is plausible for 
some people to make the claim that they have not been made better off, the non-identity problem is not a 
problem for this argument. In fact, the non-identity problem supports my claim, since it suggests another 
reason why present-day persons have not been made better off as a result of unequal emissions 
appropriation. 
260 This is not entirely arbitrary, in light of when Singer wrote this argument. However, even then, he 
could have chosen various other baseline emissions levels. Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalisation, 
p. 39. 
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current global emissions and 90 percent of cumulative global emissions”.261 This figure 
is supported by independent analyses.262 Not only have developed states emitted more 
cumulatively than developing states, but this inequality corresponds to a large per capita 
difference in emissions between developed and developing countries. In 2012, for 
example, Australians on average consumed roughly 18 tonnes, Americans 16 tonnes, and 
Brits 8 tonnes of CO2 emissions. During the same time, the figures were roughly 6 tonnes 
for Chinese, 1.5 tonnes for Indians, and 0.5 tonnes of CO2 for Bangladeshis.
263  On any 
plausible measure, each of the developed states (and, put in per capita terms, each of their 
citizens) contributed vastly more emissions to the atmosphere than developing states. It 
is clear, then, that they have appropriated a greater than equal share. 
So, it is true that developed states (and their citizens, in per capita terms) have 
used more of the atmosphere’s safe absorptive capacity than emissions egalitarianism 
would allow. But how does this link up with a claim about property-violation? The final 
step in the argument is this: Since the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere within safe 
limits constitutes a commonly owned natural resource by all the world’s people, the 
appropriation of a larger than equal share on the part of developed states, therefore, 
constitutes theft of the share owned by some of the world’s poorest people. As Singer has 
argued,  
 
                                                 
261 Baumert, Herzog, and Pershing, "Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and International 
Climate Policy." They cite this data from Marland, Boden, and Andres, "Global, Regional, and National 
Fossil Fuel Co2 Emissions." 
262 For example, another report, by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, gives 
supportive data for 2011: “The top 6 emitting countries and regions … produce 70% of total global 
emissions, whereas the top 25 emitting countries are responsible for more than 80% of total emissions”. 
See Olivier, Janssens-Maenhout, and Peters, "Trends in Global Co2 Emissions: 2012 Report." 
263 I have calculated these figures from the U.S. Energy Information Administration in U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, "International Energy Statistics". 
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…since the wealth of the developed nations is inextricably tied to their prodigious 
use of carbon fuels (a use that began more than 200 years ago and continues 
unchecked today), it is a small step from here to the conclusion that the present 
global distribution of wealth is the result of the wrongful expropriation by a small 
fraction of the world’s population of a resource that belongs to all human 
beings”.264 
 
Since these citizens are in possession of benefits that they have no entitlement to, they 
have been unjustly enriched. They therefore have a pro-tanto duty to relinquish them (or 
their value) towards those from whom their over-appropriation of the atmosphere has 
been at the expense of—namely, the victims of climate change. In practice, this means 
that they have a pro-tanto duty to bear costs of addressing climate change proportional to 
the benefits that they enjoy as a result of property-violation. This duty is ultimately 
justified because a rule requiring the respect of a scheme of property-entitlements, if the 
wide majority tried to internalise it, should be expected to have morally good 
consequences.  
 
2. Scepticism about Emissions Egalitarianism. 
 
My argument so far has been that benefiting-related duties are justified in the case of 
climate change because climate change can be assimilated to a property-violation case. 
In turn, this argument is premised on the claim that all agents have equal entitlements to 
                                                 
264 Emphasis added. Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalisation, p. 35. 
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emit. At first glance, this would seem a secure premise. After all, it is widely accepted 
within climate ethics literature and has been recognised as “the dominant view among 
environmental philosophers and activists”.265 It is also influential in policy circles, often 
discussed under the name of a ‘contraction and convergence’ policy: Contraction, in that 
we must limit the amount of overall greenhouse gases being emitted into the atmosphere; 
Convergence, in that we should move to a scheme upon which all persons have an equal 
allocation of emissions entitlements. However, some moral theorists are sceptical that this 
premise is sound. Derek Bell, for example, claims that it is an “attractive but ultimately 
indefensible idea”.266 Simon Caney, likewise, claims that “we have no reason to accept 
the claim that greenhouse gas emissions should be distributed on an equal per capita 
basis”.267  
 These sceptics’ main worry is that an equal allocation of emissions entitlements 
unduly focuses on merely one aspect of what morally matters for persons.268 What 
matters, they claim, are the fundamental interests that are impacted by climate change, 
not that everyone has an equal share of emissions entitlements. As Caney says, “If 
distributive justice is concerned with the fair share of a “total package” of goods, then we 
have no reason to endorse a principle that applies solely to one particular item, such as 
greenhouse gas emissions. If this is right then ... it does not make sense to refer to the fair 
distribution of greenhouse gases”.269 Similarly, Bell argues that it is because of its effects 
on important human goods and interests that climate change constitutes a morally 
                                                 
265 Caney, "Just Emissions," p. 260. 
266 Bell, "Carbon Justice? The Case against a Universal Right to Equal Carbon Emissions," p. 239. 
267 Caney, "Just Emissions," pp. 299-300. 
268 See: Bell, "Carbon Justice? The Case against a Universal Right to Equal Carbon Emissions."  See 
also, Simon Caney, "Justice and the Distribution of Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Journal of Global Ethics 
5, no. 2 (2009): pp. 130-33. Lastly, see: "Just Emissions." 
269 Original emphasis: "Just Emissions," p. 271. 
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important problem. Bell writes “If we focus on the effects of climate change on humans, 
we need to begin from an account of human goods or human interests that we should 
protect”.270 The idea is that our primary focus is on these goods and our concern about 
climate change (and the distribution of emissions permits) is secondary: we care about 
climate change only because and insofar as it affects these goods. And a focus on the best 
total package will often require trade-offs between the constituents of that package, such 
as between emissions entitlements and other resources. Why endorse equal shares of 
emissions entitlements when persons often have greatly unequal emission needs? Should 
we really limit a person’s emissions to an equal share if, say, because of their geographical 
location or having an intensive disability, an equal share is inadequate for subsistence or 
drastically lowers their quality of life?271 And even if it is adequate for subsistence, why 
not permit some persons to have less emissions entitlements than others if they have been 
adequately compensated by a greater share of other goods? To be clear, this does not 
constitute a reason to abandon egalitarian commitments in general since one may still be 
committed to equality (of whichever kind is relevant) at the level of the total package of 
goods. The important point is that inequality between the subsets will often yield a better 
total package which, in turn, can be the focus of an egalitarian distribution. 
 A related objection to emissions egalitarianism seeks to undermine its ‘global 
commons’ justification which I appealed to. In particular, Bell objects that if we 
understand the atmosphere as a global commons that each person has an equal claim to, 
then we should also think that all persons have an equal claim to many other natural 
resources that make up the global commons – for example, land, oil, seabeds, fish stocks, 
                                                 
270 Bell, "Carbon Justice? The Case against a Universal Right to Equal Carbon Emissions," p. 242. 
271 Ibid., pp. 248-51. See also, Caney, "Justice and the Distribution of Greenhouse Gas Emissions," pp. 
130-33. 
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geostationary orbits, the electromagnetic spectrum, and so on.272 The advocate of the 
global commons argument, of course, may accept this. The problem with accepting this 
argument, however, is that we are then led back to the claim that what matters is overall 
equality of goods (in the case, all natural resources) and these can be traded-off against 
each other.273 As Caney argues, “Someone who is committed to equality of commonly 
held natural resources should embrace a principle granting everyone an equal share of the 
total value of all these global resources combined”, rather than granting a principle that 
requires equality of emissions entitlements alone.274 
One response is that, contrary to these objections, an equal allocation of emissions 
entitlements can, in fact, be justified. One way of supporting this claim would be to show 
that there is some special feature of a policy of equal emissions entitlements that allows 
(or requires) us to consider them in isolation from broader concerns about the best total 
package of goods. The most promising feature, I think, is that a policy of emissions 
egalitarianism is especially practical or realistic, compared to the alternative of 
institutionalising the best total package of goods for all individuals.275 While it is true that 
any reasonable distribution of emissions entitlements will be controversial, it seems much 
more realistic to support equal emissions entitlements than ensuring the best total package 
of goods for all. Recall, for example, that the policy of equal emissions entitlements 
already enjoys support amongst theorists and policymakers. Indeed, some of these 
                                                 
272 "Just Emissions," pp. 268-71. 
273 Bell, "Carbon Justice? The Case against a Universal Right to Equal Carbon Emissions," p. 252. 
274 Caney, "Just Emissions," p. 271. 
275 Of course, there are other alternatives to both emissions egalitarianism and institutionalising the best 
total package of goods for all individuals. Caney’s own pragmatic proposal is that a global scheme of 
emissions should be based on a ‘minimal’ theory of justice, which does not require policy-makers to agree 
to contentious substantive moral commitments. See, ibid., pp. 291-99. For an argument that emissions 
egalitarianism offers the better pragmatic approach than Caney’s alternative, see: Baatz and Ott, "In 
Defense of Emissions Egalitarianism?." 
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theorists endorse an equal shares approach because it offers a pragmatic compromise. 
Singer writes: “I propose, both because of its simplicity, and hence its suitability as a 
political compromise, and because it seems likely to increase global welfare, that we 
support the … equal per capita future entitlements to a share of the capacity of the 
atmospheric sink…”.276 And others have likewise argued that equal emissions 
entitlements should be endorsed on practical, if not principled grounds.277 Furthermore, 
one major advantage of emissions egalitarianism is that it can plausibly play a role in, 
what Rawls called, a public conception of justice. Rawls argued that when a conception 
of justice is publically known to be satisfied for a period of time, people subject to the 
requirements of that conception “tend to develop a desire to act in accordance with these 
principles and to do their part in institutions which exemplify them”.278 Furthermore, he 
argued, “…a strong point in favour of a conception of justice is that it generates its own 
support”.279  Emissions egalitarianism is likely to generate its own support, not only 
because it is already widely accepted by theorists of climate change, but because it 
provides a relatively straightforward measure that different states (and their citizens) can 
employ to check whether other agents are playing their part in constraining their 
emissions. In this sense, a point in favour of emissions egalitarianism is that it can play 
this public role. It is much harder to see how an institutional alternative that mandated the 
best total package of goods for all (allowing trade-offs between different constituents of 
this package) could play a role as a public conception of justice, in this sense.  
                                                 
276 Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalisation, p. 43. 
277 See Baatz and Ott, "In Defense of Emissions Egalitarianism?," pp. 18-26. 
278 Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, p. 154. 
279 Ibid. See also, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), p. 8. 
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One might counter that even if there were pragmatic considerations in favour of 
emissions egalitarianism, this proposal would still be objectionable on moral grounds, 
since some who need a greater share of emissions entitlements to have a reasonable 
quality of life (for example, because they have an intensive disability) would still be 
disadvantaged by this policy. But starting by giving everyone equal emissions 
entitlements does not mean that everyone must end with equal emissions: those who need 
more emissions entitlements could buy entitlements off others who need them less (for 
example, in a cap and trade system). And if they are unfairly badly-off to begin with, 
others may be morally required to bear the costs of purchasing their additional emissions 
entitlements (for example, due to their greater ability to pay, or because they are somehow 
related to the disadvantage the badly-off person suffers). Emissions egalitarianism is, 
therefore, not committed to the view that the badly off must suffer with insufficient 
emissions entitlements to meet their basic needs (and even to have a better quality of life 
beyond this). 
 To expand on this point, it is important to note that a defence of emissions 
egalitarianism does not mean that we should neglect that different agents may be liable 
to bear different costs of addressing climate change due to their differing relationships to 
it. For example, endorsing equal emissions entitlements does not require abandoning 
principles of responsibility such as contributor-pays, beneficiary-pays, or the ability to 
pay principle. It is compatible, for instance, that everyone has an equal emissions 
entitlement but that those who have benefited from (or contributed to, or have a greater 
ability to pay for addressing) climate change should bear greater costs associated with 
reducing emissions below the appropriate limit. Plausibly, that is, they should pay the 
costs of the victims of climate change having to reduce (or limit) their own emissions so 
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that they stay within an equal share. On the view I have outlined here, an equal allocation 
of emissions entitlements is the morally best policy for distributing emissions, but how 
the costs of enacting this policy should be distributed is an open question. And the answer 
to this question may certainly appeal to broader concerns about agents’ differential 
relationships to climate change and broader considerations of distributive justice. Indeed, 
the point of this thesis is to defend the claim that the beneficiary pays principle should 
play a part in determining how the costs of addressing climate change should be 
distributed. Once the distinction between a policy of distributing emissions entitlements 
and the costs associated with this policy is recognised, it is apparent that there need be no 
ultimate conflict between emissions egalitarianism and a concern with the best total 
package of goods. Emissions entitlements should be allocated equally, but the costs 
associated with this policy should take into account wider concerns with distributive 
justice. 
 A second response to these objections is that, even if emissions egalitarianism 
cannot be defended by pragmatic considerations, this does not mean that climate change 
cannot be treated as a case of property-violation—we would just need to understand 
entitlements in a different way. Suppose, then, that we accept that what really matters for 
individuals is the best total package of goods and that this may allow unequal emissions 
entitlements, and that we should accept a policy guided by these considerations. This 
would just mean that those who possess tainted holdings in general (that is, a greater total 
package of goods than they are entitled to) would have a duty to relinquish these tainted 
holdings. In other words, the beneficiary pays principle would allocate duties to 
beneficiaries who were unjustly enriched by enjoying a greater total package of goods 
than they are entitled to. Furthermore, it would still be true that there must be some 
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allocation of emissions entitlements or another if we are to limit global emissions to a 
safe level, even if these are unequal. In principle, a given individual could exceed their 
emissions entitlements – whatever amount of emissions they are allocated by the best 
overall distribution of goods – and they would then have a duty to give up the value of 
the benefits associated with this. Even at its most damaging, then, the objection does not 
undermine the application of beneficiary pays to climate change as a property-violation 
case. Rather, it just makes a difference to how we should determine what amount of 
appropriation of the atmosphere’s absorptive capacity would be counted as ‘tainted’, for 
any given beneficiary. 
 
3. Benefiting as a Motivational-Cause of Climate Change 
 
A second way in which benefiting-related duties can be justified in climate change is by 
assimilating climate change to a motivational-cause case. I have argued that benefiting-
related duties establish important incentives in motivational-cause cases in the following 
way: if beneficiaries were allocated duties to relinquish their benefits that they receive as 
a result of wrongdoing, and if the wide majority tried to internalise this practice, then 
perpetrators who commit wrongdoing in order to benefit beneficiaries would no longer 
have that reason to do so. After all, why perform wrongdoing to benefit another, if they 
will be allocated duties to relinquish the benefits? And since these duties undermine 
incentives for wrongdoing, if the wide majority tried to internalise a practice of allocating 
them, they should be expected to have morally good consequences. 
How might climate change be assimilated to a motivational-cause case? One 
would need to show, first, that some agents act wrongly with respect to climate change 
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and, second, that they act in this wrongful way in order to benefit others.  I will argue that 
both of these conditions can be met. In particular, I will argue that decision-makers in 
wealthy democratic societies act wrongly in the sense that they fail to introduce or endorse 
policies that constrain their citizens’ emissions to an equal share of the global 
atmosphere’s safe absorptive capacity. Furthermore, they act wrongly in this way in order 
to benefit their citizens.  
To support the first claim, I have already cited evidence in this chapter that 
developed states (and their citizens, in per capita terms) have appropriated a much larger 
share of the atmosphere’s safe absorptive capacity than emissions egalitarianism would 
allow, whatever quantity of emissions precisely constitutes this equal share. The citizens 
who emit these exorbitant amount of emissions are not acting illegally by their domestic 
laws – the governments and legislature of their countries simply do not require their 
citizens to drastically cut their emissions. For example, there are no policies that require 
Australians to cut their emissions by 17 tonnes, Americans by 15 tonnes, and Brits by 7 
tonnes, in order to limit their emissions to an equal share of 1 tonne per annum. Decision-
makers, by failing to constrain their citizens’ emissions to an equal share, act wrongly 
with respect to climate change.  
But do decision-makers really act wrongly by not constraining their citizens’ 
emissions? One reason for thinking not is that it would be unacceptably demanding on 
the citizens of developed states to reduce their emissions by as much as I have suggested. 
This level of reduction would be greatly dislocating, requiring huge changes and 
sacrifices regarding their lifestyles. Therefore, decision-makers do not act wrongly by 
failing to constrain their citizens’ emissions even though these emissions vastly exceed 
what emissions egalitarianism allows. After all, demandingness is often invoked in the 
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case of global poverty as a way of limiting the costs that affluent persons can be required 
to bear in order to address the suffering of others. Plausibly, for example, I am not morally 
required to donate so much of my money to aid organisations such that any greater 
donation would result in my being worse-off than those I aim to aid. That would be too 
demanding.280 
But this argument is problematic in the present case for three reasons. First, when 
we consider a complaint that a duty is overly demanding on the person who is assigned 
that duty, we should also consider how demanding it would be on others were that duty 
not to be assigned in this manner. For example, a duty may be demanding for me if it 
requires that I miss an important job interview in order to save the life of someone I pass 
on my way to that interview. But it would be more demanding on that person were I not 
to be assigned this duty. My point here is not that there are no limits on how demanding 
a duty can be.281 Rather, my claim is that it is a plausible feature of morality that the more 
demanding it is on others if I am not assigned a duty, the weaker my appeal to 
demandingness becomes.  
It is this relationship between what is at stake for the potential duty-bearer and 
potential rights-bearers that makes the appeal to demandingness to undermine emissions 
egalitarianism implausible. Failure to constrain our collective emissions below a 
reasonably safe limit is expected to cause severe climate-related harms for present and, 
more intensely, future people. Furthermore, these harms will be iterated as each new 
generation comes into existence and confronts a world characterised by insufficiently 
                                                 
280 Note, some philosophers are sceptical of appeals to demandingness in the first place. See Robert E 
Goodin, "Demandingness as a Virtue," The Journal of Ethics 13, no. 1 (2009). 
281 Indeed, I previously argued that rule-consequentialists would endorse limits on how demanding 
duties can be and that this provides a reason to reject a rule requiring each individual to act according to 
act-consequentialism—that is, maximise overall good consequences. 
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unmitigated global warming. Due to this ‘iteration across future generations’ feature, 
appeals to demandingness in the case of climate change seem weaker than appeals to 
demandingness with respect to duties to our contemporaries. So much is at stake in the 
future, if affluent persons do not constrain their emissions to an equal share now. In a 
recent paper, Brian Berkey argues that both future climate change and contemporary 
global poverty may entail that affluent citizens’ appeals to demandingness are weak: 
“…there does not seem to be any principled reason to think that we can be obligated to 
make very large sacrifices in order to prevent, say, many billions of people from facing 
these ills [as in the case of climate change]…, but not in order to prevent merely several 
billion from facing similar ills [as in the case of contemporary global poverty]…”.282 I do 
not take a stand on this claim. My point is only that we have greater reason to prevent the 
suffering of many billions of people, than we do of many billions fewer, so the appeal to 
demandingness is weaker in the former than the latter case, even if it is weak in both 
cases.  
Second, it is often claimed that there is a significant moral difference between 
doing and allowing harm. Insofar as we can make sense of the claim that a failure to limit 
emissions to an equal share would do harm to contemporary and/or future persons, then 
the appeal to demandingness seems weaker than if our failure to reduce emissions merely 
constitutes allowing harm. Suppose that it would be very demanding on us if we were 
unable to dam a river to increase our own water supply, where the consequence of 
damming the river would be that many people downstream died of thirst. Suppose that 
we could survive without damming the river, but that it would mean that we would have 
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to reign-in our high-consumption lifestyles. In the same way that appealing to 
demandingness to justify damming the river is implausible in this case because of the 
harm that it would cause, it is similarly implausible that we can appeal to demandingness 
to avoid cutting our emissions severely in the case of climate change.  
However, one might worry that it is impossible to make sense of the claim that a 
failure to limit emissions to an equal share would do harm to future persons, due to the 
non-identity problem. And since this failure does not harm future persons, I cannot appeal 
to the distinction between doing and allowing harm to defeat an appeal to demandingness. 
After all, the future persons who will exist if we do not constrain our emissions are not 
worse-off than they would be if we limited our emissions to an equal share, since they 
would then not come into existence.  But there are two problems with this objection. The 
first is that a failure to constrain emissions to an equal share harms our contemporaries, 
even if it does not harm future persons. The second problem is that we may appeal to a 
distinct concept of harm, as argued in Chapter 2. According to a non-comparative account 
of harm,283 future persons that are brought into existence by our failure to constrain 
emissions to an equal share may be caused to be in a bad state, even if they are not made 
worse-off. And this is enough to say that they have been harmed by our emissions. Lastly, 
some counterfactual accounts of harming may evade the non-identity problem anyway, 
such as the account appealed to by Daniel Butt discussed in Chapter 2.284  
Third, recall my earlier claim that emissions egalitarianism only requires that all 
persons begin from a position of equal emissions entitlements. Again, this does not mean 
                                                 
283 As developed by Shiffrin, "Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of 
Harm."; "Harm and Its Moral Significance,"  Legal Theory 18, no. 03 (2012); Harman, "Can We Harm and 
Benefit in Creating?."; "Harming as Causing Harm." 
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that everyone must end with equal emissions: those who need more emissions 
entitlements could buy entitlements off others who need them less (for example, in a cap 
and trade system). Therefore, limiting affluent citizens’ emissions to an equal share need 
not be as demanding as it initially appeared – if these affluent citizens are willing to pay 
the market price, they can keep their current level of emissions. It would still be 
demanding, of course, that they may be required to pay extra market costs to keep their 
current level of emissions. But it does not seem unfairly demanding in a way that would 
justify not constraining our collective emissions.  
Note, this argument also offers an effective response to an independent objection 
that the hardships imposed on citizens of affluent states under emissions egalitarianism 
would render this scheme infeasible, since few affluent citizens would be willing to 
drastically cut their high-consumption lifestyle. Under a cap and trade system, starting 
from a position of emissions egalitarianism, the rich could maintain their high-
consumption life-style if they offered adequate compensation to poorer states – in other 
words, they would need to pay the market price for others reducing their emissions below 
an equal share.  
So far, I have been examining whether decision-makers in wealthy-democratic 
states could appeal to demandingness to refute the claim that they act wrongly by failing 
to constrain their citizens’ emissions. I have argued that appeals to demandingness in this 
case are implausible because (i) there is vastly more at stake for successive future 
generations if present-day people do not constrain their emissions than there is at stake 
for present-day people if they do constrain their emissions, (ii) appeals to demandingness 
are not ordinarily able to justify violating a duty not to do harm to others, as our emissions 
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are expected to do, and (iii) there are mechanisms (such as cap-and-trade) that would 
make constraining emissions much less (and not unduly) demanding.  
However, there is a separate objection to the claim that decision-makers in 
wealthy democratic societies act wrongly in failing to introduce or endorse policies that 
constrain their citizens’ emissions to an equal share. This objection claims that only those 
decision-makers who failed to introduce or endorse appropriate climate policies after 
some relevant point in time in which the problem climate change was relatively well 
established should be considered to have acted wrongly, since decision-makers before 
this time could (and should) not have been aware of the impacts of their policies on 
climate change. Therefore, only beneficiaries who enjoyed benefits from emissions 
policies after this time should be considered motivational-causes of wrongdoing. This 
argument succeeds in demonstrating that only some of the benefits enjoyed by 
beneficiaries can be assimilated to a motivational-cause case. Nevertheless, it is 
significant that benefits enjoyed after the time in which decision-makers should have been 
aware of the impacts of their policies on climate change can trigger beneficiary pays. 
The second part of the argument that climate change constitutes a motivational-
cause case was to show that the decision-makers, who act wrongly by failing to constrain 
their citizens’ emissions, do so in order to benefit these citizens. Support for this claim 
comes from literature that claims democracies possess particular features that make it 
harder to implement meaningful emissions reductions policies. It has been noted by 
various authors that democracies suffer from what has been called ‘short-termism’.285 
According to David Held and Angus Hervey, for example, “The electoral cycles tends to 
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focus policy debate on short-term political gains and satisfying the median voter”. The 
problem with this is that politicians may be unwilling to implement important but 
unpopular policy decisions out of concern for their own re-election. Holly Lawford-Smith 
similarly criticises “elected representatives’ prioritising of re-election over environmental 
protection” and “governments’ failure to lead social change by attempting to introduce 
new policy without mandate”.286 This problem is particularly pernicious in the case of 
climate change, since the obvious demographic that would be opposed to a government’s 
failure to implement stringent climate change policies – i.e. those who will bear the 
preponderance of the costs of failure – are future generations who, clearly, have no 
influence over the present-day electoral cycle.287 The problem is also exacerbated because 
there are many present people with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and 
passing the costs of inaction on climate change onto future people.288 
The point here is not that democracies are worse at implementing stringent 
environmental policies than other (authoritarian) systems of government – the evidence 
regarding that claim is mixed.289 And, in any case, authoritarian government should 
obviously be avoided for other decisive reasons. Rather, the point is that even if 
democracies were better, in general, than other forms of government at implementing 
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stringent environmental policies, structural features may nevertheless make them unlikely 
to achieve the drastic emissions reductions needed to limit warming to a reasonable level.  
To summarise, my claim is that governments of developed states endorse over-
appropriation of the atmosphere’s absorptive capacity at least partly because it benefits 
their citizens by maintaining their high-emissions dependent lifestyles. They endorse 
these policies at least partly because they expect their citizens, on balance, to support 
them since they are beneficial. The hypothesis is that serious reductions in emissions is 
unlikely because governments believe they would be voted out (or not voted in) were they 
to drastically lower their citizen’s lifestyles. Therefore, governments’ failure to constrain 
their citizens’ emissions, itself, constitutes a motivational-cause case: they are 
perpetrating an injustice intended to benefit their citizens. Since benefiting-related duties 
can be justified in property-violation and motivational-cause cases, beneficiary pays can 
justify pro-tanto duties in the case of climate change.  
One might object that there are various methods, other than allocating benefiting-
related duties in motivational-cause cases, of undermining incentives for governments to 
prioritise re-election at the expense of stringent climate change policies. For example, we 
might alternatively attempt to undermine incentives for climate policy failure by 
improving citizens’ preferences and reactions to governments’ attempts to introduce 
strong climate policy. Held and Hervey, for example, argue that moving from 
conventional styles of representative democracy to a new model of ‘deliberative 
democracy’ “…can, in principle, increase the quality, legitimacy and therefore the 
sustainability of environmental policy decisions”.290 This is because, they say, 
                                                 
290 Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
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deliberative democracy involves increased public deliberation, discussion, and defence 
of values and preferences amongst equal citizens. And empirical work does support the 
claim that citizens do change their preferences when confronted with new information, 
evidence, and debate.291 If we can improve citizens’ political preferences, then we could 
establish incentives for governments to introduce stringent action on climate change.  
However, the problem with this objection is that, rather than providing a reason 
to reject beneficiary pays, it offers a reason to also accept other measures that reduce 
incentives for wrongdoing. In arguing that deliberative democracy would incentivise 
better political decision-making, the objection grants the importance of such incentives. 
Why not endorse both benefiting-related duties in motivational-cause cases and 
deliberative democracy, if the empirical case holds for both? A second worry with this 
objection is that it makes a problem of regress likely: perhaps there are good reasons to 
transition to a democratic system, i.e. deliberative democracy, in which only citizens’ 
better-informed values and preferences count. But in order to convince citizens to permit 
their representatives to fundamentally change the democratic system may, itself, require 
that they are better-informed, since they may be unwilling to depart from conventional 
representative democracy (I note that theorists disagree on the form that deliberative 
democracy should take, and this worry may not apply to less radical departures from 
conventional representative democracy). The regress problem, in other words, is that we 
already need better-informed citizens to enable a transition to a democratic system that 
makes them better-informed so that they then demand strong action on climate change 
                                                 
291 David Held, Models of Democracy, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), pp. 247-55. 
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from their governments, but what gives them the better-informed values and preferences 
to begin with? 
Another worry about the argument I have presented is that by supporting political 
parties that do not implement appropriate climate change policies citizens may also be 
contributors to the injustice. Therefore, they are not merely innocent beneficiaries of 
others’ injustice. In other words, just as we may criticise decision-makers’ failure to 
introduce legislation that constrains their citizens’ emissions due to their concern for re-
election, we can likewise criticise citizens for failure to take their own climate-related 
duties seriously. For example, Holly Lawford-Smith argues that many individual citizens 
are morally culpable for “selective attention with respect to the scientific facts about 
climate change” and also for “failure to put pressure on their elected representatives to 
introduce new (or better) emissions-reduction policy”.292 If citizens are culpable of 
failures to pressure their representatives, they are contributors to the problem and not 
merely beneficiaries. In this case, we can appeal to other principles of responsibility – 
namely, the contributor pays principle – to assign duties to citizens of affluent states. 
However, nothing I have said in this thesis requires that beneficiary pays is incompatible 
with contributor pays. In fact, I have argued that both principles play an important role in 
determining our responsibilities towards addressing climate change. The justification I 
have developed for allocating benefiting-related duties in motivational-cause cases – i.e. 
in terms of the expected effects this practice would have, if the wide majority tried to 
internalise it – can assign duties to innocent beneficiaries, but it need not rely on the fact 
that they are innocent. In other words, my argument for beneficiary pays can likewise 
                                                 
292 Lawford-Smith, "Benefiting from Failures to Address Climate Change," p. 393. 
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justify duties for individuals who are both contributors to and beneficiaries of injustice. 
These people would then have contribution-related and benefiting-related duties to take 
on costs to address the harms of climate change. If this is right, then they should be 
allocated more stringent and demanding duties than if they had merely innocently 
benefited from others’ injustice. 
 
4. Benefiting and Pro-Attitudes towards Climate Change 
 
In the previous chapter, I also argued that rule-consequentialism can justify the allocation 
of benefiting-related duties in pro-attitude cases since in these cases, by retaining benefits, 
a beneficiary either holds or expresses an attitude towards wrongdoing that 
characteristically risks further wrongdoing. When I made this argument in Chapter 5, I 
discussed the example: 
 
Supervisor: A rogue employee secretly engages in insider trading and thereby 
increases the company’s profits. His supervisor receives a commission of these 
profits, so benefits from the insider trading.293 
 
I argued that it is the fact that retaining the benefits risks further wrongdoing that explains 
why the supervisor has a duty to relinquish them (and I acknowledged there might be 
other reasons why the supervisor should do so too). In this case, the beneficiary has a duty 
to relinquish their benefits not because of the attitude they actually hold, but because, 
                                                 
293 Green, "Benefiting from Evil: An Incipient Moral Problem in Human Stem Cell Research," p. 549. 
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were they to fail to relinquish the benefits, it would express a pro-attitude towards 
wrongdoing to others, which characteristically incentivises further wrongs.  
 I also claimed that this argument had implications for real-life cases, and I cited 
exploitative labour as an obvious example. I claimed that while it doesn’t seem plausible 
to think that most citizens of affluent countries who benefit from exploitative labour (by 
being able to purchase cheap products) welcome, intend, or encourage wrongdoing, it is 
very plausible that they are indifferent to, or even condone, the exploitative labour from 
which they benefit. Factories which engage in exploitative labour are set up because they 
are profitable. And they are profitable because a great many consumers are willing to buy 
their products and are unwilling to sanction companies that engage in these wrongful 
practices. These consumers do not, by and large, switch to alternative products which 
may be less harmful. The attitudes of a great many consumers towards wrongdoing really 
do risk further wrongdoing, by incentivising exploitative labour. 
 My argument now is that climate change can be assimilated to a pro-attitude case 
since an analogous argument can be given for many beneficiaries of climate change. 
Recall, in the previous section I argued that decision-makers in wealthy states fail to 
introduce or endorse policies that constrain their citizens’ emissions by the appropriate 
amount and that (at least part of) the explanation for this failure is that politicians prioritise 
re-election over stringent climate change policies. If this is right, then it must be the case 
that politicians believe that their citizens would be unwilling to support stringent cuts to 
their own emissions, undermining their high consumption lifestyles. Indeed, as Lawford-
Smith argued, many citizens are culpable in failing to pressure their representatives to 
support such policies. It must be the case, then, that enough citizens express an attitude 
(whether overtly, by protesting attempts to cut emissions or less overtly, or tacitly, by 
  
196 
 
 
giving votes to governments even when they fail to cut emissions) that encourage their 
representatives not to take strong action on climate change. Many of these citizens may 
not welcome or intend their government to fail to legislate emissions reductions (though 
there are plenty of people who are outright hostile to action on climate change, whose 
attitudes would properly be characterised in this way), it is very plausible that many 
citizens are indifferent to the harms that climate change is expected to cause. What else 
could explain why governments who fail to drastically cut their citizens emissions keep 
getting re-elected? If this is correct, then climate change can be assimilated to a pro-
attitude case, in which benefiting-related duties can be justified. 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter concludes my argument that beneficiary pays applies in the case of climate 
change, allocating pro-tanto duties for beneficiaries to bear costs associated with 
addressing its associated harms. The argument that I have developed is consistently based 
on the claim that a rule requiring the allocation of benefiting-related duties in some cases 
– namely, property-violation, motivational-cause, and pro-attitude cases – should, if the 
wide majority of people tried to internalise it, be expected to result in morally good 
consequences. Since climate change can be assimilated to each of these cases, beneficiary 
pays plays an important role in the allocation of duties to address climate change.   
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Chapter 7: General Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have defended beneficiary pays as a principle of responsibility for 
allocating the costs of addressing climate change. In this general conclusion, I retrace the 
substantive argument that I developed over the course of the thesis. I then discuss some 
remaining questions for future research, indicating how the positive defence of 
beneficiary pays that I developed in this thesis may guide some of that future research. 
In Chapter 1, I surveyed recent empirical literature and argued that climate change 
raises an important moral problem: who should bear the costs of addressing its associated 
harms? I argued that the answer to this question involves weighing the duties assigned by 
various compelling principles of responsibility: namely, the ability to pay principle, the 
contributor pays principle, and the beneficiary pays principle. I then discussed various 
motivations for the beneficiary pays principle that have been developed in recent 
literature. 
In Chapter 2, co-authored with Christian Barry, we examined what we take to be 
the most challenging objections that have been presented to the beneficiary-pays 
principle. While we did not attempt to develop a positive argument for beneficiary pays, 
we suggested various ways in which the principle might be plausibly interpreted so that 
it can avoid these objections. Beneficiary pays remains a principle of moral and 
potentially practical importance for allocating the costs of addressing human-induced 
climate change. A major innovation of this chapter is our account of how the concept of 
benefiting should be understood in order to trigger beneficiary pays. We argue that we 
should be pluralists regarding the concept of benefiting, endorsing a ‘non-comparative’ 
test as a sufficient condition to trigger beneficiary pays while at the same time accepting 
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that particular ‘counterfactual’ tests may constitute other, independent, sufficient 
conditions.   
In Chapter 3, I examined four possible (and exhaustive) ways of formulating 
beneficiary pays and gave a prima facie case that the most plausible interpretation of this 
principle would hold that the moral relevance of benefiting reduces to some other factor, 
and that duties should only be allocated in the presence of some other factor. The final 
section of this chapter examined – and rejected – four existing proposals regarding when 
beneficiary pays is triggered to allocate duties, paving the way for my own positive 
account in the next chapter. 
In Chapter 4, I developed a positive defence of the beneficiary pays principle. I 
defended beneficiary pays by arguing that a morality which incorporates the practice of 
allocating benefiting-related duties in some kinds of cases, if the wide majority of people 
tried to internalise it, should be expected to result in morally better consequences than a 
morality that does not. In particular, I argued that benefiting-related duties should be 
allocated in property-violation and motivational-cause cases. On my account, the only 
reason why we should allocate these duties is because of the expected effects that such a 
practice would have, if the wide majority tried to internalise it. This chapter thus had 
important upshots both for theorists who are interested in how we should allocate 
responsibility between agents in particular scenarios in which people benefit from 
wrongdoing or injustice and for theorists who are independently interested in rule-
consequentialist theory. The important upshot for the former is that a convincing rationale 
can be developed for the claim that the beneficiary pays principle plays an important role 
in allocating responsibility to address harm in some types of cases. The important upshot 
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for the latter is that rule-consequentialists are committed to applications of their theory 
that they may not have been aware of. 
In Chapter 5, I examined whether, and how, beneficiaries’ attitudes might make a 
moral difference to the duties that they should be allocated. I argued that the same rule-
consequentialist rationale for beneficiary pays that I have already developed in the 
previous chapter is, without modification, also able to justify why a beneficiary’s holding 
or expressing pro-attitudes towards wrongdoing is itself wrong, and why such 
beneficiaries in turn should be allocated duties to relinquish their benefits. Rule-
consequentialism can also justify why some attitudes are more relevant than others, in the 
sense that they more greatly increase the stringency and demandingness of the duty that 
the beneficiary should be allocated than other attitudes.  
In Chapter 6, I argued that climate change should be assimilated to a property-
violation, motivational-cause, and pro-attitude case. I argued that climate change is a 
property-violation case because affluent states (and their citizens, in per capita terms) 
have wrongfully appropriated a greater share of the atmosphere’s safe absorptive capacity 
than a fair distribution would allow. Climate change is a motivational-cause case since 
decision-makers in democratic states are motivated to fail to enact morally defensible 
climate change policies in order to benefit their citizens, out of a concern for re-election. 
Lastly, climate change is a pro-attitude case because many citizens either hold or express 
attitudes that display indifference towards the harms of climate change from which their 
benefits derive (for example, citizens routinely fail to vote against parties that do not enact 
morally defensible climate change policies, and vote for these parties instead). And since 
I argued in Chapters 4 and 5 that beneficiary pays can be justified in these cases, I claim 
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that the beneficiary pays principle is justified as playing an important role in allocating 
the costs of addressing climate change. 
In short, I have argued that the beneficiary pays principle plays an important role 
in determining how the costs of addressing climate change should be allocated between 
various agents. Having justified this claim, the central aim of the thesis has been satisfied. 
However, there are important questions that remain for further research. I will finish this 
thesis by pointing to some of these questions, and noting how my rule-consequentialist 
rationale for beneficiary pays may help in answering them. 
A first question for remaining research is whether my rule-consequentialist 
rationale for allocating benefiting-related duties can be extended to any other types of 
cases besides property-violation, motivational-cause, and pro-attitude cases. After all, my 
argument is committed to the claim that whenever the practice of allocating beneficiaries 
duties to relinquish their benefits should, if the wide majority of people tried to internalise 
it, be expected to result in optimally good consequences, then that allocation of duties 
will be justified. While the types of cases I have discussed are of central concern, there 
may be other important types of cases in which benefiting-related duties should also be 
allocated. My rule-consequentialist rationale is helpful in determining whether there are 
any additional relevant types of cases: We need only determine whether, in some new 
type of case, the practice of allocating duties should be expected, if the wide majority of 
people tried to internalise it, to result in optimally good consequences.  
A second question for remaining research is whether there are other practical 
issues additional to climate change that can be assimilated to property-violation, 
motivational-cause, and pro-attitude cases. After all, it is an implication of my argument 
that the beneficiary pays principle would be triggered in any such cases, justifying the 
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allocation of pro-tanto duties to beneficiaries to relinquish their gains. Some practical 
issues naturally come to mind: for example, it is plausible that some (perhaps many) 
persons have been unjustly enriched by colonialism, that they were the intended 
beneficiaries of its associated wrongs and injustices, and that at least some people have 
attitudes of indifference to those wrongs by which they benefit. If so, beneficiary pays 
should be extended to that case according to my argument. Further research should be 
done on the precise details of this extension and what other cases my argument for 
beneficiary pays would apply to.  
A third question for remaining research concerns who it is that beneficiaries (who 
have been allocated duties to relinquish their benefits) should be required to relinquish 
their benefits to. In property-violation, there seems to be an obvious answer. In these 
cases, the duty to relinquish benefits is explained via entitlements to property. The 
beneficiary should, if they can, return the (value of the) benefits to victims who retain an 
entitlement to that property. Of course, various factors may complicate this response: the 
victim may be dead, it may be unclear who the victim is, or it may be for pragmatic 
reasons infeasible to return the benefits. If so, the obvious answer will not apply. And 
then other responses might be justifiable: For example, Robert Goodin advocates a 
plausible proposal that the benefits should be put into a common pool to be used for 
general distributive justice purposes.294 But how should we understand what these general 
distributive justice purposes are? Ultimately, on my view, benefiting-related duties are 
justified on rule-consequentialist grounds. Therefore, benefits should be relinquished 
according to whatever rule should be expected to have the best consequences, if the wide 
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majority of people tried to internalise it. There are various plausible options that may 
align with this rationale: it might be best, as a general rule, to relinquish benefits towards 
worse-off rather than better-off victims, since the law of diminishing marginal returns 
suggests these benefits would be more valuable to worse-off rather than better-off victims. 
Distributing in this way, therefore, should be expected to result in the best consequences. 
A fourth remaining question for future research concerns the non-comparative 
account of benefiting that was developed in Chapter 2. We argued, “We can similarly say 
that an agent is benefited if they are caused to be in a particular kind of good state—for 
example, if they are caused to be in pleasure, in mental or physical comfort, to be alive, 
and so on”. And we then appealed to this account to justify the claim that present people 
enjoy various benefits produced by a history of industrialisation, even if they are not better 
off than they would have been had industrialisation not occurred in the manner it 
historically did. While these examples we picked clearly have intuitive appeal – and 
mirror the examples that Elizabeth Harman puts on her list of bad states when discussing 
non-comparative harms – it would be helpful to develop a principled explanation of what 
is it, precisely, that makes the relevant examples good states? Harman’s account of non-
comparative harms does not help answer this question, since she does not provide any 
further explanation of what constitutes the relevant bad states on her list. Further research 
must be done, therefore, on how we should precisely understand what constitutes being 
in a good state, which any non-comparative account of benefiting must take a stand on. 
One potential direction for this research would be to appeal to Seana Shiffrin’s account 
of non-comparative harms. On her account, the relevant bad states are constituted by a 
“significant chasm, conflict, or other form of significant disconnect between one’s will 
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and one’s life”.295 For example, this account can explain why I have been harmed if I 
broke my finger, even if I would have been worse-off had I not broken my finger (since, 
suppose, I would then have broken my leg instead). After all, there is a significant chasm 
between my will (I presumably did not want to break my finger or my leg) and my life (I 
did, in fact, break my finger). It remains to be seen whether something similar could be 
plausibly said regarding non-comparative benefiting, and how the details of this account 
should be filled in. 
 
   
                                                 
295 Shiffrin, "Harm and Its Moral Significance," p. 384. 
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